never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power. Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen, 243, 256, 259. Simpson v. State, 92 Georgia, 41. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 356. Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Massachusetts, 1, 6, 18. We may assume therefore that Daily is a criminal under the laws of Michigan.

Of course we must admit that it does not follow that Daily is a fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 712. On the other hand, however, we think it plain that the criminal need not do within the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest elsewhere, he becomes a fugitive from justice, when the crime is complete, if not before. In re Cook, 49 Fed. Rep. 833, 843, 844. Ex parte Hoffstot, 180 Fed. Rep. 240, 243. In re William Sultan, 115 No. Car. 57. For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a State into a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State after having incurred guilt there, Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, and his overt act becomes retrospectively guilty when the contemplated result ensues. Thus in this case offering the bid and receiving the acceptance were material steps in the scheme, they were taken in Michigan, and they were established in their character of guilty acts when the plot was carried to the end, even if the intent with which those steps were taken did not make Daily guilty before. Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396.

We have given more attention to the question of time than it is entitled to, because of the seeming exactness of

the evidence. But a shorter and sufficient answer is to repeat that the case is not to be tried on habeas corpus, and that when, as here, it appears that the prisoner was in the State in the neighborhood of the time alleged it is enough.

Judgment reversed, prisoner remanded.

MARCHIE TIGER v. WESTERN INVESTMENT COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

No. 60. Argued November 30, December 1, 2, 1910; restored to docket for reargument January 23, 1911; reargued March 1, 2, 1911.-Decided May 15, 1911.

The obvious purpose of § 8 of the act of May 27, 1908, c. 199, 35 Stat. 312, was to continue supervision over the right of full-blood Indians to dispose of lands by will, and to require conveyances of interests of full-blood Indians in inherited lands to be approved by a competent court.

When several acts of Congress are passed touching the same subjectmatter, subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in interpretation of the prior legislation.

In passing the enabling act for the admission of Oklahoma of June 16, 1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, Congress preserved the authority of the Government of the United States over the Indians, their lands and property, which it had prior to the passage of that act.

The act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, providing for the final disposition of the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory, while it permitted lands to be conveyed by full-blood Indians, was nevertheless intended to prevent imprudent sales by this class of Indians and made such conveyances valid only when affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.

Quare whether the constitutionality of an act of Congress limiting a right of conveyance by a class of Indians can be questioned by the

221 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

grantee of an Indian of that class on the ground that it deprives the Indian of his property without due process of law.

From the earliest period Congress has dealt with Indians as dependent people and legislated concerning their property with a view to their protection as such. Congress has full power to legislate concerning tribal property of Indians, and the conferring of citizenship on individual Indians does not prevent Congress from continuing to deal with tribal lands. It is for Congress, in pursuance of long established policy of this Government, and not for the courts, to determine for itself when, in the interest of the Indian, government guardianship over him shall

cease.

The privileges and immunities of Federal citizenship do not prevent such proper governmental restraint upon the conduct or property of citizens as may be necessary for the general good.

When the act of April 26, 1906, was passed, Congress had not by the supplemental Creek agreement of June 30, 1902, c. 1323, 32 Stat. 500, or by any other act, released its control over the alienation of lands of full-blood Creek Indians, and it was within its power to continue to restrict such alienation, notwithstanding the bestowal of citizenship upon the Indians, by requiring the approval of the Secretary of the Interior to conveyances made by them.

As above construed, the act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, is not unconstitutional as depriving full-blood Indians upon whom citizenship has been bestowed of their property without due process of law because it places further restrictions upon their right of alienation of lands.

21 Oklahoma, 630, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of the provision of the act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, requiring certain conveyances of full-blood Indians to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. W. L. Sturdevant, with whom Mr. M. L. Mott and Mr. W. A. Brigham were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

In determining the meaning and application of a statute, the courts will consider the mischief to be prohibited

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

221 U.S.

or the benefits to be conferred, the nature of the subjectmatter, the class and condition of the persons to be affected, the necessities and circumstances of its enactment, the system of laws of which it is a part, its necessary relation to, and effect upon, that system, its consistency with other provisions of the same and also prior and subsequent acts, the general policy of legislation upon the same subject and the consequences to result from the construction adopted.

When the purpose and scope of a statute are thus ascertained its language becomes subservient thereto to the extent that what is within the intention of the lawmaker is within the statute whether within its terms or not, and that what is not within such intention is not within the statute although included within its terms.

From the inception of the legislation providing for allotment of these lands to the last act upon the subject no affirmative expression by Congress can be found removing restrictions or governmental control from inherited lands of full-blood Indians.

The authority of the Government, so often asserted and so long exercised over a subject so peculiarly within the province and necessity of that authority, will not be abandoned by such an omission when, upon all positive declaration, the intention has been otherwise.

Sections 19 and 22 of the act of April 26, 1906, when read in connection with § 23 of that act and §§ 8 and 9 of the act of May 27, 1908, show an unmistakable intention on the part of Congress to protect and, in furtherance of that end, to extend the period of restrictions upon the inherited lands of full-blood Indians. Section 7, act of March 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861; §§ 6, 16, act of June 30, 1902, 32 Stat. 500; §§ 19, 22, 23, 28, 29, act of April 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137; §§ 8, 9, act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 312; Endlich on the Interp. Stat., §§ 43, 45, 103, 258, 265, 295, 320, 322; Lewis's Sutherland on Stat. Const., 2d ed., §§ 443, 447,

221 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

448, 585, 586, 590, 592; Black on Interpretation, § 113; Alexander v. Mayor, 5 Cranch, 7; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556; Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178; Brown v. Douchesne, 19 How. 183; Lamp Chimney Co. v. Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656; Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U. S. 153; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287; Interstate Drainage Co. v. Comes, 158 Fed. Rep. 273; Goodrum v. Buffalo, 162 Fed. Rep. 817; Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Missouri, 42; Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 203; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1; United States v. Moore, 161 Fed. Rep. 518, 519; United States v. Hanson, 167 Fed. Rep. 893; 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 352.

On the definition and construction of provisos, see Black on Int., § 110; Georgia Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174; Chesapeake Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 239; United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135; United States v. Scruggs &c. B., 156 Fed. Rep. 940.

The General Government has power to deal with, control and protect the property of the Indians, where not expressly abandoned. Arising originally out of the necessities of the situation, it now has the support of immemorial legislative and executive usage, and of judicial sanction.

This power must, in the nature of things, continue until its further exercise is deemed unnecessary by those in whom it rests. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 439; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 249; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 484; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S. 420.

When the agreements were entered into between the Government and the Creek tribe of Indians providing for the allotment of their lands, and laws were enacted to carry them into effect, the authority of the Government over these lands, exercised prior thereto, was not wholly VOL. CCXXI-19