221 U.S.

Argument for Appellees.

public or the people, who have no proprietary interests therein.

When the legislature prohibits the sale of private property for the sole and only purpose of providing a future supply of fuel for the public, it is appropriating private property for public use and compensation must be made. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 417; Willett v. People, 117 Illinois, 294, 303, 305; People ex rel. Goff v. Kirk, 136 N. Y. App. Div. 45; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 398, 399.

The Mineral Springs decisions in New York can be distinguished, except as the Court of Appeals applied the rule of the common law in regard to the right of landowners in subterranean waters, and held that prohibitions as such diminished most of the rights which the landowners had at common law, and were unconstitutional. People v. Natural Carbonic Acid Co., 196 N. Y. 421.

The owner of natural gas has the constitutional right to sell his gas in the most favorable market. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 127; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190; Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co., 156 Indiana, 679.

The cases cited by appellant, in which statutes deal with game, waters of streams and the atmosphere, proceed upon a wholly different principle.

The right of a citizen of the United States to carry on interstate commerce is a privilege guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and is enjoyed without distinction by corporations engaged in interstate commerce as well as individuals. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 21; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 455; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 69; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 204; Stockton v. Baltimore & New York R. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 14; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125

Argument for Appellees.

221 U.S.

U. S. 181, 190; Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 118; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 314.

Congress has expressly declared that natural gas is a lawful subject of commerce and has made provision authorizing the transportation of the same in pipe lines. Acts of March 11, 1904, c. 505, 33 Stat. 65; June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267.

An attempt by a State to select the articles of commerce which may or may not enter into interstate trade, or prohibit any article of commerce located in the State from so doing, is a regulation of commerce which is void. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 108; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697; Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 279; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 140; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 469, 470; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 12, 13.

A state statute prohibiting the exportation of private property out of the State is void as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151; Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488; Cooke on the Commerce Clause, § 61; Corwin v. Indiana Oil & Gas Co., 120 Indiana, 575; Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co., 155 Indiana, 545; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 205; Benedict v. Columbus Company, 49 N. J. Eq. 23; Cooley on Const. Lim., 7th ed., 858; Jackson Mining Co. v. Auditor General, 32 Michigan, 488; MacNaughton Co. v. McGirl, 20 Montana, 124.

A State may not exercise its police powers in such a manner as to prohibit or directly interfere with interstate commerce. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 302; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455, 464; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 108. See to the same effect: Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 618, 626; Schallen

berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 12; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Huber, 169 U. S. 618, 626; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 12, 25; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 558. In all commercial regulations the United States form a single nation. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413, 414; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 604; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 377; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 533; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492.

The real purpose of the Oklahoma statute in requiring a charter right to cross a highway is to prevent the transportation of natural gas out of the State-to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30, 34; Ch. 67, Laws of Oklahoma.

To require as a condition to obtaining the privilege of crossing the highways the surrender of the constitutional right to engage in interstate commerce is in violation of the Federal Constitution, and renders the requirement of permission to cross highways unconstitutional and void. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 200; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 62.

The effect of the Oklahoma statute in granting the right to cross the highways freely for intrastate transportation, but denying that right absolutely for interstate transportation, is a direct and positive discrimination against interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Constitution. A State cannot prohibit a corporation, which has acquired the right of way by purchase from abutting owners, from constructing or operating its pipe lines across and beneath its highways for the purpose of interstate commerce. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 26; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 120; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9; Escanaba v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 689.

Argument for Appellees.

221 U.S.

The right of Oklahoma in its public highways is a mere easement.

The appellees may lay their pipe lines along the private right of way purchased and cross underneath the surface of the highway adjoining.

Under the common law as declared in the Federal decisions the abutting landowner has title to the soil beneath a public highway, and the public have merely a right of passage. Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 697; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 421; United States v. Harris, 1 Sumn. 21; Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. 498, 513; Lyman v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 195.

Mott v.

The common-law rule prevails in Oklahoma. Eno, 181 N. Y. 346, 363; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Krueger, 36 Ind. App. 348, 369.

Natural gas is not the property of the State. Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190.

An owner of land has not merely the right to reduce to possession, but the actual title to, the natural gas in his lands, so long as the gas does not escape into the lands of other owners. Brown v. Spillman, 155 U. S. 665, 669.

Oil and gas do not differ in respect of the rights of the public from coal, iron ore and other like substances; they are property when in place and when reduced to possession; they may be sold even while in place and like coal, iron ore and other minerals, and two distinct estates may be created by the owner, both in absolute fee simple, one in the oil and gas in place and the other in the surface and remainder of the earth, in the same manner precisely as title is sometimes acquired by one man in the veins and deposits of coal, limestone, iron ore, lead, zinc and all other like solid substances separate and apart from the remainder of the soil or earth. We submit the correctness of all this is shown conclusively by the following authorities: Thornton on Oil and Gas, §§ 18, 19, 20; White on Mines and Mining Remedies, § 162, p. 223; Snyder on

Mines, § 1170, p. 954; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 248; Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 198; Blakeley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. St. 429; Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. St. 312; Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235; Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. St. 324; Murray v. Allred, 100 Tennessee, 100; Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kansas, 164; Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 147 California, 659; Ontario Natural Gas Co. v. Smart, 19 Ont. Rep. 591; Ontario Natural Gas Co. v. Gossfield, 18 Ont. App. 666; Hughes v. Pipe Lines, 119 N. Y. 423; Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231; South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntire, 44 W. Va. 296; Carter v. Tyler County Court, 45 W. Va. 806; Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Oh. St. 317; Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Oh. St. 259; Nonemaker v. Amos, 73 Oh. St. 163; Hail v. Reed, 15 B. Mon. 479; Brown v. Spillman, 155 U. S. 665.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the

court.

This appeal brings up for review the decree entered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma in four suits consolidated by stipulation of the parties.

The suits had the common purpose of attacking the constitutional validity of a statute of Oklahoma, enacted in 1907, which is referred to as chapter 67 of the Session Laws of 1907. It is inserted in the margin in full.1 All 1 Chapter 67-Pipe Lines-Regulating Gas and Oil Pipe Lines

Article 1.

An act regulating the laying, constructing, and maintaining and opcrating of gas pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas within the State of Oklahoma, defining the modes of procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain for such purposes, providing for the inspection and supervision of the laying of such pipe lines and limiting the gas pressure therein, and providing penalties for the violation thereof.