obligation of an oath, and in a future state of rewards and punishments.10 According to the great weight of modern authority, it is now held that it is not necessary that the witness should believe in the doctrine of receiving punishment after death for crimes done in this life, so long as he believes in the existence of a God and a future state and recognizes the binding force of an oath." Many statutes have been enacted in the American States removing the disability that existed at common law on account of religious belief or want of religious belief.12 McKelvey, in his work on Evidence, Sec. 213, says: "In the case of the sect of Quakers, so obnoxious to the early English churchmen, whose members refused to take the oath, some little difficulty was experienced, in bringing them within the rule of competency; so much, in fact, that a special statute 13 was passed allowing Quakers to affirm where other persons were required to take the oath. But this did not extend their competency to criminal cases. Later, however, all restriction was removed, and a form of oath established for any person not competent or not desiring to take the oath." 14 By statutes in most of the States Quakers are allowed to solemnly affirm instead of the regular oath. 10 1 Starkie on Evidence, 82, note. "Noble vs. People, 1 Ill., 54; Hunscom vs. Hunscom, 15 Mass., 184; Clinton vs. State, 33 Ohio 27; Hutton vs. Seaver, 26 Pa. St., 274; Arnold vs. Estate of Árnold, 13 Vt., 362. " Arizona; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Georgia; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Mass achusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; North Dakota; Oregon; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; West Virginia and Wisconsin. 13 7 and 8 Wm. III, c. 34. 14 31 and 32 Vic., c. 68. 15 By statute, in the early days many states refused to allow Indians to testify for or against white persons; but these statutes have all been repealed. The common law made no discrimination against the Indian. At the present time, in all of the states, he is permitted to testify. SECTION 64. CHINAMEN. Formerly, in California, by statutory enactment, a Chinaman was rendered incompetent to testify for or against a white person on trial in a criminal case.16 That act is no longer in force, and everywhere Chinamen are competent to testify in all matters, except that they are excluded by federal statute from testifying that a fellow-countryman attempting to re-enter the United States had been engaged as a merchant previous to his departure therefrom." It was also formerly held in some of the southern states that a negro was incompetent to testify for or against a white person; 18 but the courts of such states have since generally held that the Act of Congress known as the "Civil Rights Bill" restored their competency and placed them on an equal footing with other witnesses. SECTION 66. GRAND JURORS. Legal writers and sometimes courts have laid down the broad rule that members of the grand jury cannot 15 Harris vs. Doe, 4 Blackf. (Ind.), 369; Carroll vs. Pathkiller, 3 Port. (Ala.), 279. 10 Speer vs. Yup Co., 13 Cal., 73; People vs. Hall., 4 Cal., 399; People vs. Jones, 31 Cal., 565. 17 Li Sing vs. United States, 180 19 disclose the proceedings that take place in the grand jury room, on the ground that such proceedings are privileged. Other authorities hold that grand jurors cannot be sworn and examined as witnesses to impeach the validity or correctness of their finding, after an indictment has been regularly found and returned. But there are many modern decisions which hold that, since it is of highest importance to the maintenance of our ancient rights and liberties that no person be held to answer for a crime until he has been regularly accused in due form of law by the proper tribunal, neither the oath of the grand jurors, nor any sound rule of public policy, forbids the disclosure by a grand juror, or by any other person, of what took place before the grand jury, where the evidence is indispensable to public justice, or the establishment of private rights.20 The fact that a person did or did not testify before the grand jury, and the testimony given by him (if otherwise competent) may be proved by a grand juror.21 All authorities seem to agree, however, that a member cannot be allowed to disclose how any grand juror voted, nor as to any opinions expressed or arguments advanced by any member thereof, upon any question before them, nor to reveal the fact that an indictment for felony has been found against any person not yet apprehended.22 SECTION 67. ATTORNEYS. An attorney, at the common law, in the absence of a disqualifying interest, was a competent witness for and on behalf of his client. 10 1 Greenleaf, Sec., 252. 20 United State vs. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cases, No. 14, 858; It is the rule in all the (Mass.), 137; Rocco vs. State, 37 Miss., 357. State vs. Carroll, 85 Iowa, 1; Hinshaw vs. State, 147 Ind., 334; United States vs. Kilpatrick, 16 Fla., 765. "State vs. Broughton, 29 N. C., 96. states except Delaware, that a lawyer is a competent witness on behalf of his client, statutes having removed the disqualification on the ground of interest. The practice of acting as both witness and counsel is frowned on by courts, and the more ethical practice, if a lawyer desires to testify for his client, is for him to withdraw as counsel in the case. SECTION 68. JUDGES. A judge cannot be allowed to testify in a case on trial before him, and his disqualification therein is absolute. The reasons for this rule are obvious. Imagine the awkward spectacle of a judge passing upon the competency of his own testimony, determining its materiality, if objections are interposed, overruling or sustaining motions of counsel to strike it out of the record, and deciding questions relating to the impeachment of his testimony by other witnesses. SECTION 69. PETIT JURORS. There seems to be no rule of law making a juror incompetent as a witness in a trial in which he has been empaneled. If otherwise not disqualified, it would seem that he may be sworn and examined as to all relevant facts of which he has knowledge. He cannot testify as to facts learned by him as a juror, or by observation in open court.23 SECTION 70. DEAF AND DUMB PERSONS. Persons deaf and dumb from birth were, in contemplation of the common law, presumed to be idiots. The experience of modern educators has taught that deaf mutes are possessed of more mental capacity and " Scruggs vs. State, 90 Tenn., 81. are capable of higher mental culture than was formerly supposed. However, this ancient presumption of the common law still clings so far as to cast upon the party offering the witness the duty of showing that he is possessed of sufficient understanding. But if he be shown to possess sufficient mental capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath, and to communicate, by means of writing, or by signs with the aid of an interpreter, in an intelligent manner, the facts concerning which he is called to testify, he is a competent witness. Some authorities assert that the written method is the better; others hold that method most satisfactory by which he can make himself best understood; while other decisions declare either method allowable. SECTION 71. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. The course to be pursued in the examination of witnesses is a matter resting largely within the discretion of the court. Whatever method will best elicit the truth from biased, disinterested and nonintelligent witnesses should be adopted, and the usual rule may, in the court's discretion, be so relaxed or changed as to most effectually attain the ends of justice. While the great weight of authority inclines to the belief that it cannot be demanded as a matter of right, according to a practice that has obtained for over four hundred years, upon the request of either party, courts may, in their discretion, order the exclusion from the court room of all witnesses except the parties litigant themselves. SECTION 72. DIRECT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION. Unless there is some cogent reason for departing from this rule, the usual method, after the witness has |