Let the photographers beware how they decorate their windows! The Circuit Court for the District of MassachuPhotographs, setts has lately held, in Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. Reproduction Rep. 280, (1) That it is a breach of contract and violation of confidence for a photographer to make urauthorized copies of a customer's photograph; and (2) That though a private individual may enjoin the publication of his portrait, a public character cannot, in the absence of breach of contract or violation of confidence in securing the photograph from which the publication is made; and (3) That one who is among the foremost inventors of his time is a "public character," within the above rule.

Replevin.
Damages

The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Werner v. Graley, 38 Pac. Rep. 482, has ruled that though in an action of replevin the measure of damages for the wrongful detention is ordinarily the interest on the value of the property while wrongfully detained, yet, when the property has a usable value, the value of its use while so detained is a proper measure of damages.

The Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department, following the general rule, has recently held, that a manufacturer will be protected in the use of a geograTrade Name phical name, by which his goods are known to the public, as against another manufacturer, who uses the same name to designate a similar article, not for the purpose of describing the place where the goods are made, but for the fraudulent purpose of deceiving purchasers: Gebbie v. Stitt, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 102. There is an annotation on this subject in I AM. L. REG. & Rev. (N. S.) 514. See also 2 AM. L. Reg. & REV. (N. S.) 30.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has just passed upon a most important question, under the Kentucky statutes, §1350, providing that all wage earners shall be paid for their wages in lawful money. A mining company paid its employes once each month, in lawful money, for the labor of the past month, and at any time

Wages, Payment In Money

during the month, upon their application, issued checks to them, payable in merchandise at the company's store. The amount of checks so issued to each man was deducted from his wages on every pay day, and he was paid the balance in cash, but no money was paid for outstanding checks. This arrangement was held not to be a violation of the statute: Avent Beattyville Coal Co. v. Comm., 28 S. W. Rep. 502.

This is hardly in accord with the weight of authority. In Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 253. a contract by an employe that he would receive his wages, or any part thereof, at the option of his employer, in goods from the latter's store, and expressly waived his right to be paid according to the statute of that state, was held to be absolutely void, and could not be pleaded as a bar to an action for the wages due the employe. In State v. Loomis, (Mo.), 20 S. W. Rep. 332, the defendant issued to his employe a coupon check book for $5 in payment of his wages, which stated that the book was good for merchandise at the defendant's store, when presented by the employe; and it appeared that the amount of the coupons was deducted from the employe's wages and charged to him. This was held a violation of the act. But an order given to the plaintiff, for labor per. formed, directing another to pay him $180, is not an evidence of indebtedness for wages, payable "otherwise than in lawful money of the United States," within the statutory prohibition: Agee v. Smith, 7 Wash. 471; S. C., 35 Pac. Rep. 370.

A statute similar to those in the above cases was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, why, no one knows, but ostensibly on the ground that it was an attempt to prevent persons sui juris from making their own contracts; the judge who delivered the opinion, (one from whom better things might have been expected,) saying with that tinsel-like speciousness of epigram that is so often foisted on the world in place of sound reason, that it was “an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States." But with all the deference

possible under the circumstances, one may well stop to inquire whether it is more degrading, to be forced to labor at wages barely sufficient to keep soul and body together, and then be compelled to accept goods at exorbitant prices instead of the needed money, or to be freed from that oppression, when unable to free oneself, even if it be by the exercise of a little paternalism. Certainly, most men would prefer to be the slaves of the public, rather than of a private individual or corporation. But tastes differ.

Warehouseman,
Storage,

The Supreme Court of California, on the authority of Archer v. McDonald, 36 Hun, (N. Y.), 194, has recently decided, that a warehouseman, under a contract to store property for a certain time for a certain sum, cannot recover for storage where the property is destroyed, though without negligence on his part, before the expiration of the time: Cunningham v. Kenney, 38 Pac. Rep. 645. But when it is the cus

Charges for Goods Destroyed

tom of warehousemen to collect charges for storage only when the goods are ordered out, an accidental burning of them before they are ordered out will not release the owner from the payment of storage: Jones v. Chaffin, (Ala.), 15 So. Rep. 143.

BY STEPHEN B. STANTON.

The great Brooklyn strike just ended, has added its contribution to strike law, in the shape of a further definition of the sphere of the writ of mandamus. However purposeless its short and disastrous history may seem, however lessonless it may appear to pass, yet, each strike, we may hope, in the wearying succession, adds its quotum to the gradually growing fund of strike law. The experience gained in one strike, makes the conduct of the next more intelligent, and its outcome more just; each brings us a step nearer the solution of the underlying problems, and the removal of the underlying evils. This hope is inspired chiefly by the ever increasing tendency of both sides, in labor controversies, to seek protection from the courts. Judicial intervention has already given us a jurisprudence of injunction as applicable to strikes, a legacy left by the recent great strikes of the West and Northwest. And now the Brooklyn trolley strikes have filled a like office with respect to the writ of mandamus.

Without going minutely into the history of the Brooklyn strike, suffice it to say, that the usual concomitants of a strike prevailed, lawlessness, disorder, violence and riot. Cars of the companies returned to the stables windowless; new "nonunion" motormen, with broken heads, or not at all. The cutting of wires became a general pastime. The efforts of Brooklyn's entire police force, and 7000 State troops, proved unavailing as a preventive. The city authorities to lessen their responsibilities, advised the companies not to attempt running their full complement of cars. At this juncture, application was made to Judge Gaynor, of the New York Supreme Court, for a writ of mandamus, to compel the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Co., to resume the operation of its road. The writ was granted in its alternative form, and Brooklyn, I may say the country, was astounded to read in the learned judge's decision, the statement, that "the claim of violence, amounting to a prevention, is not legally made out.

Instances of violence, generally by others than the former employés of the company, are shown, but it is also shown that, not only the police force of the city, but also over 7000 soldiers are preserving order, and I cannot believe that this company, is not protected in its rights. It is entitled to the full protection of the government in the performance of its public duties, protection on the one side, and obedience to law and duty on the other, being reciprocal, and going hand in hand. . . .

It has had such protection, and it now has it. I do not find that Government has failed in that respect at all. Instances. of disorder have occurred, but have been speedily suppressed.

I cannot, therefore, attribute to government the failure of this corporation to perform its public duties. . . . That this corporation is not fulfilling its ordinary corporate duties to the public is not denied. It presented the issue to the court, that the reason for it is, that it is overcome by violence, and that the government does not adequately protect it.

This might be a sufficient answer in law, if true, but I refuse to find that either the judicial, or the executive branch of Government has failed in affording protection to this corporation. There is no evidence before me upon which I can cast such a reproach upon the State.”

A few days later, a similar application was made to the same justice against the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Co., and was similarly disposed of by him on the same grounds.

A week before Judge Gaynor's decision, however, and before the situation had assumed the seriousness requiring the calling out of the First Brigade, in addition to the Second already on the scene, Judge Cullen, also of the Supreme Court of New York, had refused just such an application against the Brooklyn City Railroad Co., on the grounds that "the duty of the company to operate its road is to be exercised reasonably. In its operation, the company is absolutely entitled to the protection of the authorities, and to the protection of the court. The court cannot shut its eyes to the fact that assaults and violence have been committed, and that detachments of police are scattered all over the city. The com