legal claims, will constitute a general assignment: City Natl. Bk. v. Merch. Natl. Bk., 28 S. W. Rep. 277; see I AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 850. Bail Liability It has been recently decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, in State v. Morgan, 28 S. W. Rep. 17. that (1) In proceedings on a scɛi, fa, to show cause why a judgment against the bondsmen for breach of the condition of a recognizance of bail entered into by a defendant should not be made absolute, the validity of the indictment cannot be inquired into; (2) That such proceedings are so nearly civil, that an answer over, after a demurrer is overruled, is a waiver of the demurrer; and (3) That the fact that indictments similar to that drawn against defendant were held bad, and the case in which his was held to be good overruled, is no excuse for his failure to appear according to the condition of the recognizance. And the same court has ruled, in State v. Murmann, 28 S. W. Rep. 2, that when the surety produced his principal in court at the time named in the recognizance, and the case was called, the jury impanelled, the evidence taken, and a verdict of guilty rendered, and thereupon a deputy sheriff took hold of the principal, and left the court-room with him to conduct him to jail, and no order was made for a continuance of the case, this manual caption of the principal by the sheriff dispensed with the necessity of a formal surrender of the principal, and the surety was discharged. Discharge A formal surrender is not in all cases essential; and yet the surety is so strictly held to his undertaking, that it is always the safer course. Any act of the law, however, which takes the principal out of the hands of the bail, as in the present case, or which interferes with the power of the bail over the principal, is justly held to release the surety. Accordingly, the surety is discharged, when, after the prisoner is delivered by him to the sheriff, pursuant to an order of court, he is then released by another order, made without the application or knowledge of the bail, and escapes: Pro. v. McReynolds, (Cal.) 36 Pac. Rep. 590. But the re-arrest and conviction of the principal on the same charge, after the bond has been forfeited, will not release the suretics thereon: State v. Warwick, 3 Ind. App. 508. And when the principal in a recognizance pleaded guilty, and was fined on another charge, in the same court in which his pres ence was required by the recognizance, and was then taken by a deputy sheriff to the clerk's office, where the fine was paid, the whole time so spent not being over five minutes, the detention was held not to release the surety; nor was he released by a mere request to a deputy sheriff to take the principal into custody: Peo. v. Robb, 98 Mich. 397; S. C., 57 N. W. Rep. 257. Bids The Supreme Court of New Jersey has very justly ruled, that if a question is raised as to the truth of a statement in a bid, which, under the law, would, on its face, entitle the bidder to the contract, the awarding board cannot decide that question against the bidder, and award the contract to another, without giving the first bidder an opportunity to be heard: State v. Board of Choosen Freeholders of Hudson Co., 30 Atl. Rep. 548. But the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Elliott v. City of Minneapolis, 60 N. W. Rep. 1081, maintains, that in the absence of fraud or abuse of discretion, a municipal corporation may award a contract to another than the lowest bidder, if the municipal charter does not prescribe the mode of awarding and entering into such contracts, and if the contract made is otherwise within the scope of the corporate powers. There is an excellent annotation on this subject in 1 Am. L. REG. & Rev. (N. S.) 899. See also Ibid., 742, 819, 820, 851. Building The Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided a most important question in regard to the rights of members of building associations, in Randall v. Nat. Bdg. Lean & ProAssociations lective Union, 60 N. W. Rep. 1019, where it held, that when a contract of membership in a building association provided for the forfeiture of the stock in case any payment should not be made when due; and a member having bor rowed money on mortgage, made a number of payments on the stock, and also on interest and premium, but then ceased to pay, whereupon the association declared her stock forfeited, and brought suit to foreclose the mortgage; the payments on the stock should be applied as payments pro tanto on the loan, in an accounting of the amount due on the mortgage. According to the Supreme Court of Florida, a supreme court has power, on the common law suit of certiorari, to review and quash the proceedings of inferior tribuCertiorari nals, when they proceed in a cause without jurisdiction, or when their proceedings are essentially irregular, and not according to the requirements of law, and no appeal or other direct mode of reviewing their proceedings exists. The writ in such a case, however, does not issue of right, but rests in the sound discretion of the court; and when issued, will not serve the purpose of a writ of error, or appeal, with bill of exceptions. The office of such a writ, when issued to review the proceedings of an inferior court, is to bring up for inspection the entire record of the proceedings of that court, in order that the superior court may determine therefrom whether the inferior court acted within its jurisdictional powers, or whether its proceedings were essentially regular, and in accord'ance with the requirements of law: Jacksonville, T. & K. WV. Rr. Co. v. Boy, 16 So. Rep. 290. Conflict of The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in Theron v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 84, has lately held, that an action for death by wrongful act, occasioned in a state which gives three years within which to bring suit therefor, may be maintained at any time within the three years, in another state, which limits the time of suit to two years; and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds, that in such a case the amount recovered is to be distributed according to the laws of the place of the act which caused the death: McDonald v. McDonald's Admr., 28 S. W. Rep. 482. it The great railroad strike is over, but the litigation to which gave rise is still vigorous. The Circuit Court for the Fastern District of Missouri has again passed upon the " 06 or Conspiracy effect of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. at Large, 209, and in accordance with the current of authority, ruled: (1) That a combination of railroad employés to prevent all the railroads of a large city, engaged in carrying the United States mails, and in interstate commerce, from carrying freight and passengers, hauling cars, and securing the services of persons other than strikers, and to induce persons to leave the service of such railroads is within the first section of the act mentioned, which provides that every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states, is illegal; (2) That under § 5 of the same act, an injunction order, in an action to enjoin an illegal conspiracy against interstate commerce, may provide that it shall be in force on defendants not named in the bill, but who are within the terms of the order, when it also provides that it is operative on all persons acting in concert with the designated conspirators, though not named in the writ, after the commission of some act by them in furtherance of the conspiracy, and service of the writ on them: U. S. v. Elliott, 64 red. Rep. 27. See In re Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 801, and I AM. L. Reg. & REV. (N. S.), 823. Law The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Gallitzin School case, recently decided, missed an excellent opportunity to vindiConstitutional cate its ability, and, instead, laid itself open to severe censure. In that case it held, Williams, J., dissenting, that the employment by the school directors, in the common schools, of nuns of the sisterhood of St. Joseph, a religious society of the Roman Catholic Church, in the absence of proof of religious sectarian teaching or exercises, was purely an exercise of the discretion of the directors, was lawful, and not subject to review by the courts; (which is true, if the premises are granted,) and then deliberately went on to hold, in the coolest disregard of facts, that the wearing of the dis tinctive garb and insignia of that sisterhood by the nuns, while teaching in the public schools, coupled with free instruction in the catechism of their church to ali who chose to attend, both before and after school, could not be termed sectarian teaching, and was not unlawful!!! Hysong v. School Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 30 Atl. Rep. 482. It would really seem as if the learned court had forgotten the vast superiority of practice over precept, and the peculiarly impressionable nature of young children. Contracts, The Supreme Court of Washington has recently held that a promise to a third party to accept a bill of exchange which has been, or is to be issued, does not fall within the statute of frauds; and that when the defendant authorized B. to draw certain orders, which he agreed to pay, and after those orders were drawn, told plaintiffs that if they would purchase them, he would afterwards accept and pay them, and plaintiffs purchased some of the said orders, the defendant cannot set up as a defence that the plaintiffs were neither parties, privies, nor beneficially interested in his contract with B.: Kelley v. Greenough, 38 Pac. Rep. 158. The Court of Appeals of England has gone a step farther, and held that a promise by the defendant, that, in consideration of plaintiff's accepting certain bills of exchange for a firm of which defendant's son was a partner, he, the defendant, would provide plaintiff with funds to meet those bills, is a contract of indemnity from liability to make payment on such bills, and not of guarantee, and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds, and may be made orally: Guild v. Conrad, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885. It seems to be now the generally accepted view, that, apart from special statutory provi sions, a promise to accept a bill of exchange is not within the statute of frauds, on the ground that the acceptance of a bill of exchange is an original undertaking: Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 406; Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116; S. C., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; affirming Cordell v. Hall, 34 Fed. Rep. 866; and Missouri and Pennsylvania, at least, have found it necessary to pass statutes requiring acceptances to be in writing: |