(2) That writing the word "Yes" or "Get" in the square at the margin of an affirmative vote for a constitutional amendment does not avoid the ballot :

(3) That signing the voter's name to the ballot invalidates it, as it tends to impair the secrecy of the ballot :

(4) That the making of any mark which bears no resemblance to a cross, such as a single stroke, or a circle, or a nondescript scribble, or writing out the party name, or placing a cross wholly outside the proper square, will invalidate the bailot for the same reason:

(5) That the erasure of a name with a lead pencil is not a distinguishing mark :

(6) That when a voter makes crosses opposite the names of two political parties, one of which has no candidate for a particular office, the vote is good only as to the candidate for that office on the other ticket, and a nullity as to the rest:

(7) That when a voter writes in the name of a candidate of his own, and marks a cross so that it is uncertain which candidate it refers to, his vote does not count for either.

ing Marks

In determining the validity of ballots cast under the Australian ballot laws, the fact that the stamp (when one is Distinguish- required,) was not placed on the ballot with such precision as to make a single, perfect impression, will not render the ballot invalid; but if, in the preparation of the ballot, there is such a departure from the strict letter of the law, that, if purposely done, the ballot could be known by the voter casting it, as when there are imprinted on it two separate and distinct impressions of the stamp, or when there is within one of the large squares a distinct mark, as of a pencil, in addition to the voter's stamp, the ballot will be rejected on the ground that it bears a distinguishing mark, though the mark was made innocently: Zeis v. Passwater, (Supreme Court of Indiana,) 41 N. E. Rep. 796.

Who dare say, "De minimis non curat lex?" The pencil mark in this case was one-fourth of an inch wide and fivesixteenths of an inch long. What man could say with certainty, "I made that mark?"

Evidence, Privileged Communications.

In Williams v. Quebrada Railway, Land & Copper Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 751, Judge KEKEWICH, of the Chancery Division of England, has laid down the salutary rule, that when fraud is alleged against a defendant, communications between himself and his solicitor as Discovery, to the subject-matter of the alleged fraud are not privileged from production, there being no distinction in this respect between a crime and a civil fraud; and that it is immaterial for this purpose, whether the solicitor is or is not a party to the alleged fraud.

Fraud

Husband and

Wife. Hushand's Liability for

In Morgan v. Kennedy, 64 N. W. Rep. 912, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has lately held, that the common-law rule that holds a husband liable in damages for slanderous words uttered by his wife, Slander by though he is not present, and has not in any manner participated in the slander, has not been abrogated by the passage of the statutes relating to married women, and enlarging their property rights.

Wife

Innkeeper,

Goods of

The Court of Appeal of England, in Robins v. Gray, [1895] 2 Q. B. 501, has affirmed the judgment of WILLS, J., in the court below, [1895] 2 Q. B. 78. In this Lien, case a commercial traveler employed by a firm Commercial that dealt in sewing-machines went to stay at an Traveler inn, and while there machines were sent to him by his employers in the ordinary course of business for the purpose of selling them to customers in the neighborhood. Before the goods were sent the innkeeper had express notice that they were the property of the employers, but he received them as the baggage of the traveler. The latter subsequently left the inn without paying for his board and lodging; and it was held that the innkeeper had a lien on the goods for the amount of his bill.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has recently decided a very interesting point of insurance law. An accident

Insurance,
Accident,

Notice

certificate issued by the Odd Fellows' Accident Association provided that written notice should be given to the insurer, within ten days of the date

of the accident and injury for which a claim should be made, stating the circumstances of the accident and the nature of the injury, and that there should be no claim to death benefits unless death resulted within ninety days from the accident, of which accident the insurer should have had notice within ten days. While this certificate was in force, the plaintiff, assured stepped on a wire nail, inflicting a small but visible wound in his foot. He continued to pursue his usual occupation for fourteen days, and was then taken ill and died from lockjaw resulting from the wound. No notice of the accident was given within ten days after it occurred, but proofs of death were furnished in due time. Under these circumstances, it was held that the terms of the certificate did not require notice to be given within ten days of the happening of an accident which did not immediately disable the assured from pursuing his usual occupation, and which did not, within the ten days, give rise to a claim for death benefits; and that the beneficiary was therefore entitled to recover: Odd Fellows' Fraternal Accident Association of America v. Earl, 70 Fed. Rep. 16.

International

Jurisdiction of

According to a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of England, under the treaties between Great Britain and Japan, by virtue of which the Law. consular courts of the former and the territorial Consular courts of the latter have exclusive jurisdiction Courts over claims against British and Japanese subjects respectively, it would be in excess of the jurisdiction granted to the British consular court if it were to entertain by way of counter-claim or cross-action a claim by a British defendant against a Japanese plaintiff; the cognizance of such a claim belongs to the territorial courts. This rule was applied to a suit by the Emperor of Japan against a steam-boat company for damages resulting from a marine collision, in which the defendant company counterclaimed in respect of the same collision, on the ground that it was due to the negligence of the plaintiff's servants; and it was accordingly held that the counter-claim could not be sustained: The Imperial Japanese

Government v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co., [1895] App. Cas. 644.

Interstate Commerce, Original Package

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, packages of oleomargarine, weighing ten pounds each, put up out of the state, and sent into it, by the manufacturer, to be there sold by his resident agent from his store, by the package, are not original packages," within the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution, but, being intended for sale to the consumer, and being in fact so sold, are subject to the police regulations of the state : Commonwealth v. Paul, 33 Atl. Rep. 82.

In reaching this remarkable conclusion, the court rests wholly on its own decisions to the same effect, in Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615; S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 7, and Commonwealth v. Schollenberger, 156 Pa. 201; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 30, which in their turn rest on the newly discovered principle that "a manufacturer who puts up his products in packages evi lently adapted for and intended to meet the requirements of an unlawful retail trade in another state, and sends them to his own agent in that state, for sale to consumers, is not engaged in interstate commerce, but is engaged in an effort to carry on a forbidden business by masquerading in a character to which he has no honest title." There is also a good deal said in regard to the dire and awful consequences which would result from the opposite doctrine, and the learned judge who delivered the opinion declares that "we cannot adopt a construction that seems to us so unnatural and unreasonable, and that would work such absurd and monstrous results," meaning thereby the construction which would hold the separate packages, shipped in an open box or barrel, an original package. But the very strength of his language betrays the weakness of his argument. It is not necessary to vituperate when one is sure of his position.

It is the general opinion that when the bottles or other vessels in which the goods are put up, though each enclosed in a separate wrapper, are put into one common receptacle for

the purpose of transportation, that receptacle is the original package, and, when that receptacle is opened, and the contents are separated, the original package is broken, and none of the separately wrapped packages can be called original. The importer may put up and ship his packages separately in any form he pleases; but, if he puts them up together in the same box or barrel, he cannot claim that they are original packages. The presumption in such a case is that the separate wrapping is a mere device to evade the law: In re Harmon, 43 Fed. Rep 372; Harrison v. State, 91 Ala. 62; S. C., 10 So. Rep. 30; Smith v. State, 54 Ark. 248; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 882; State v. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436; S. C., 27 S. W. Rep. 1102; Haley v. State, (Neb.) 60 N. W. Rep. 962; Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615; S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 7; Commonwealth v. Schollenberger, 156 Pa. 201; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 30; State v. Chapman, 1 S. Dak. 414; S. C., 47 N. W. Rep. 411. If, however, the carrier puts the separate bottles or packages into a receptacle furnished by itself, for its own convenience in transporting them, without the knowledge of the consignor, the receptacle is not the original package. Keith v. State, (Ala.) 8 So. Rep. 353; Tinker v. State, 96 Ala. 115; S. C., 11 So. Rep. 383.

The Iowa courts alone have seen the absurdities to which this doctrine will lead, and have held that in such a case the separately wrapped bottle or package is the original: State v. Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep. 921; State v. Miller, 86 Iowa, 638; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 330. But this, if applied indiscriminately, is as far wrong as the other doctrine. The only safe rule is, to leave to the jury, as a question of fact, to find whether the separate packages or the receptacle is the original package in any given case, under instructions that if they find that the intent of the importer was to evade the law, not to assert bona fide his rights under the interstate commerce rule, that they should find the receptacle to be the original package; otherwise, the separate bottles or packages. To assert that a pint bottle of whisky, wrapped separately, and then boxed with others, is an original package, is absurd; but it is equally absurd to claim that a ten-pound