trated largely from the experiences of the New York Association, to which the country looks as a model, by reason of its achieved success, dwelt on the importance of committee work and outlined the essentials to success. The second paper treated of "Legal Education and Admission to the Bar," and was read by Professor George W. Pepper, of the University Law School. It is a most able and thoughtful contribution to this branch of literature, and dealt not only with the advanced methods now the subject of experiment, but also with the proper duties of state and local associations in the premises. The third paper was a vigorous indictment of the indifference to the claims of the profession as a public calling, by Alex. Simpson, Jr., of Philadelphia, under the title of The Local Bar Association-Its Functions and Relations to the State Bar Association." In the appendix as supplemental to Judge Simonton's paper on Pennsylvania Jurisprudence, and germane thereto, are reprinted three most valuable papers, i. e., Laussatt on Equity in Pennsylvania; Sharswood on the Common Law in Pennsylvania; and Lewis on Early Courts in Pennsylvania. The volume contains much of interest to the general reader, but it is chiefly to be welcomed as signalling, as we said, the fact that the Bar of Pennsylvania has organized itself to consider and act in respect to such things as make for the public welfare in the wide domain wherein its members stand sentinel. Where such an organization is responsive to a general appreciation of the necessity therefor it has great potentialities for effective work. Its machinery must be at once comprehensive, elastic and yet simple. It must be managed on a broad guage and with sound business principles, and if so conceived and managed, it is well assured of enlisting the active loyalty of the profession of the state, without which it would be but as sounding brass and tinkling cymbals whose sound would soon die away in innocuous desuetude. " State bar associations exist in thirty states (See the able paper on The Mission of State Bar Associations," by Ralph Stone, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, read before the annual meeting of the State Bar Associations of New York, 52 Leg. Int. 250 and Albany Law Journal for November 16, 1895), and success or failure can be everywhere measured by the degree of conformity to the conditions precedent hinted at above. Up to this time three of the older states, which boasted of a powerful and learned bar, were conspicuous by their absence, i. e., Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Massachusetts. Pennsylvania, the youngest convert, started out with a membership which is close up to the roll of New York and which promises speedily to place it far in advance thereof. An examination of the proceedings shows this to be due to the pains which were taken to perfect its machinery along lines which puts the association at once in touch with every county in the state. Through its standing committees, on any subject, a referendum can be made to the consensus of the professional judgment of the state, with unrivalled effectiveness and dispatch. It is this principle that secured for the Pennsylvania Bar Association its magnificent endorsement, and which gives promise of a long career of usefulness and power. And it is in allegiance thereto that the leaders of the bench and bar have recognized it as a common ground where, on equal footing, they can labor shoulder to shoulder "to clear the foundations, to strengthen the pillars and adorn the entablatures" of the Temple of Justice. NOTE.-The December number of the AMERICAN LAW Register and REVIEW will contain a note by Hampton L. Carson, Esq., in reply to an article which appeared in the July-August number of the American Law Review, entitled "The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court to Nullify Acts of Congress,” signed Sylvester Pennoyer. THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW. DECEMBER, 1895. PROGRESS OF THE LAW. AS MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE REPORTS FOR NOVEMBER. Edited by ARdemus StewaRT. In Hickman v. Berens, [1895] 2 Ch. 638, the Court of Appeal of England has enunciated a rule that seems to Attorney and rest upon a sound basis of principle, holding that Client. when counsel, acting under general instructions Compromise, Mistake given by his client to compromise a litigation, consents to a compromise under a misapprehension, e. g., when, intending to concede one thing, he inadvertently concedes another, or when the counsel on both sides do not put the same interpretation upon the terms of the compromise, neither the client nor the counsel are bound thereby, and the court will set it aside, on application. Ballee for Hire, Barber, The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately conferred upon the barber fraternity a new distinction, which they will hardly covet. In Dilberto v. Harris, 23 S. E. Rep. 112, it held that the proprietor of a barber shop kept Liability for for public patronage is liable to a customer for the value of his hat, which was deposited on a hatproperty of Customer rack in the shop, and which disappeared from the shop and was lost while the customer was being shaved, since the proprietor is, in such circumstances, a bailee for hire as to the hat. loss of The court does not deign to fortify its decision by any discussion of the questions involved ; but Chief Justice BLEAKLEY, in a dissenting opinion, discourses on the aspects of the case in a way which, while professedly facetious, contains a good deal of common sense, and some keen satire. "It hath never happened," he says, "from the earliest times to the present, that barbers, who are an ancient order of small craftsmen, serving their customers for a small fee, and entertaining them the while with the small gossip of the town or village, have been held responsible for a mistake made by one customer whereby he taketh the hat of another from the common rack or hanging place appointed for all customers to hang their hats; this rack or place being in the same room in which customers sit to be shaved. The reason is that there is no complete bailment of the hat. The barber hath no exclusive custody thereof, and the fee for shaving is too small to compensate him for keeping a servant to watch it. He himself could not watch it, and at the same time shave the owner. Moreover, the value of an ordinary gentleman's hat is so much, in proportion to the fee for shaving, that to make the barber an insurer against such mistakes of his customers would be unreasonable. The loss of one hat would absorb his earnings for a whole day; perhaps many days. The barber is a craftsman laboring for wages, not a capitalist conducting a business of trade or trust." As a general rule, any one who invites persons to come into his store or place of business, for the purpose of dealing with him, will be held liable for whatever articles it may become necessary that the person so invited should lay aside while engaged in dealing with the tradesman; and therefore a dealer in clothing is liable for the loss of valuables or clothing laid aside while trying on other clothing: Bunnell v. Stern, 122 N. Y. 539; S. C., 25 N. E. Rep. 910; Woodruff v. Painter, 150 Pa. 91, and the keeper of a bathing establishment is liable for the loss of clothing taken from the bath-house or dressing-room: Bird v. Everard, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 1008; S. C., 4 Misc. Rep. 104, or for the loss of valuables delivered by him to one who had stolen the check issued therefor, when, by looking at the person who presents the check, he could perceive that he is not the one to whom the check was issued: Tombler v. Koelling, 60 Ark. 62; S. C., 28 S. W. Rep. 795. The keeper of a restaurant is liable for the loss of a customer's overcoat or wraps left in his charge, or taken in charge by his employee: Ultzer v. Nicols, [1894] 1 Q. B. 92 ; Bultmann v. Dennett, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 247; S. C., 9 Misc. Rep. 462, but not for overcoats or wraps hung up by the customer himself on a rack provided for the purpose, if he keeps a vigilant watch over the room: Simpson v. Rourke, 34 N. Y. Suppl. 11. Bids, Collusion A secret contract between persons who propose to bid upon the construction of a public work, that their bids shall be put in apparently in competition, but really in concert, with the intention of securing as high a price as possible, and dividing the profits, is illegal, and contrary to public policy, and will not be enforced, though one of the parties to it has secured the contract for the work, and has executed the same and received the profits : McMillan v. Hoffman (Circuit Court, Dist. Oreg.,) 69 Fed. Rep. 509. Constitutional Negligence In Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 33 Atl. Rep. 237, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has dealt a severe blow to the unscrupulous labor legislation that is at present epidemic. The act of that state of 1891, Liability for June 2, P. L. 176, Art. VIII, § 6, provides that the owners of every anthracite coal mine shall employ a certified mine foreman, who shall examine the working places in the mine to see if they are safe, and permit no one to work in an unsafe place; and Art. XVII, § 8, declares that "For any injury to person or property occasioned by any violation of this act or any failure to comply with its provisions by any mine foreman, a.right of action shall accrue to the party injured against said owner or operator for any direct damages he may have sustained thereby." This the court holds unconstitutional, in a strong opinion by Justice WIL |