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1008. And in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a similar restriction is violated by the erection, within the prohibited distance, of a piazza, eight feet wide, encircled by a railing, and having a roof supported by posts, attached to a house, and extending along its entire front: Reardon v. Murphy, 40 N. E. Rep. 854.

Donatio

The Vice-Chancellor for Ireland has decided, in the recent case of Porter v. Walsh, [1895] 1 Ir. R. 284, that Mortis Causa an unindorsed deposit receipt is a good subjectmatter of a donatio mortis causa.

Easement,

Tacking

aban

The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately ruled, that when one has for less than the statutory period of prescription used as a private way a strip of land belonging to anPrescriptive, other, and then, at the request of the owner, doned this strip, and with the consent of the owner used another strip belonging to the latter, in its stead, as a private way, also for less than the statutory period, the two users cannot be tacked together so as to create a prescriptive right of way in either strip, though together the period of use amounts to more than the statutory period: Peters v. Little, 22 S. E. Rep. 44.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Connolly, 40 N. E. Rep. 862, has recently laid down the principles of law governing a prosecution for Criminal Law, falsely making or signing a certificate of nominaNomination tion or nomination paper, as follows: (1) That it

Elections,

Signing

Paper is sufficient to charge the offences in the language of the statute, as they were unknown at common law; (2) That a provision that any voter who signs a nomination paper shall do so in person, requires the voter to sign with his own hand, or to be present at the signing by another for him, and request it to be done; and (3) That it is no defence to a prosecution for signing a certificate of nomination in another's name, that the defendant entertained no criminal intent, and thought that he had a right to do so.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, (Division No. 1,) has recently held, that under a statute (Acts Mo. 1893, § 4781.) which provides that "on receipt of his ballot, the

Preparation

of Ballot

Voters,

elector shall, forthwith, and without leaving the polling place, retire alone to one of the places, booths, or compartments provided, to prepare the ballot," the fact that several voters neglected to retire to the booths to mark their bailots will not make their votes illegal, when it does not appear that such neglect was wilful: Hall v. Schoenecke, 31 S.W. Rep. 97. The Court of Appeals of New York, in In re Goodman, 40 N. E. Rep. 769, has affirmed the decision of the court below, reported in 31 N. Y. Suppl. 1043, that, under the Students Constitution of New York, Art. 2, § 3, which provides that, for purposes of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while a student of any seminary of learning, he does not, by rooming in a seminary while a student, gain a right to vote in the election district in which it is situate. It modifies the general language of that decision, however, by adding that there may be circumstances under which a student may gain a residence in the district where the seminary is situate; but that the acquisition of such a residence must be not only intended, but accomplished, wholly apart from his position as a student. See 2 AM. L. REG. & Rev. (N. S.) 220, 281.

Equity cannot, on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, entertain jurisdiction of a bill by the receiver of a national

Equity, Pleading,

Multifariou

ness

bank against its stockholders to recover dividends illegally paid them out of its capital stock, as such a bill is multifarious, one stockholder having no interest in the claim against another: Hayden v. Thompson, (Circuit Court, Dist. of Nebraska,) 67 Fed. Rep. 273.

A conviction for obtaining property under false pretences cannot be had on the extrajudicial statements and admissions of the defendant alone as to the falsity of the statements, since that falsity is part of the corpus delicti, which must be proved otherwise: Pro. v. Simonson, (Supreme Court of California,) 40 Pac. Rep. 440.

False Pretences, Confession

Steam

Radiators

In Capehart v. Foster, 63 N. W. Rep. 257, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has decided some interesting questions on Fixtures, the subject of fixtures, holding that, as between Gas Fixtures, mortgagor and mortgagee, (1) Gas fixtures, consisting of chandeliers and burners, screwed to the ends of the gas pipes projecting from the walls and ceilings of the building, are not a part of the realty; (2) That the foregoing is to be regarded as an arbitrary exception to the general rule regarding fixtures, and does not apply to steam radiators, attached at the floors to steam pipes by being screwed to them, and such radiators are to be considered as a part of the realty; (3) That an electric annunciator, attached to the wall and to ail the wires of the electric bell system of a hotel, is a part of the realty; and (4) That an office desk, about twenty-five feet long, resting on a tile floor, between projections in the walls, to which it was fastened by screws, and forming, with the space behind it, the hotel office, is a part of the realty.

As between the holder of a real estate mortgage and a chattel mortgagee, carpets, curtain rods and gas fixtures, and their attachments, are movables; but as to whether ranges, hot water boilers, sinks and washtubs are movables, depends on when and how they were attached to the house: Manning v. Ogden, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 70.

When land was leased for the use of operating an electric lighting plant, and the lessee built on a solid stone foundation, laid with mortar, a substantial dynamo house, in which he placed two dynamos; and also buiit a boiler house of rough lumber upon sills laid on stone or blocks, with a shaft house or shed, constructed for the most part of old lumber from buildings on the premises, and a shafting twenty-nine fect long, resting on trestles imbedded in the ground to the depth of two feet, it was held that the buildings, as well as the machinery, were accessory to the trade, and therefore were removable as trade fixtures by the lessee, on the termination of the lease: Brown v. Reno Electric Light & Power Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229.

In National Bank of Catasauqua v. North, 160 Pa. 303; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 694, it was held that radiators and valves connected with steam heating apparatus were not fixtures

attached to the realty, but were exactly analogous to gas fixtures, and therefore severable from the real estate.

As between mortgagor and mortgagee, a “bar," fastened by nails and screws to the wall and floor of a building used by the mortgagor as a saloon, is a part of the realty, and passes by the mortgagee: Woodham v. First National Bank of Crookston, 48 Minn. 67; S. C., 50 N. W. Rep. 1015.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has lately ruled, in Stevehot v. Eastern Ry. Co. of Minnesota, 63 N. W. Rep. 256, that property in the hands of a common carrier, in transit to a place outside of the state, is not subject to garnishment, although it is yet within the state at the time of the service of the garnishee summons.

Garnishment,
Common
Carrier

Policy.

According to a recent decision of the Common Pleas of Insurance. New York City and County, at special term, a Limitation of provision in an insurance policy, that no action Right to Sue shall be brought on it by the insured, exccpt against the attorneys in fact representing all of the insurers, is against public policy, on the ground that it ousts the jurisdiction of the courts: Knorr v. Bates, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 691.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in refusing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in In re Debs, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900, went further than the circuit court, and based its decision on exceedingly broad principles, which will make it a landmark in the legal history of this country. These, as laid down in the opinion of Mr. Justice BREWER, are as follows:

Interstate Commerce, Obstruction of Mails. Injunction, Contempt

(1) The government of the United States is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each citizen; and, while it is a government of enumerated powers, it has within the limits of these powers all the attributes of sovereignty:

(2) To it is committed power over interstate commerce, and the transmission of the mail; and the powers thus conferred are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practi cal exercis by the legislation of Congress. In the exercise of

these powers, it is competent for. the nation (through its officers) to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mail:

(3) While it may be competent for the government, (through the executive branch, and in the use of the entire executive power of the nation,) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally within its power to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence and character of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exisit, or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of these courts to remove or restrain such obstructions:

(4) The jurisdiction of the courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient times, and by indubitable authority; and is not ousted by the fact that the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in themselves violations of the criminal law:

(5) The proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt, which are not an execution of the criminal laws of the land; and therefore the penalty for a violation of an injunction is no substitute for, and no defence to, a prosecution for any criminal offence committed in the course of such violation:

(6) That as the complaint in this case clearly showed an existing obstruction of artificial highways for the passage of interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail, not only temporarily existing, but threatening to continue, the circuit court had power to issue its process of injunction; that having issued, and having been served on the defendants, the circuit court had authority to inquire whether its orders had been disobeyed; when it found that they had been, then to proceed under Rev. Stat. U. S. § 725, and enter the order of punishment complained of; and, the circuit court having full jurisdiction in the premises, its finding of the fact of disobedience is not open to review on habeas corpus in the supreme or any other court.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, (Division No. 2,) has

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