Preliminary rules: (1) That when, on rendition proceedings, a copy of the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing in the state from which the accused has fled, is attached to the requisition, the court will not, on kabias corpus, examine into the evidence, to see if it sustains the charge of crime alleged in the information, or whether it supports the finding of the examining court that there was probable cause to believe that the party committed the crime charged; and (2) That in rendition proceedings, an indictment found is prima facie evidence that the act charged amounts to a crime; and when a state has adopted criminal procedure by information, ard it appears that the person accused has been given a preliminary hearing, been held to answer at a higher court, and an information has been filed in that court, a copy of which is attached to the requisition, such information is of as high a grade, as a criminal pleading, as an indictment, is entitled to the same weight as evidence, and will be so construed: In re Van Sceiver, 60 N. W. Rep. 1037. Intoxicating Liquers, Original Package The court last mentioned has also, in conformity with the weight of authority, declared, that when bottles of intoxicating liquor were each inclosed in a paper wrapper or box which was sealed with sealing wax, and a number of these paper boxes, each containing a flask of such liquor, was packed in a wooden box by a party in one state, and shipped to his agent in another state; and the agent opened the wooden box, took out the paper boxes in which the flasks of liquor were contained, and sold them separately;—that the wooden box was the original package, and not the scaled paper box or wrapper, and the flask therein inclosed: Haley v. State, 60 N. W. Rep. 962. This is the general opinion: Harrison v. State, 91 Ala. 62 ; S. C., 10 So. Rep. 30; State v. Chapman, S. Dak. 414; S. C., 47 N. W. Rep. 411; In re Harmon, 43 Fed. Rep. 372; whether the boxes are closed or open: Smith v. State, 54 Ark. 248; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 882. See Comm. v. Schollenberger, (Pa.), 27 Atl. Rep. 30; Comm. v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615; S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 7. The courts of Iowa have held the con trary: State v. Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep. 921; State v. Miller, (Iowa), 53 N.W. Rep. 330; though even there a sale of such bottles over the bar, with permission to the purchasers to open them on the premises, and facilities furnished for drinking the contents, has been held not a sale from the original package; a doctrine utterly inconsistent with the former one: Hopkins v. Lewis, 84 Iowa, 690; S. C., 51 N. W. Rep. 255. If, however, the bottles are separately wrapped and labelled, and delivered to a carrier, and the latter, for its own convenience, puts them in a box furnished by itself, and fastened to the floor of the car, so as to be virtually a part thereof, the bottles, and not the box, are then the original packages: Keith v. State, (Ala.), 8 So. Rep. 353; and the same rule applies to any box furnished by the carrier without the knowledge of the consignor, whether fastened to the car or not: Tinker v. State, 96 Ala. 115; S. C., 11 So. Rep. 383. According to the opinion of ROMER, J., of the Chancery Division, a covenant in a lease not to erect or build on the demised premises, without the written consent of Lease. Covenant the lessor, "any other building whatsoever," save and except a stable and coach-house, is violated by the erection, without the lessor's consent, above the boundary fence of the premises, of an open trellis-work screen of wood, about fifty-eight feet long and twelve feet high, which interfered to some extent with the light flowing to the ground floor windows of the adjacent premises, held on a lease from the same lessor, with covenants similar to those of the defendant; and that, under the circumstances, the erection was also a breach of a covenant not to do on the demised premises any act, matter or thing, which might be an annoyance or nuisance to any tenant of the lessor: Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch. 671. The Supreme Court of Missouri has recently decided, that when an owner of valuable mineral lands makes a lease of them, in consideration that the lessce will establish manufactories thereon, and dig and quarry stone or other mineral therefrom, and of the payment of one dollar Rescission per carload of mineral mined; and the lessee fails to erect manufactories or work the mineral, but, one year thereafter, agrees with several manufacturers not to work the mineral for three years; the lessor may rescind the contract: Oliver v. Gorts, 28 S. W. Rep. 441. Libel. The Supreme Court of Oregon holds, that when a libelous article does not name the person alluded to therein, witnesses may testify, on a criminal prosecution, that, in Person Meant reading the article, they understood, from their acquaintance with the prosecuting witness and the circumstances alluded to in the article, that it was intended to refer to him: State v. Mason, 38 Pac. Rep. 130. So, when a witness testifies that the words used referred to the plaintiff, and that he knew the defendant was talking about the plaintiff, the evidence is sufficient to prove that the words were spoken of the plaintiff: Dexter v. Harrison, (III.) 34 N. E. Rep. 46. But, when a libelous article is ambiguous, a witness may not state to whom, in his opinion, it refers, but, after simply replying in the affirmative to the question, "Do you know to whom it applied?" may subsequently give facts and circumstances which show who was pointed to by the publication : Smith v. Sun Pub. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 399. If the plaintiff's name is used by mistake, there being no intention to refer to him, and the name is not accurately given, there can be no recovery: Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., (Mass.), 34 N. E. Rep. 462. The Court of Appeals of Colorado has reached the just decision that a newspaper article, giving an account of a person's arrest, and stating that he has been guilty of infamous crimes, though published in good faith, is not privileged: Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy, 38 Pac. Rep. 423; See Democrat Pub. Co. v. Jones, 83 Tex. 302. An accusation of crime will not be privileged, merely because the person accused is a public official, or a candidate for office: Upton v. Hume, (Oreg.), 33 Pac. Rep. 810; Post. Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. Rep. 530, affirming Hallam v. Post. Pub. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 456. Privilege The Court of Appeal of England, in Mellin v. White, [1894] 3 Ch. 276, has lately passed upon a very interesting Trade case of trade libel. White, a chemist, was sup 'Mellin's Infants' Food," White sold it at retail, first made up in bottles, and labelled. affixing to each bottle a notice as follows: "The public are recommended to try Dr. Vance's Prepared Food for Infants and Invalids, it being far more healthful and nutritious than any other preparation yet offered." White was the owner of Dr. Vance's preparation. Mellin brought an action for an injunction to restrain White from affixing these notices, and adduced evidence to show that his food was much better than Dr. Vance's, especially for infants under six months of age; but the case was dismissed by the judge below, after hearing the plaintiff's evidence, without calling on the defendant, on the ground that the defendant's notice was a mere puff of Dr. Vance's preparation, and gave the plaintiff no legal ground of complaint. This was held error by the Court of Appeal, for if, on the whole of the evidence, it should appear that the statement contained in the defendant's notice was a false statement about the plaintiff's goods, and to the disparagement of them, and had injured, or was likely to injure the plaintiff, the action would lie. False statements concerning the goods or business of another are actionable, if special damage results: Western Cos. Manure Co. v. Lawes Chem. Manure Co., 9 L. R. Exch. 218. Such are insinuations that goods are spurious: Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; or that a patent is infringed by the articles manufactured by the plaintiff: Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo. 492; See Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. v. Haney School Furniture Co., 92 Mich. 558; S. C., 52 N.W. Rep. 1009. If the words used are not actionable per se, but constitute an untrue statement, maliciously published concerning plaintiff's business, which statement is intended, or is reasonably likely to produce, and in the ordinary course of things does produce a general loss of business, as distinct from the loss of particular known customers, evidence of such general loss of business is admissible, and sufficient to support the action: Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524. Limitation of The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has lately ruled that when a corporation, being financially embarrassed, places its affairs in the hands of a committee of its creditors, Actions for adjustment and settlement, the payment of a dividend by the committee to a creditor of the corporation, is such a voluntary payment by the corporation as will take the claim of that creditor out of the statute of limitations: Prabody v. Tenney, 30 Atl. Rep. 456. 'Prosecution According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, while, ordinarily, the dismissal of a warrant Malicious by a justice of the peace, with the consent of the party prosecuting, is a sufficient determination of the proceeding to authorize an action for malicious prosecution; yet, when the prosecution is dismissed by an agreement between the parties, by which the party prosecuted is to pay part of the costs, the burden, in an action for malicious prosecution, of showing probable cause, is not thrown on the defendant: Welch v. Cook, 20 S. E. Rep. 460. A discharge by a justice on preliminary examination is a sufficient termination of the prosecution to found an action for malicious prosecution : Dreyfus v. Aul, 29 Neb. 191 ; even when he was at first inclined to hold the accused to bail, but discharged him on a promise of good behavior: Robbins v. Robbins, 133 N. Y. 597; S. C., 30 N. E. Rep. 977. The same is true of an entry of wolle prosequi: Woodman v. Frescott, (N. H.), 22 Atl. Rep. 456. But when a magistrate discharges a prisoner without investigation into the merits, and for lack of jurisdiction, and a prosecution is afterwards brought in another county for the same offence, and a wolle prosequi is entered with the consent of the prosecutor, and after having the advice of counsel, that, aside from the truth of the charge, the prosecution is likely to fail for the same reason, neither discharge can be considered as a fact from which to infer malice or want of probable cause: McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86; S. C., 30 W. N. C. 339; 24 Atl. Rep. 1042; and when, after a criminal complaint entered in the supreme court on appeal, a nolle prosequi is entered by the |