The same objection is made to the certificates of the commissioners of highways as to the amount necessary to be raised by taxation as was made in the case of People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. (ante, p. 527.) It was there held that the certificate of the amount necessary to be raised by taxation was all that was required by the statute and that the preliminary action of the commissioners need not be shown.

The delinquent list filed by the collector set forth the statutory description of appellant's railroad track and right of way in Clark county, commencing at the point where the said railroad track crosses the north boundary line of the county in entering the same and extending to the point where the said railroad track crosses the south boundary line of the county in leaving the same. The judgment was rendered separately for the taxes due in each township against the railroad track and right of way in such township. This was the proper judgment to be rendered.

It is objected that there is a variance between the delinquent list and the judgment. The delinquent list properly described all the railroad track of the appellant in the county. It would have been improper to render a judgment against all the property for the road and bridge tax in each town, but the judgment was properly limited in each case to that part of the property located in the town in which the particular tax was assessed. People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis and Western Railway Co. 261 Ill. 582; People v. Toledo, St. Louis and Western Railroad Co. 266 id. 112.

Another objection made is that the certificates of the commissioners were not filed with the county clerk until after the first Tuesday in September. The language of section 56 of the statute is, that at a meeting to be held on the first Tuesday in September the board of highway commissioners shall determine and certify to the board of supervisors the amount necessary to be raised by taxation, and that such certificate shall be filed in the office of the county

clerk and by that officer presented to the county board at the regular September meeting for its consideration. The statute is complied with if the meeting is held at the time fixed and the amount necessary to be raised by taxation is then determined and certified to the board of supervisors and the certificate made filed with the county clerk in time for presentation to the board of supervisors at their September meeting.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. SAMUEL SIMPSON, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 22, 1915.

1. CRIMINAL LAW—when jury are sufficiently advised as to law of self-defense. In a murder trial the jury are sufficiently advised of the law of self-defense where the court, in connection with an instruction containing sections 148 and 149 of division I of the Criminal Code, gave an instruction stating that men threatened with danger are obliged to judge from appearances, and that the defendant would be justified in the homicide if the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would have reasonable ground to believe he was in danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury.

2. SAME when a motion for new trial is properly denied. A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, consisting of the testimony of two witnesses as to threats made by the deceased against the defendant and that the deceased had a loaded revolver when he was talking to one witness, is properly denied, where the defendant testified on the trial as to the threats by the deceased and it is beyond question that the deceased had no revolver at the time of the homicide.

3. SAME-defendant should ask for a continuance if attendance of witness cannot be secured for the trial. Where a subpoena has been served on a witness for the defendant but the attendance of the witness at the trial cannot be procured, the defendant should ask for a continuance instead of waiting until after judgment and then moving for a new trial to enable him to have the testimony of such witness.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN M. O'CONNOR, Judge, presiding.

SHORT, DAVIS & RUST, for plaintiff in error.

P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, and George P. RAMSEY, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

The plaintiff in error, Samuel Simpson, was indicted and tried in the criminal court of Cook county for the murder of Louis Buchanan and was convicted of manslaughter. He has brought the record by writ of error to this court for review.

At the trial defendant admitted killing Louis Buchanan between five and six o'clock in the afternoon of Monday, May 12, 1913, by shooting him with a 38-calibre revolver, but claimed that he killed him in self-defense. The defendant and Buchanan were negroes, and at the time of the homicide Buchanan was walking west from State street on the north side of Thirty-third street, and, having crossed toward the south side of the street, continued west along the middle of the street. The defendant came north on Dearborn street, the next street west of State street,— carrying a suit-case, overcoat, rain-coat and umbrella. He came into Thirty-third street and crossed to the north side of the street, going east toward State street. When he and Buchanan were about twenty or twenty-five feet apart, near the alley running north and south between State and Dearborn streets, the shooting occurred. There was one witness of what then happened, who testified for the People. He appeared to be free from any bias or partiality, and if he had any prejudice it was against Buchanan, who was a gambler and confidence man, and who, the witness said, had cheated him out of $30 by shooting craps with loaded dice.

That witness testified that he was going to a saloon for beer and went into the side entrance of the saloon; that when he first saw the defendant he had a revolver in his right hand and was in a bending position, setting his suitcase down and motioning with his left hand toward Buchanan as if to keep him back. The witness turned to go down the alley, when he heard two shots, and looking back he saw the defendant shooting and walking toward Buchanan, who was standing still, with his right hand up and his left hand in the region of his abdomen. The first two shots were followed in quick succession by three others, and Buchanan walked over to the south side of the street and sat on the steps. Buchanan was taken to a hospital and died the next day. There were two shots in each arm and the fatal shot was in the right side. It entered at the ninth rib and took a downward course through the liver, above the kidney, and finally lodged near the femoral artery on the left side of the body.

The defendant and two others testified for the defense concerning the occurrence. One witness said that he was standing at the northwest corner of Thirty-third and Dearborn streets when he saw a man with a suit-case coming north on the east side of Dearborn street; that the man turned and went east on Thirty-third street, and a heavyset, dark-skinned man was coming west on that street and told the man with the suit-case to wait a minute,-that he wanted to see him; that the man with the suit-case told the other to stay off of him, and the other man called him a vile name and said he was going to kill him, and made for his belt; that the man with the suit-case dropped it and knelt down and commenced shooting, and the heavy-set man threw his hand out and staggered and then sat down on the steps. The other witness, an undertaker, who was at the inquest upon the body of Buchanan and who did not reveal anything that he knew at that time or until the trial, said that Buchanan went along Thirty-third street, and

when he got to the alley went down the middle of the street; that the defendant came around the corner from Dearborn street and started east, with a suit-case in his hand and an overcoat on his arm; that Buchanan said to the defendant he wanted to see him, and the defendant said to get back and leave him alone; that the defendant stopped and squatted down and drew his revolver; that Buchanan called the defendant a vile name and said he was going to kill him, and Buchanan had his hand down in front of him, and when he made that motion the defendant fired; that Buchanan had his right hand up and did not stop going toward the defendant until the third shot was fired, when he turned and went to the south sidewalk.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, told of a difficulty between Buchanan and himself on the morning of the day of the homicide. The defendant was a married man, having a wife and five children, but had been rooming at 3323 South Dearborn street in a house occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, Cora Marshall and Lydia Dorsey. Cora Marshall had for years been a notorious character in the neighborhood and went by the name of Big Sis, and Lydia Dorsey lived with her and passed as her daughter, although she was not, in fact, her daughter. The defendant testified that Buchanan had been in Dayton, Ohio, at the time of a flood, and on that Monday morning came to the defendant's bed-room, where he was in bed, and said that the defendant had got the woman and that he ought to kill him and her too; that the defendant had bought strawberries and chicken for her and she had given them to him; that she brought him a dinner and he threw it out and broke the dish. The defendant protested against the charges and denied having the woman, and they talked about a wager with reference to something that Buchanan charged the defendant with having told a lieutenant. The defendant said that Buchanan told him that he should not stay there, and if he was there when he came back he would