Among

papers required by law to be filed in his office. other things he is required to record in the book of records of his district all orders and directions of the highway commissioners required by law to be kept and as thereinafter provided for. Section 80 provides for the filing and recording by the town clerk of all agreements for or releases of damages in the establishment, alteration, widening or vacating of roads. Sections 92 and 99 provide for recording final orders with reference to the establishment of roads. Section 121 is as follows: "The commissioners shall keep a full and accurate record of all their proceedings under this act, and shall, upon the completion of the road, file with the town or district clerk all records, papers, plans, plats, estimates, specifications and contracts, and shall make a full report to, and settlement with the board of town auditors or district clerk as provided in section 50 of this act. If the commissioners fail to make such settlement, the supervisor or board of county commissioners shall cause an action to be instituted against them in the corporate name of the township or road district to enforce such settlement."

In our judgment the duty of the clerk to keep a record of the proceedings of the commissioners is not any less extensive than it was under the former act. The language of section 121 is positive and unequivocal. Unless limited by construction there can be no doubt of its requirement that the commissioners shall keep a full and accurate record of all their proceedings. This section was a part of the act to authorize the construction and maintenance of gravel, rock, macadam or other hard roads, (Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 2038,) which, with some modifications, was inserted in the Road and Bridge law of 1913 as subdivision 8 of article 6, under the head of "Gravel, rock and macadam hard roads." Article 6 deals with the general subject of the town and district organization and administration for highway purposes, and is the portion of the act which provides for the election of highway commissioners, defines their

duties and powers and provides for their organization and method of performing their duties. We see no reason why the requirement for the keeping of records should be limited by construction because of the part of the act in which the requirement appears. The subdivision in which section 121 appears is dealing with the particular subject of hard roads, but the language used is general and refers in express terms to all proceedings under the act. We cannot assume that there was any inadvertence in the use of this language. It might be thought that this provision would be found more logically and naturally in some other part of the act bearing particular reference to the general powers and duties of the commissioners or of the clerk. It cannot, however, be held ineffective, nor can its meaning be limited, because of the incongruity of the connection in which it appears, unless some reason appears requiring the clause to be given an interpretation different from its natural meaning. The character of the proceedings of the highway commissioners is such that records of them would naturally be required. For many years such records have been expressly required by statute. The act under consideration expressly requires the keeping of such records, and unless something in the act itself clearly requires the general terms in which this requirement is expressed to be restricted, or indicates an intention to change the law in this respect, it must be held that the legislature intended that a record should be kept of all proceedings of the highway commissioners. The board of highway commissioners is a quasi municipal corporation. It is vested with important powers and has imposed upon it important duties. Commissioners of highways, in the aggregate, expend vast amounts of the public money. They levy large sums for public purposes. The construction and maintenance of public highways and bridges and the expenditure of money for those purposes are in their hands. They must act in their corporate capacity by votes taken at meetings at which the individual com

missioners act in their official capacity. Even if the act did not, in terms, require that the board should keep a record of its proceedings, yet the nature of the duties of the commissioners makes it important that such a record should be kept. Only by this means could there be any certainty or permanency about their action. If the levy of taxes, the laying out and establishing of roads, the settlement of damages, the calling of elections, the issuing of bonds and other action of the commissioners were left to be determined by the uncertain memories of the participants in those transactions, weeks or months or years after they occurred, there would be no stability in such matters. These ought to be preserved by a permanent record, and we hold that under the Road and Bridge act as it now exists the commissioners of highways are required to keep a record of their proceedings. This disposes of the case. There was no record of a meeting of the commissioners at which the rate to be certified to the county board was determined, and the objection of the appellant should have been sustained.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the county court to sustain the objection. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE, dissenting:

I am of the opinion that the present Road and Bridge act nowhere requires the clerk to keep a record of all the official acts and proceedings of the commissioners of highways, and that in the absence of such statutory requirement, under the authority of Town of Old Town v. Dooley, 81 Ill. 255, the commissioners are not required to keep a record of their acts and the proceedings of the commissioners may be proved by parol.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Henry Stuckart, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CHICAGO, LAKE SHORE AND EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.-Same Appellee VS. THE KENSINGTON AND EASTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.-Same Appellee vs. THE NORTHwestern Elevated Railroad COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 10, 1915.

I. TAXES amount needed to pay judgments must be included in the $1.20 rate for corporate purposes. Section 1 of article 8 of the Cities and Villages act fixes the limitation of $1.20 on each $100 of taxable property for all taxes levied by a city in any one year, exclusive of the amount levied for bonded indebtedness and interest thereon; and this does not authorize the exclusion of the amount necessary to pay judgments not rendered for bonded indebtedness or interest thereon, notwithstanding the provision of the Revenue act for scaling taxes.

2. SAME amounts required for other purposes must be reduced, if necessary, to pay judgments. If the amount required by a city. in any one year, including the amount needed to pay judgments not for bonded indebtedness or interest thereon, exceeds what will be produced by the rate of $1.20 on each $100 of taxable property, exclusive of bonded indebtedness and interest, the provision of the Revenue act that no reduction of any tax levy shall diminish the amount levied pursuant to any mandate or judgment of the court, requires that the amounts required for other purposes shall be reduced accordingly.

3. SAME the tax for mothers' pension fund is not exclusive of limitation for county taxes. The tax for mothers' pension fund is a tax for ordinary county purposes, which, though it is not subject to the scaling process, must be considered when taxes for other county purposes are being scaled to make the rate of forty cents, and it is improper to add the rate per cent for the mothers' pension fund to the rate of forty cents.

4. SAME County clerk may add rate to pay bonds and interest to the rate of forty cents. After the taxes for county purposes have been reduced to the rate of forty cents a rate to pay bonds and interest may be added, since a county may levy a tax to pay bonded indebtedness in addition to other county taxes, when it can do so within the constitutional and statutory limitation.

5. SAME when addition by clerk of an amount to cover loss and cost of collection is authorized. The county clerk, in extend

ing a tax for the payment of bonds, may add a reasonable sum for loss and cost of collection of that tax, even though the county board has appropriated a reasonable sum for loss and cost of collection of general taxes.

6. SAME-right of the clerk to raise fractions to whole numbers. Under section 128 of the Revenue act, authorizing the clerk to extend a fraction of a cent as a whole cent, the clerk may raise fractions or decimals to whole numbers in the aggregate tax of each taxing body, but he is not authorized to raise fractions to whole numbers as to each separate item in the levy of a taxing body.

7. SAME statute requires record to be kept of essential steps in levying taxes. The statute requires that a record be kept of the essential steps in levying a tax, and they cannot be left to the uncertain memories of clerks or officers.

8. SAME what does not invalidate park tax. Where a park lies in two towns, the fact that the park tax is not uniform in the two towns does not invalidate the tax in its entirety, nor to any extent if the tax is equitably distributed so as to maintain a fair balance between the two towns.

9. SAME-penalties should not be added to taxes the treasurer refuses to accept. If a tax-payer objects to certain taxes as being illegal but concedes that other taxes are valid and offers to pay the same but the treasurer refuses to accept the money, it is error to charge the penalty of one per cent after the first day of May on the taxes which the tax-payer endeavored to pay.

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN H. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

BRUNDAGE, LANDON & HOLT, KNAPP & CAMPBELL, ROYAL B. CUSHING, and JOHN N. WHEATLEY, (Robert N. HOLT, of counsel,) for appellants.

MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, and FRANCIS O'SHAUGHNESSY, (HENRY A. BERGER, P. J. MURPHY, I. N. WALKER, and H. N. BELL, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

Upon the application of the county collector of Cook county for judgment against lands and lots for delinquent taxes, the Chicago, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Com