interest his father had in the premises at the time of his death was the mortgage to secure the $7000 note. The master reported that the complainants in the bill were not, entitled to the relief prayed and recommended a decree dismissing the bill. The chancellor, after overruling exceptions to the report, entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. We think the decree is correct. The evidence did not raise a suspicion that the deed was procured through undue influence. The grantee was not present in the notary's office when the deed was executed. It was left with the notary to be delivered to the grantee when he came in the next day and signed the note and mortgage. The evidence showed the deed was delivered pursuant to the grantor's intention to presently pass title to the grantee subject to the life estate in the grantor. Conceding that John Reibold was incompetent to testify to facts occurring before the death of his father, as contended by plaintiffs in error, and that the question was properly preserved, the other evidence abundantly establishes the fact of delivery. The will of Lorenz Reibold recognizes that the testator did not own the land but that he had previously conveyed it to his son, and the will does not pretend to devise the land to John Reibold or to give him any interest therein. It simply provides how the proceeds of the note the testator held as a consideration for the conveyance to John Reibold shall be paid by him, as executor, on specific legacies to testator's children and grandchildren. There is no foundation for the claim of plaintiffs in error that the deed, note, mortgage and will should be considered together, and when so considered it would appear that the deed was in the nature of a testamentary disposition of the land and passed no present interest to the grantee. Under the evidence in this case it could not have been held otherwise than that John Reibold took title to the land by virtue of the deed, and his title was not affected nor attemped to be affected by the will afterwards made. Plaintiffs in error insist the chancellor should have at least retained the bill for an accounting. To have done so would have been practically to take the administration of the estate out of the probate court, as that court has jurisdiction to grant all the relief asked on that ground. The chancellor was right in dismissing the bill and cross-bill for want of equity, and the decree is affirmed. Decree affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. Paul Armstrong, Plaintiff in Error, VS. THE CHICAGO RAILWAYS COMPANY et al. Defendants in Error. Opinion filed October 27, 1915-Rehearing denied Dec. 9, 1915. This case is controlled by the decision in People v. Chicago Railways Co. (ante, p. 87.) WRIT OF ERROR to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARles M. Foell, Judge, presiding. B. F. LANGWORTHY, and WILLIAM R. Moss, (S. S. GREGORY, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. JOHN J. HERRICK, and HORACe Kent TennEY, for defendant in error the Chicago Railways Company. JOHN W. BECKWITH, Corporation Counsel, and CHAS. M. HAFT, for defendant in error the city of Chicago. Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: The situation disclosed by the record in this case is the same as that in People v. Chicago Railways Co. (ante, p. 87,) with the exception that in this case the petition for mandamus was filed on the relation of Paul Armstrong, president of the village of River Forest, and it was sought to compel the Chicago Railways Company and the County Traction Company to establish and maintain a five-cent rate of fare for transportation between the western boundary line of the village of River Forest and the loop district in the city of Chicago. The same plea was filed to the petition and the same replication to the plea as in the case above mentioned. The court sustained the demurrer interposed by the Chicago Railways Company to the replication and rendered judgment in favor of the Chicago Railways Company and the city of Chicago. For the reasons given in People v. Chicago Railways Co. supra, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the replication. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. Thomas C. Kerrick, Plaintiff in Error, VS. THE COMMISSIONERS OF HIGHWAYS OF SULLIVANT TOWNSHIP, Defendants in Error. Opinion filed October 27, 1915-Rehearing denied Dec. 9, 1915. 1. STATUTES-object in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislative intent. The object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, and to that end the whole act, the law existing prior to its passage, any changes in the law made by the act and the apparent motive for making such changes, will be weighed and considered. 2. SAME when the word "may" will be held to mean "shall." The fact that the language of a statute is permissive in form of expression does not determine the question of the legislative intent, and the word "may" will be held to mean "must" or "shall" in cases where public interests and rights are concerned and where the public or third persons have a claim of right that the given power shall be exercised. 3. HIGHWAYS-act of 1913, providing that commissioners may reduce width of public road on petition, is mandatory. In view of the facts that section 73 of the Road and Bridge act of 1913 provides that all public roads established under such act shall be forty feet wide, and that section 74 withdraws the question of the consideration of the public interest from the commissioners upon a petition by adjoining land owners to narrow an existing public road to the width of forty feet, which question was reserved to the commissioners by the acts of 1897 and 1907, it must be held that said section 74 is mandatory, notwithstanding its language is permissive in form. 4. SAME-road may be narrowed on petition for less than its entire length in the township. If a majority of the land owners along one mile of road in a township petition the commissioners of highways to narrow such mile of road to a width of forty feet it is the duty of the commissioners to grant the prayer of the petition, even though the road extends for six miles in the township. 5. SAME when signers of a petition cannot withdraw names. The signers of a petition to highway commissioners to narrow a public road cannot withdraw their names after the commissioners have acted upon the petition and suit is begun in the circuit court to compel the commissioners to grant the prayer of the petition. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Ford county; the Hon. T. M. HARRIS, Judge, presiding. THOMAS C. KERRICK, pro se, and BRACKEN & YOUNG, for plaintiff in error. CLOUD & THOMPSON, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court: Thomas C. Kerrick, plaintiff in error, filed his petition in the circuit court of Ford county for a writ of mandamus commanding the commissioners of highways of Sullivant township, defendants in error, to reduce the width of a public road one mile in length and fifty feet in width between. sections 24 and 25, in Sullivant township, to a width of forty feet, in accordance with the prayer of a petition presented to them and signed by the owners of the land along the line of the road and which they had rejected. The defendants answered, and by paragraph 1 admitted the filing of the petition but denied that it truly set forth all matters of fact therein stated. By paragraph 2 they denied that the public highway was one mile in length, but alleged that it continued westward from the northeast corner of section 25 in a direct line for six miles to the west line of the township. By paragraph 3 they admitted that the signers of the petition were owners of all of the land along the line of the road between sections 24 and 25, but denied that they were a majority of the land owners along the line of the whole road six miles in length. By paragraph 4 they admitted considering and rejecting the petition. By paragraph 5 they denied that the law was mandatory and required them to grant the prayer of the petition, and alleged that the question of reducing the width of the highway was one resting in their sound discretion. By paragraph 6 they alleged that two land owners who signed the petition withdrew their names therefrom on December 2, 1914, which was after the suit was begun and during its pendency. The relator replied to paragraph 2 that the road described in the petition was laid out and established as a public road one mile in length about thirty-five years ago, and that no public road extending westward from the west end thereof was laid out until twenty years after the road in question was established. The defendants demurred to the replication, and the court sustained the motion of the relator to carry the demurrer to the replication back to paragraph 2 of the answer and sustained the demurrer to that paragraph. The defendants elected to stand by paragraph 2. The relator demurred to paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 6. The court, in accordance with the ruling concerning paragraph 2, sustained the demurrer to paragraph 3 and also sustained the demurrer to paragraph 6, and the defendants elected to stand by those paragraphs. The court overruled the demurrers to paragraphs 1 and 5 and the relator elected to stand by the demurrers. The relator having elected to stand by the demurrers to paragraphs I and 5 and refusing to reply, the court dismissed the petition |