CHAPTER V.

THE MEXICAN MARCH TOWARDS SAN JACINTO HOUSTON'S RETREAT-CAMPS IN MILL CREEK BOTTOM-THE MEXICANS MEET WITH RESISTANCE AT SAN FELIPE, AND TURN DOWN THE RIVER TO RICHMOND-BOTH ARMIES CROSS THE BRAZOS.

THE

HE length of time required to capture the small garrison of the Alamo had been very vexatious to the President-General of Mexico, whose previous military movements had been conducted with great rapidity. But his victory was complete, and he now had leisure to plan for further operations. On the 11th of March he ordered Generals Sesma and Woll, with 675 infantry, 50 dragoons, two six-pounders and eight days' rations, to march for the interior, intending that they should go, via Columbus, San Felipe and Harrisburg, to Ananuac. He also ordered about 400 men, with three guns, under Colonel Juan Morales, to reinforce Urrea at Goliad. His plan contemplated the invasion of the province by three divisions. One, consisting of about 750 men, under General Gaona, was to go via Bastrop and Washington to Nacogdoches; the coast division of 1,700 men, under Urrea, to advance via Victoria, Brazoria, and Galveston to Ananuac; and the central division, of about 4,000, under Filisola, was to follow the route taken by Sesma. Santa Anna, when he heard of the capture of Fannin, thought the conquest of Texas was effected, and in the exuberance of his delight gave orders to his subordinates to shoot all prisoners. He intended soon to return to his capital, and leave Filisola and Almonte to complete the reorganization of the government of the conquered province. But having heard from Sesma that a considerable army, under Houston, was encamped on the east bank of the

Colorado, he, at the solicitation of Almonte and Filisola, concluded to remain and complete his work.

On the fourth day of the session of the Convention at San Felipe, General Houston was re-elected commander-in-chief of the forces in the field. Two days later, on the 6th, the day the Alamo fell, Houston, with George W. Hockley, chief of staff, and one or two companions, left Washington for the headquarters of the army at Gonzales, arriving there on the 11th. Mr. Yoakum says: "It was Houston's intention to combine the forces of Fannin and Neil and march to the aid of Travis." But Houston, in his last senatorial speech, says he had anticipated that calamity (the fall of the Alamo), and went to Gonzales, intending to fall back. There has been no little controversy as to the number of men at Gonzales when Houston arrived there. Mr. Yoakum fixes the number at 374; other authorities make it twice as large, though no thorough organization had been effected. As our readers will remember, thirty-two of the citizen soldiers from Gonzales entered the Alamo during the siege. The night Houston reached the place, the sad tidings arrived that the Alamo had fallen and its brave defenders were all killed. This produced an indescribable scene of grief in the town, as a dozen women and a large number of children had lost their husbands and fathers. A terrible panic ensued. Twenty-five soldiers, says Houston, deserted that night, and fleeing towards the Sabine, spread the news and the panic throughout the country.

Houston deemed a retreat inevitable, and securing the women and children, the party took up the line of march about midnight, March 12th. As the rear guard left the town, the place was fired, without any orders. The Texans arrived at Peach creek the next day. Here they met a reinforcement of 125 men; but when the news of the massacre of Travis and his companions was told the new troops, twenty-five of them immediately left for their homes. The Texans reached the Navidad on the 14th, and the Colorado,

at Burnham's, on the 17th, where the river was crossed; the army now numbering about six hundred men. Descending the stream, they encamped on the west bank, opposite Columbus, until the 25th. In the mean time, the Mexican advance, under Sesma, had reached the right bank of the river. By the 26th, Houston's army had increased to

between twelve hundred and fifteen hundred men.

Houston has been severely censured for not making a stand at that place. The river offered a good line of defence; and as soon as he resumed his retrograde movement, many men, whose families would be exposed, had to leave the army to secure their safety. In his last speech in the Senate, he gives the reason for his retreat. When encamped on the Lavaca river, going west, he had dispatched Col. Wm. T. Austin to Velasco for artillery. The guns were shipped up to Columbia, but owing to excessive rains, it was found impossible to transport them to army headquarters. Without artillery, and the soldiers depressed by the sad fate of Travis and of Fannin, Houston thought it best to fall back to the Brazos. When he reached the river at San Felipe, instead of crossing the stream and establishing a line of defense, he turned up across Mill creek, and encamped, from the 29th of March until the 12th of April, in the bottom.

Mosely Baker, with a company of about one hundred men, was stationed on the east bank of the river, opposite San Felipe, to protect the ferry, and prevent the enemy from passing the stream. At Richmond, Wylie Martin, with fortysix men, was guarding the two ferries. On the day that Houston encamped on the west bank of the Brazos, Santa Anna started the bulk of his army from San Antonio; the central division following Sesma, and Gaona marching for Bastrop. The General himself did not leave the city until the last day of March, and arrived at Columbus on the 5th of April. Leaving his heavy guns and most of the infantry to follow, the President, with a division of cavalry, reached

the neighborhood of San Felipe on the 7th. The town had been burnt. Baker showed so determined a resistance, that the Mexicans deflected down the river, camping at Cole's on the 9th and 10th, and sending a foraging party to the fine Mercer and Heard plantations, for provisions, sugar, etc. At Cole's a negro was captured and dispatched to Houston, with an insolent message to the General, in which Santa Anna told him that he knew where he was; and as soon as he had cleaned out the land of thieves at Harrisburg, he was coming back to smoke him-Houston-out. The negro delivered the message. On the 11th the Mexicans camped at Powell's, and reached Richmond on the 12th. Almonte, who knew the place, rode down to the lower ferry, kept by Mr. Morton, and in good English announced that the Mexicans were approaching, and he wanted to make his escape. The negro ferryman, deceived by the speech, took the boat over, and it was instantly seized by the Mexican soldiers. In the meantime, the Mexicans were firing their guns at Captain Martin's company, at the upper ferry; while others were crossing below. When Martin ascertained the ruse that had been practiced, he immediately started up the river to report to Houston.

Houston seized the steamer, Yellowstone, that had entered the Brazos to carry out cotton; and with this steamer, and a ferry boat, crossed the stream opposite Groce's on the same days—April 12th and 16th-that Santa Anna crosșed the advance division of Mexicans at Richmond.

The pertinent question recurs, why did Houston remain so long in the bottom?

This hiding of himself, and so long period of inaction, have been severely criticised. He had stepped, so to speak, right out of the way of Santa Anna; but did not ascend the river far enough to intercept Gaona, who would cross at Washington or Tenoxticlan. Newell, in his history, says this was done for a secure position. If Houston wished to avoid a fight, this was a very secure position. In his Sen