2. EVERY PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF VALIDITY.

Every presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute. Ex Parte Goddard, 128.

3. INTERPRETATION SOUGHT WHICH WILL AVOID ABSURDITY.

Such an interpretation of the constitution must be sought as will avoid absurd consequences and as will be least likely to produce mischief, State v. Brodigan, 306.

4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PROHIBITION STATUTE NOT DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.

Prohibition statute held not violative of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, sec. 1, as denying equal protection of law to all persons; test being whether all persons similarly situated are affected alike in respect to privileges and liabilities. Ex Parte McGee, 23. 5. IRRIGATION DISTRICT ACT HELD NOT TO EXTEND JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTION.

Irrigation district act, secs. 19 and 20, providing for confirmation of district's organization, are not in violation of Const. art. 6, sec. 6, for they do not limit or extend the original jurisdiction of district courts. In Re Walker River Irr. Dist., 321.

6. ONLY PERSONS AFFECTED CAN ATTACK CONSTITUTIONALITY.

If a party's rights are not affected by a statute, or a part thereof, its constitutionality will not be considered upon his application. Ex Parte Goddard, 128.

7. PART OF WATER CODE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS GIVING JUDICIAL POWERS TO STATE ENGINEER.

Water code (Stats. 1913, c. 140), secs. 29, 31, 32, and section 30, as amended by Stats. 1915, c. 253, sec. 2, held unconstitutional because attempting to give judicial power to the state engineer to hear and determine contests involving not relative, but vested, water rights which section 84 of the statute expressly inhibits. Pitt v. Scrugham, 418.

8. SHEEP COMMISSION LAW NOT DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES.

The sheep commission law held not violative of Const. U. S. art. 4, secs. 1, 2, providing that citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states; the law being properly construed as referring to sheep brought into Nevada whether owned by citizens of Nevada or of a sister state. Ex Parte Goddard, 128.

9. STATE ENGINEER HELD PERFORMING ADMINISTRATIVE AND NOT JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.

Water code (Stats. 1913, c. 140), sec. 45, requires the state engineer and district courts to act as coordinate agencies to effect the speedy determination for administrative purposes of the relative rights of claimants to waters of a stream or system, and where the engineer as an administrative officer was only proceeding to do what the court might require him to do in a pending suit, the pendency of such suit furnished no grounds for enjoining the engineer from performing duties of the court. Pitt v. Scrugham, 418.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

10. STATUTE DENOUNCING SYNDICALISM NOT CLASS LEGISLATION. Stats. 1919, c. 22, denouncing criminal syndicalism, is not objectionable as class legislation denying equal protection; it being applicable to any person committing the acts denounced. Ex Parte Moriarity, 164.

11. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-IRRIGATION DISTRICT ACT HELD NOT IN VIOLATION OF DUE-PROCESS CLAUSE OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Irrigation district act, sec. 14, limits the indebtedness which a district may incur to the obligations voluntarily assumed by the landowners, and does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. 14, by permitting confiscation of property by taxation without due process of law. In Re Walker River Irr. Dist., 321.

See ANIMALS, 2; BAIL, 1; COMMERCE, 2; CRIMINAL LAW, 10, 19; ELECTIONS, 4, 8; STATES, 1; STATUTES, 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 13; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 4, 5, 6.

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT AS TO TITLE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. See STATUTES, 2.

CONSTRUCTION OF LAWS

STATES. See STATUTES, 5.

ADOPTED FROM FOREIGN

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. See STATUTES, 1, 2, 3, 9.

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF TITLE.

POSSESSION, 1.

See ADVERSE

CONTINUANCE OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.

CONTINUED RELATION AFTER REMOVAL OF IMPEDIMENT TO LEGAL MARRIAGE. See MARRIAGE, 1, 3, 4, 5.

CONTRACT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT QUESTION OF FACT. SEE MARRIAGE, 2, 3, 4, 5.

CONTRACTS.

1. CONTRACTS OPERATING TO PUBLIC DETRIMENT VOID.

All contracts the purpose of which is to create a situation which tends to operate to the detriment of the public interest are against public policy and void, regardless of whether in a particular case the purpose of the contract is effectuated. King v. Randall, 118.

2. FORFEITURE MUST BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED.

Courts are not diligent in searching for an excuse to justify a forfeiture or convert a precautionary clause into one of forfeiture, and nothing will be held as contemplating a forfeiture, unless such idea is clearly expressed. Clark v. London Assurance Corp., 359.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 2; INDEMNITY, 1; INSURANCE, 1, 2, 3.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BARS RECOVERY. See NEGLIGENCE, 1.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE NO DEFENSE TO WILFUL INJURY. See NEGLIGENCE, 2.

CONVERSION. See SALES, 2; TROVER AND CONVERSION, 1.

CONVEYANCE BY COTENANT. See TENANCY IN COMMON, 1.

COPY OF COMPLAINT MUST BE CERTIFIED. See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, 6.

CORPORATIONS. See JUDGMENT, 4, 5, 6; MANDAMUS, 3.

COSTS.

1. APPELLANT NOT ALLOWED Cost on AffIRMANCE, THOUGH HE WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO AMEND.

Where appellant filed a cost bill under court rule 6, subd. 2, and respondents objected under subdivision 3, the clerk's ruling against allowing costs must be upheld where the judgment against appellant was affirmed, but the court merely ex gratia remanded the cause with leave to plaintiff to amend, since such judgment did not give appellant relief justifying allowing him costs under Rev. Laws, 5381, subd. 2. Dixon v. City of Reno, 350.

2. ATTORNEY'S FEES NOT ALLOWABLE IN ACTION FOR SERVICES APPEALED FROM JUSTICE COURT.

An action to recover attorney's fees, appealed from a justice of the peace to the district court, is tried as other trials in the district court under Rev. Laws, 5794, and, since there is no statute authorizing the allowance of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff in such an action, none can be allowed in view of Rev. Laws, 5376, providing that the compensation of the attorney is governed by agreement, express or implied. Dixon v. District Court, 98.

3. NOT ALLOWABLE IN ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY.

Costs are wholly the creature of statute, and are not allowable in the absence of the statute permitting such allowance. Idem.

4. OFFER OF JUDGMENT AS TO UNDISPUTED PART OF CLAIM MAKES COST DEPENDENT UPON RESULT OF DISPUTED PART.

When plaintiff unites in the same action a claim that is not disputed with one that is, defendant may remove from the controversy the undisputed claim by offer of judgment, as authorized by Comp. Laws, 3470, and thus make the subsequent costs of the litigation depend upon the result of the litigation in regard to the disputed claim. H.-H.-M. Safe Co. v. Balliet, 94.

5. OFFER OF JUDGMENT DOES NOT AFFECT COSTS ACCRUING PRIOR TO OFFER.

Although plaintiff failed to obtain a more favorable judgment than offered by defendant, plaintiff was entitled to accrued costs up to the time of the making of the offer. Idem.

6. OFFER OF JUDGMENT NEED NOT INCLUDE Costs.

Offer of judgment under Comp. Laws, 3470, need not include costs. Idem.

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 24.

COURTS HAVE DISCRETION TO OPEN DEFAULTS. See JUDGMENT, 1, 3, 5, 6.

COURTS MUST LOOK TO INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE. See STATUTES, 3.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. CONTINUANCE OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION DID NOT DEPRIVE JUSTICE OF JURISDICTION.

Continuance from June 21 to July 3 of preliminary examination on charge of having in possession intoxicating liquor in violation of the prohibition statute held not to have deprived justice of jurisdiction. Ex Parte McGee, 23.

2. DISTRICT COURT, AND NOT JUSTICE COURT, HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION STATUTE.

In view of Rev. Laws, 4851, district court, and not the justice court, had jurisdiction to try one charged with misdemeanor of violating the prohibition statute, section 3 whereof provides for fine of $100 to $1,000 and imprisonment in county jail for from two to twelve months. Ex Parte Arascada, 30. 3. DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY CHARGE OF HAVING INTOXICANTS IN POSSESSION.

In view of Rev. Laws, 4851, district court had jurisdiction to try petitioner charged with misdemeanor of having in her possession intoxicating liquor in violation of the prohibition statute, section 3 whereof provides for fine of $100 to $1,000 and imprisonment in county jail for from two to twelve months. Ex Parte McGee, 23.

4. FALSE PRETENSES-FALSE PRETENSE OF OWNERSHIP OF AUTOMOBILE HELD TO HAVE INDUCED COMPLAINING WITNESS TO MAKE LOAN.

Although complaining witness had reason to believe from the conduct of defendant and his wife with reference to an automobile that it belonged to the defendant, held that without defendant's false representation that it still belonged to him when in fact he had only an equity of redemption therein, the complaining witness would not have made a loan secured by a mortgage on the car. State v. Bacha, 373.

5. FALSE PRETENSES-JURY COULD CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TELL PROSECUTING WITNESS CERTAIN FACTS.

As bearing on the question of knowledge and intent of defendant, accused of false pretenses in representing that he was the owner of an automobile, the jury could consider the fact that he told the complaining witness nothing whatever concerning his transaction with a third person to whom he had given a bill of sale of the car as security for a loan. Idem. 6. FALSE PRETENSES-NEED NOT BE SOLE INDUCEMENT FOR PARTING WITH PROPERTY.

A false pretense need not be the sole inducement for the victim of a fraudulent representation to part with his money or thing of value, but it is sufficient if the defrauded party was materially influenced by the false pretense to part with his property, although other motives may have operated to produce the result. Idem.

7. FALSE PRETENSES-PRETENSE HELD SUFFICIENT TO DECEIVE ONE OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE AND PRUDENCE.

Where defendant had been the owner of a car, and the complaining witness had seen it in his possession, but did not know that defendant had then only an equity of redemption in the car, and upon defendant's false pretense of ownership loaned him money, taking a mortgage on the car, held, that the false pretense was calculated to deceive one of ordinary intelligence and business prudence into parting with money without making further investigation so that the defendant would be liable criminally. Idem.

8. FALSE PRETENSES-REPRESENTATION OF OWNERSHIP OF AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH DEFENDANT HAD ONLY EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IS FALSE.

Where a defendant, prosecuted for obtaining money under false pretenses, gave a mortgage on an automobile then in possession of another holding under a bill of sale to secure a former loan, notwithstanding the defendant had an equity of redemption in the former mortgage, held, that his representation as to ownership constituted a false pretense. Idem.

9. HABEAS CORPUS-CORRECTNESS OF STATEMENT OF FACTS IN GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION UNDER SHEEP COMMISSION LAW NOT REVIEWABLE.

In habeas corpus proceedings by one convicted of violating the sheep commission law by driving sheep into Nevada from a state which the governor had by proclamation scheduled as a locality where scabies was epidemic, the correctness of the statement of facts contained in the governor's proclamation cannot be inquired into. Ex Parte Goddard, 128.

10. HABEAS CORPUS-EXCESSIVENESS OF BOND NOT CONSIDERED WHERE PETITIONER IS UNABLE TO FURNISH ANY.

Even though the action of the court in raising the bail from $2,500 to $5,000 violated the spirit of Const. art. 1, sec. 6, forbidding excessive bail, the matter will not be reviewed on habeas corpus, where it appeared petitioner was unable to furnish any bail whatsoever. Ex Parte Moriarity, 164.

11. HABEAS CORPUS-IMPERFECTIONS IN INDICTMENT NOT CONSIDERED. On habeas corpus, imperfections in the indictment because it consisted of generalities and conclusions cannot be considered, and if the indictment attempts to state an offense of a kind which the court assuming to proceed has jurisdiction, the question whether the facts charged are sufficient to state an offense will not be examined into. Idem.

12. HOMICIDE INDICTMENT IN STATUTORY FORM HELD SUFFICIENT TO CHARGE FIRST-DEGREE MURDER.

After the statute (Rev. Laws, 6386) as to murder was amended in 1915 (Stats. 1915, c. 48) to declare murder perpetrated by poison, or lying in wait, or torture, or committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, murder in the first degree, and all other kinds of murder, murder in the second degree, an indictment simply charging, in the form prescribed by Criminal Practice Act, sec. 201, then existing and not afterwards changed, that