Opinion of the Court-Sanders, C. J.

in exercising functions of the government in running the machinery of the state, that section 1, article 2, applies. We are aware that this conclusion conflicts with the decisions in Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106, and Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. Walker, 20 Idaho, 605, 119 Pac. 304.

We are in accord with the case of Board of Directors v. Peterson, supra, and decline to adopt the conclusion stated in the California and Idaho decisions. Section 8 is patterned largely upon the Oregon statute, 6186 L. O. L. as amended, General Laws 1915, p. 234.

The Oregon court, in the Peterson case, says:

"Although the decisions in Re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296 (28 Pac. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106), and in Pioneer Irrigation District v. Walker, 20 Idaho, 605 (119 Pac. 304), hold to the contrary, we cannot adopt the conclusion stated therein. We believe we are not running counter to section 2, article 2, of the constitution in this conclusion, and a contrary holding would work a great wrong upon the farmers, who may obtain considerable benefit under such an organization, and who, on the other hand, might be burdened by debt beyond the benefits conferred; and its affairs should be left exclusively to those affected thereby."

It is suggested that the Oregon constitution contains the broad provision, "in all elections not otherwise provided for in this constitution," not contained in our constitution, therefore the case of Board of Directors v. Peterson is not controlling. We observe the court does not base its conclusions upon the broad provisions contained in the constitution, but its reasoning is that the California and Idaho courts might have reached a different result upon principle under their constitutions.

In construing the constitution the thing to be sought is the thought expressed. Pershing County v. Humboldt County, 43 Nev. 78, 181 Pac. 960, 183 Pac. 314; State ex rel. Lewis v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399.

Opinion of the Court-Sanders, C. J.

It is not questioned but that such instrument must be construed according to its purpose and intent. The object of section 1 of article 2 is obviously twofold: First, to secure to the people the right to select representatives for their government; and, second, to determine the will of the people upon such questions as may be submitted to them.

13. It is urged that irrigation districts are within the spirit and letter of the constitution, and to preclude resident qualified electors therein from voting at the elections provided for under the act is violative of the residential qualification of electors as prescribed in section 1 of article 2 and the general election law. Our answer to this position is that we have endeavored to make it clear that we are of the opinion that such districts are not political subdivisions of the state, or created for political or governmental purposes, and that the term "elections," embraced in section 1, article 2, is used in its restrictive political sense-as election of public officers and to determine the will of the people upon questions in which they have a public, as distinguished from an immediate private interest. Any other interpretation of the intent and purpose of the section of the constitution in question would lead to the absurd result of allowing every qualified elector to insist upon voting at every election, public as well as private, and thus interfere with affairs of others in which he has no interest or concern. It is true the public-the people of the district—are presumed to be interested in the reclamation of its arid lands. Nevertheless, the district is one of those public enterprises which results in a benefit to privately owned lands and, therefore, the cost is by the statute made a lien upon such lands. The land alone is made to bear the charge of the immense cost of its improvement. It is the land that is organized into a district to make it possible for its owners by their combined efforts to bring the same under cultivation through a corporate system, which

Coleman, J., dissenting

but for the helping hand of the constitution, as guided and controlled by the law-making body of the state, possibly could never be accomplished.

"That those who are specially interested and who must pay for the improvement are heard upon the question as to whether it shall be done, and are permitted to appoint those who shall superintend it, is not unusual, nor would it constitute an exercise of the elective franchise." People ex rel. v. Reclamation District No. 551, 117 Cal. 114, 48 Pac. 1016.

Hence, we conclude that the residential requirement of voters, as prescribed in the constitution and the general election law, has no application to irrigation districts as organized under the Nevada irrigation district act.

Being of the opinion that the legislation in question is such as is within the scope of the authority of the legislature to enact, and that the objections here raised against its constitutionality are not well taken, we affirm the judgments appealed from.

DUCKER, J.: I concur.

COLEMAN, J., dissenting:

I am not in accord with all that is said in the foregoing opinion. I am convinced that such projects as contemplated by the statute in question are capable of being productive of much benefit to the state, and I am in sympathy with the idea; but, not being able to concur in some of the views expressed, I am driven to the necessity of dissenting. I could briefly set forth my views, but, as such action would serve no useful purpose, I refrain from doing so.

Argument for Petitioner

[No. 2479]

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF A. CERFOGLIO FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

[195 Pac. 96]

1. STATUTES-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AS TO TITLE IS TO PREVENT TRICKERY OR INATTENTION.

The purpose of Const. art. 4, sec. 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and the matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in the title, is to prevent inconsiderate or undesirable legislation through trickery or inattention.

2. STATUTES-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT AS TO TITLE LIBERALLY

CONSTRUED.

Const. art. 4, sec. 17, requiring each law to embrace but one subject, which shall be briefly expressed in its title, though mandatory, should be liberally construed.

3. STATUTES-PROVISION OF PROHIBITION ACT HELD WITHIN TITLE. The provision of prohibition act, sec. 7, prohibiting the possession of intoxicating liquors in certain places, including soft-drink parlors, has a legitimate tendency to promote the object of that act to suppress the liquor traffic, so that it is within the title thereof to prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and gift of intoxicating liquors.

4. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PERSON MAKING HOME IN PLACE WHERE POSSESSION IS PROHIBITED CANNOT KEEP LIQUORS THERE.

Though the prohibition act does not prevent the keeping of liquors in a home for personal use, a person who makes his home in one of the places in which the possession of liquor is prohibited by section 7 of that act cannot keep liquor therein and thereby avoid the provision of the act.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in habeas corpus by A. Cerfoglio. Writ dismissed, and petitioner remanded to custody.

Moore & McIntosh, for Petitioner:

The prohibition act is unconstitutional in this: That the title is not broad enough to cover the provisions of section 7, under which petitioner has been prosecuted, and is therefore violative of the provision that "each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." Const. Nev., art. 4, sec. 17. The title of the prohibition act refers to "the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and gift," while the section in controversy makes it unlawful

Argument for Respondent

for any person to "keep or have for personal use or otherwise, or to use or permit another to have, keep, or use intoxicating liquors." The title of the act being restrictive, it was without the power of the legislature to extend the subject-matter beyond the restrictions contained in the title. S. P. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 735.

The people and the legislature having seen fit to adopt a restrictive title with reference to prohibition, which restrictive title on its face has reference only to the “manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and gift" of liquors, they cannot include in the act provisions which are not within that title, and which were obviously not intended to be included. Wind River L. Co. v. Frankfort Co., 196 Fed. 340.

"The provision of our constitution is that every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. This provision is to prevent tricking the legislature into passing acts foreign to the one under consideration by it." Schmitt v. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N. E. 19, 3 L. R. A. 270.

L. D. Summerfield, District Attorney, and W. M. Kearney, Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent:

The title of the prohibition act complies with all the requirements of the constitution. The provisions of section 7 come within section 17 of article 4 of the constitution by being "matter properly connected therewith." Ex Parte Zwissig, 42 Nev. 360. "All of these provisions are properly connected with the purpose of the legislature to prevent the traffic in intoxicating liquor as a beverage, and are therefore within the title of the act." Schmitt v. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N. E. 19, 3 L. R. A. 270. "The restriction requiring the subject of the act to be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed, considering substance rather than form." 36 Cyc. 1018. "Any number of provisions may be contained in an act, however diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the