Opinion of the Court-Coleman, C. J.

water at that time, or remember it, unless he had been in Pittsburg at the time mentioned. If he was there, was he not the Mr. Allen who was enjoying the honeymoon trip?

Dr. Dyar knew that his wife had been estranged from him, designedly or innocently, by the plaintiff, and it does seem that, if there were no sentimental ties existing between him and the plaintiff, he would never have found it necessary to go the length he did in his course of conduct with the plaintiff. She testified that she went to Nassau with the doctor as a nurse. It is admitted that he did not come to Nevada with the intention of becoming a resident (at least he so testified) and of obtaining a divorce, but the plaintiff came for that express purpose. The doctor went to Nassau-accepting their evidence to recuperate from an attack of la grippe, and still needed the care of the plaintiff when she came to Nevada. There is no testimony in the record that any doctor had advised Dr. Dyar that his health demanded that he follow the plaintiff on a long ocean trip, and to Reno. After he had arrived in Reno, he followed his profession as an employee of the government, and there is no evidence that he ever had the need of a physician during the entire period between the time he left Nassau and up to the time of the trial. In this view of the case, if no sentimental reasons entered into his accompanying the plaintiff, it might be thought strange that an educated and refined scientist could be so devoid of regard for the feelings of his wife, daughter, and son as to conduct himself as he did, especially since he might have secured the services of a trained nurse to take care of him, had he needed one, and thereby do a bit to allay the suspicion of all as to the relationship existing between him and the plaintiff.

We might continue to point out from the record evidence which in our opinion forges a chain of circumstances which leads irresistibly to the conclusion, not only that there is substantial evidence in the record to

Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J.

sustain the judgment, but that no other judgment could properly have been rendered in the case.

The judgment is affirmed.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

By the Court, COLEMAN, J.:

In the petition for rehearing it is strenuously contended that the court erred in holding that the objections made to certain testimony during the taking of the depositions of several witnesses could not be considered on appeal, since they had not been urged upon the trial court. In the petition it is said:

"Your petitioner respectfully urges that each and all of these assignments were based upon objections regularly taken, and that it was the duty of the trial court to rule upon them, whether the court so ruled or not, and if the trial court failed to do and perform its duty in these particulars and failed to allow appellant all her rights and privileges in the court below, that that furnishes no reason why appellant should be denied the benefit of such objections in the above-entitled court."

1, 2. In this contention counsel is mistaken. Nothing was before the trial court to rule upon. Objections noted at the time of the taking of a deposition will not be considered by the court unless renewed upon the trial. Objections going only to the form of the question or answer should always be made at the time a deposition is taken, that the opposing party may have an opportunity to correct the vice (McLeod v. Miller & Lux, 40 Nev. 447, 153 Pac. 566), and, if not then made, cannot be urged upon the trial; but objections going to the materiality or competency need not be made at the taking of the deposition, but may be made for the first time upon the trial, and, if made before the trial, the objection must be renewed upon the trial and a ruling insisted upon, and, if the court refuses to rule, the misconduct of the court in so doing must be assigned as error and embodied in the record, for otherwise we may

Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J.

presume that the objection is waived. In Thomas v. Boyd, 108 Va. 584, 62 S. E. 346, it was held that where objection was made at the time a deposition was taken, but not upon the trial, the objection embodied in the deposition was deemed waived. To the same effect: Hancock v. Chapman, 170 Ky. 99, 185 S. W. 813; Roberson v. Roberson, 183 Ky. 45, 208 S. W. 19; Tremaine v. Dyott, 161 Mo. App. 217, 142 S. W. 760; Murray v. Omaha T. Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N. W. 360; 7 A. L. R. 1343.

We are unable to find an authority holding to the contrary.

While what we have said must necessarily result in a denial of the petition for a rehearing, we do not desire to seem disposed to avoid ruling upon the objections which were made at the time the depositions in question were taken. As a matter of fact, many of the objections were well taken. It is true, also, that some of the objections were frivolous and without merit, as is true of a large majority of the objections interposed in almost every trial. But if the objections which were well taken had been urged upon the court during the trial and sustained, such rulings could not have affected the result upon the merits. There is ample competent evidence in the record to show the manner in which Mrs. Allen and Dr. Dyar had demeaned themselves toward each other, as outlined in the original opinion.

The petition for rehearing is quite lengthy, and consists mainly of a singling out of various circumstances and building around and about them an argument to show that each of them, standing alone, does not make out a case against the plaintiff-all of which we concede; but the big fact is that, while one circumstance may prove nothing, a long train of circumstances, covering a period of several years, may make out a case good and strong.

The evidence in the case, as a whole, shows an utter disregard on the part of Mrs. Allen and Dr. Dyar for

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Points decided

the conventionalities of life. Society is hedged about by certain recognized canons of moral ethics that cannot be violated without incurring a penalty. These canons have grown up and become crystallized-the products of man's knowledge of human nature-and he who defies them well knows that in so doing he is constructing a case against himself in the eyes of decent society. Society demands that these canons of moral ethics be recognized and enforced.

There was ample evidence to justify the judgment.
Petition for rehearing is denied.

[No. 2466]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES
PEDROLI, DECEASED.

LOUISE PEDROLI, PETITIONER, v. JOSEPH SCOTT,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES
PEDROLI, DECEASED, RESPONDENT.

BEHALF OF ADMINISTRATOR, APPEALING FROM REVOCATION OF
LETTERS, HELD IN CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR, AND NOT AS
INDIVIDUAL.

On appeal from order revoking letters of administration, an undertaking, "Whereas, the above-named respondent, Joseph Scott as administrator, * * * has appealed to the supreme court," etc., held, given in behalf of the appellant in his representative capacity, and not as an individual.

2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—NO APPEAL BY ADMINISTRATOR AS SUCH FROM ORDER REVOKING LETTERS.

An administrator cannot appeal in his representative capacity from an order which revokes his letters of administration, under Rev. Laws 6112; his only right of appeal being as an individual.

3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-APPEAL AS ADMINISTRATOR NOT GOOD AS APPEAL AS INDIVIDUAL.

Notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal by one “as administrator" from an order revoking his letters of administration cannot be considered as an appeal by such administrator in his individual capacity, and he will not be permitted

Argument for Appellant

to perfect an appeal in his individual capacity, under Rev. Laws, 5358, which provides that no appeal shall be dismissed for insufficiency of a notice of appeal or undertaking thereon. APPEAL from Sixth Judicial District Court, Humboldt County; Edward F. Lunsford, Judge.

In the Matter of the Estate of Charles Pedroli, deceased. Petition by Louise Pedroli for the removal of Joseph Scott as administrator. An order was entered, removing Scott and appointing petitioner as administrator; and from an order denying the motion for a new trial, Scott appeals. Appeal dismissed. Petition for rehearing denied.

Campbell & Robins, and Thomas A. Brandon, for Appellant:

"No appeal shall be dismissed for insufficiency of a notice of appeal or undertaking thereon." Rev. Laws, 5358.

"Any person interested in, affected by, and aggrieved at the decision of the district court * * * revoking letters may appeal to the supreme court of the state, to be governed in all respects as an appeal from a final decision and judgment in action at law." Rev. Laws, 6112.

Objections may be cured on suggestions of diminution of the record. Supreme Court Rule 8.

"We come next to the motion to dismiss the appeal. There are two reasons assigned. One is that the appellant has no interest in the subject-matter of the order appealed from. The other is that the testimony taken below has not been incorporated in the record. Neither of these reasons furnishes a ground for dismissing the appeal. The appellant (the removed administrator) has a direct interest in the subject-matter. His removal, if upheld, would deprive him of his commissions. An appeal lies from an order revoking letters of administration." Williams v. Addison, 48 Atl. 458; McAuley v. Tahoe Ice Co., 86 Pac. 913; Jarman v. Rea, 61 Pac. 790;