Argument for Respondent The court should have given the instruction to the effect that an attorney is without authority to compromise his client's case unless he is specially authorized by his client. Rogers v. Pettigrew, 75 S. E. 631; State v. Cal. M. Co., 15 Nev. 243; Pomeroy v. Prescott, 138 Am. St. 352; Penman v. Patchin, 5 Vt. 346. The evidence fails to support the verdict and the judgment, and by reason thereof the court should have granted a new trial unconditionally. The question of the excess of the verdict was raised upon the ground relating to the insufficiency of the evidence. J. M. McNamara, for Respondent: * There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow reference to decisions on cross-examination of experts. "It would be a mere evasion of the general rule * * if counsel were allowed on crossexamination to read to the witness portions of such works, and to ask if he concurred in or differed from the opinions there expressed; hence this is not allowed." Jones, Evidence, vol. 3, sec. 579. The hypothetical questions were not indefinite. Idem, vol. 2, secs. 370-371; Sandro v. Missoula L. & W. Co., 157 Pac. 641; Kelley v. Daily Co., 181 Pac. 331. The court was not in error in refusing to allow questions as to bias of the attorneys testifying in respondent's favor. This was entirely a matter of discretion for the court. Blue Book of Evidence, vol. 5, sec. 829. "Obviously, testimony collateral to the issues which would merely tend to prejudice the jury should be rejected." Idem, vol. 1, sec. 137, p. 674. The "mental-anxiety" instruction was proper; and responsibility includes mental anxiety and mental labor. With increased responsibility there follows increased mental anxiety and increased mental labor. 6 C. J. 751; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Quint v. Ophir S. M. Co., 4 Nev. 304. There was no evidence that the respondent's labor was useless, and it would therefore have been error for Argument for Respondent the court to have instructed on this point as requested, as it would have been an instruction upon a state of facts not developed by the evidence. Quint v. Ophir S. M. Co., supra. No question of the excess of the verdict was raised in the lower court, and it is not properly raised here. The verdict of the jury was upheld by the trial court to the extent of $2,500, and the verdict was not set aside upon the ground of insufficiency of evidence. This court will not, therefore, examine into this question. “There is a conflict in the testimony as to what would be a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the plaintiffs; and although the preponderance of evidence may not be in favor of the verdict, there is at least sufficient to support it. The law is now thoroughly settled that a verdict will not be set aside by an appellate court upon this ground when the lower court has refused to do so, unless there is such a decided preponderance of evidence against it as to create a conviction that it was the result of mistake or misconduct on the part of the jury. * Upon this ground, therefore, the verdict cannot be set aside." Quint v. Ophir S. M. Co., supra. * * On motion for a new trial, the lower court made a conditional order, reducing the amount of the verdict. An appeal may be taken from said order. De Severinus v. Press P. Co., 132 N. Y. S. 80; Wooding v. Thom, 132 N. Y. S. 50. The court assigned certain reasons for its order. It did not find that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and did not disturb the verdict by reason of any lack of evidence, although the evidence was conflicting. The reasons for the granting of a new trial having been specified, this court cannot indulge the presumption that the motion was granted upon any other ground. James v. Butcher, 215 S. W. 768. The question of an excessive verdict was not raised on the motion for a new trial, and the court therefore erred in considering any grounds not stated in said motion, in the memorandum of errors, or in the Opinion of the Court-Ducker, J. argument. Colo. & S. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 138 Pac. 439. A verdict cannot be set aside simply because excessive, but can be disturbed only when it is also found that the excess of award is due to passion or prejudice. Colo. & S. R. Co. v. Jenkins, supra; Tunnel M. Co. v. Cooper, 115 Pac. 902; Henderson v. Drafus, 184 Pac. 819; Rev. Laws, 5320; Standard Ency. Proc., vol. 20, p. 602; Davis v. Montgomery, 24 N. E. 367; Riverside Coal Co. v. Holmes, 55 N. W. 255; Pocos v. N. T. R. Co., 153 S. W. 185; English v. Railroad, 104 N. W. 886; Hammond v. Edwards, 77 N. W. 75; Stoteman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 34 N. W. 225. It is a universal rule, laid down by this court in many cases, that it will not disturb the verdict of a jury rendered upon conflicting evidence. Nelson v. Smith, 42 Nev. 302; Spinney v. Derrick, 105 Atl. 105; Matthews Turpentine Co. v. Keefe, 81 South. 852; Gluck v. Hatchner, 176 N. Y. S. 756; Johnston v. Mayfair F. Co., 175 N. Y. S. 494. By the Court, DUCKER, J.: This is a cross - appeal, and it will therefore be convenient to allude to the parties herein as they were designated in the lower court. Plaintiff is an attorney at law, and brought this action in the district court in Elko County to recover from the defendant the sum of $3,500 for legal services alleged to have been performed by plaintiff for the defendant at his request in the case of Mary Alice Capell and Charles S. Capell, complainants, against Wm. T. O'Neil, Richard C. O'Neil, and James P. O'Neil, defendants, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada, in equity, and in the settlement thereof, and in the incorporation of O'Neil Bros., Incorporated. It is alleged in the complaint that the said services were reasonably worth the sum of $4,000, no part of which has been paid, except the sum of $500. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $3,500 and interest, as prayed for in the complaint. Opinion of the Court-Ducker, J. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. The defendant moved for a new trial, and in deciding this motion the lower court made and entered the following order, viz: "In decision on defendant's motion for a new trial, court ordered that if the plaintiff, on or before December 31, 1919, file a remittitur in the amount of one thousand dollars, a new trial will be refused, and the verdict to stand for the residue, to wit, twenty-five hundred dollars; if the remittitur be not filed, court ordered that a new trial shall be granted." From this order, and the judgment entered, defendant appeals. Plaintiff appeals from the order only. 1. We will first consider the case with reference to defendant's appeal. Plaintiff was a witness in his own behalf, and in his testimony detailed at length his training and experience as an attorney, the legal services he claims to have rendered the defendant with reference to the matters alleged in the complaint, and also gave his opinion as to the value of such services. Defendant complains of the action of the court in refusing to allow plaintiff to answer questions on crossexamination as to whether, as an expert witness, he agreed with certain decisions of courts of other jurisdictions determining the reasonable value of attorney fees. A number of similar questions were asked, to which objections were sustained by the court. The following is a sample of the general nature of the questions ruled out: "Q. Do you agree with the court in the case of Carson v. Cockrell, reported in 56 S. E. 1034, where $500 was held to be a reasonable fee for prosecuting a hardly contested suit for damages, and judgment obtained of $4,000 in the supreme court after two trials in the lower court?" It has been held competent, upon cross-examination to test the learning and accuracy of a witness testifying as an expert and to determine the weight of his testimony, to read excerpts from standard authorities upon Opinion of the Court-Ducker, J. the subject-matter involved, and asking him whether he agreed or disagreed with the authorities, and then comparing his opinion with that of the writer. This is the rule supported by some of the authorities cited by defendant; but it is obvious that it can have no application in the present case. Assuming that the plaintiff was testifying as an expert when he gave his opinion as to the value of his own services, the questions propounded could be competent only upon the theory that the answers would tend to test the knowledge of the witness concerning the subject-matter of his testimony. Now, it must be obvious that his opinion as to the correctness of the rulings of different courts on the reasonableness of attorney fees would serve no such purpose. What is a reasonable attorney fee in one case is no criterion for another. Each case rests on its own facts, and what is held reasonable in one jurisdiction may, under the same state of facts, be considered unreasonable in another jurisdiction. Plaintiff, therefore, might have agreed or disagreed with the rulings in any or all of the cases embodied in the questions, and his disagreement or concurrence have furnished no test of his learning in the law concerning the subject-matter of his testimony. The objections were properly sustained. 2. Four attorneys of the local bar of Elko County, and one from Salt Lake City, Utah, testified on behalf of plaintiff, as expert witnesses on the question of the reasonable value of his services. No objection was taken to the qualifications of any of these witnesses. A hypothetical question, which defendant claims was improper, was addressed to and answered by each of these witnesses. It is insisted that the questions were in some respects indefinite as to the extent of services and were leading in form. It is also asserted that the questions were objectionable, because they assumed matters not in evidence and included statements of services for which the defendant was not liable. The questions are altogether too long to set out in this opinion, but, generally speaking, they include the extent of plaintiff's |