The true principles of jurisprudence, in order to fructify, ought first to take root in the minds of the members of the legal profession. Then, and not till then, will false principles gradually give way, as the ripe fruit falls from the tree. But in order to produce that effect, we ought to invite each other to reflection on these important subjects by learned treatises and free discussions, and the labours of the jurist ought not to be confined to mere compilations. In short, jurisprudence ought to be treated as a philosophical science. If Montesquieu had not written, the distinction between the three powers of government would be yet unknown, and their limits undefined. If Beccaria had not written, the torture and its horrid concomitants would not have disappeared from the face of Europe, and sanguinary codes would not almost every where have given way to mild punishments. All the amendments which Blackstone in his Commentaries suggested to be made in the common law, have been adopted, and some of them improved upon in this country, and it is only to be regretted that he did not suggest more.

But as I have observed, these suggestions ought to come from those who have made legislation their peculiar study, and ought to be made in the grave and solemn manner which the subject requires. They ought to be addressed to the understanding of those who are best able to judge of them.

Therefore, I address myself exclusively to the profession, by whom I expect to be understood

and appreciated. To their tribunal I submit the observations I have ventured to make, soliciting only brotherly indulgence.

The common law is destined to acquire in this country the highest degree of perfection of which it is susceptible, and which will raise it in all respects above every other system of laws, ancient or modern. But it will not have fully reached that towering height, until the maxim shall be completely established in practice as well as in theory,

THAT PURE ETHICS AND SOUND LOGIC ARE ALSO PARTS OF THE COMMON LAW.

ADDENDA.

CONTAINING,

I. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY POWERS EXERCISED IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT OF THE COLONIES TO THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. BY THOMAS SERGEANT, Esq.

II. AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, BEFORE THE TRUSTEES AND MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, IN THE HALL OF THE SUPREME COURT, ON WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST OF FEBRUARY, 1821. BY PETER S. DUPONCEAU, LL.D.

Ο

ADDENDA.

I.

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY POWERS EXERCISED IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT OF THE COLONIES TO THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. BY THOMAS SERGEANT, ESQ. VICE PROVOST OF THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA.

THE States of which our Union was at first composed, during the period antecedent to the adoption of the Constitution, while they were colonies of the British empire, and while they were connected together at first by the Congress, and afterwards by the articles of confederation, exercised within their respective limits the main portion of the judicial authority of the country through the medium of tribunals constituted by themselves, and governed by the common law, the principles of equity, their own acts of Assembly and usages, and such British statutes as had been extended to or adopted by them. But, during this period, there were judicial controversies over which the colonial or State Courts did not entertain jurisdiction at all, or entertained it in subordination to, or by delegation from, the national authority, residing in a power supposed to be the depositary of a common interest, and pos sessing a general jurisdiction.