On the 30th of March, 1871, the Legislature of Virginia passed an act entitled "An Act to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt." By the provisions of that act, the state agreed that if her creditors would come forward and surrender to her her old bonds, she would issue to them new coupon bonds, for two-thirds of the amounts due upon the old bonds, payable at the expiration of thirty-four years, with interest at six per cent., payable semi-annually; the semi-annual interest to be represented by coupons attached to the bonds, which coupons should be "receivable at and after maturity in payment of all taxes, debts, dues and demands, due to the state which shall be so expressed on their face." For the other third the Commonwealth was to give the bondholder a certificate setting forth that "payment of the amount will be provided for in accordance with such settlement as shall hereafter be had between the States of Virginia and West Virginia, in regard to the public debt of the State of Virginia, existing at the time of its dismemberment." Under this act the holders of bonds of the Commonwealth amounting to about $30,000,000, had funded their bonds by March, 1872, so that at that time there were out bonds of the state for about $20,000,000, bearing six per cent. interest, with tax receivable coupons attached. On the 7th of March, 1872, the Legislature of Virginia passed an act declaring that nothing should be received in payment of taxes, except gold or silver, United States Treasury notes or notes of United States National Banks. In the case of Antoni v. Wright, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that this last mentioned act was unconstitutional and void, in that it impaired the obligations of the state contract with her bonds and her coupon holders. On the 25th of March, 1873, the State Legislature passed an act providing that there should be deducted from the coupons of the funding bonds, issued under the Act of 1871, when such coupons were presented in payment of any dues to the state, a sum equal to a tax of one-half of one per cent. on the market value of the bonds from which said coupons had been cut. This act was slightly modified in 1874, but was re-enacted in its original form in 1876. Shortly subsequent to that time, one Hartman, a citizen and property holder of Richmond, Va., tendered to one Greenbow, the tax collector of that city, in payment of taxes, $24, in coupons cut from the aforesaid funding bonds, and $2.53 in money, that being the amount of taxes due by him to the state. The tax collector refused to receive the coupons at their face value in payment of Hartman's taxes, on the ground that the Act of 1876 required him to deduct from the coupons the state tax of one-half of one per cent. Hartman thereupon applied to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the tax collector to receive the said coupons and money in payment of his taxes. By an equally divided court the mandamus was refused. Hartman thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice FIELD, after reviewing the history of the debt of Virginia, and the legislation of the state with reference thereto, expresses the opinion of the court in substance, as follows: The Lower of the state to impose a tax upon her own obligations is a subject upon which there has been a difference of opinion among jurists and statesmen. But whatever may be the wisest rule as to the taxability of public securities, it is settled that any tax levied upon them cannot be withheld from the interest payable thereon. This was the judgment in the case of Murray v. Charleston, 96 United States, 445, where the court held that by the legislation of the city, its obligation to its creditors was impaired, and however great its power of taxation, it must be exercised, being a political agency of the state, in subordination to the inhibition of the Federal Constitution against legislation impairing the obligation of a contract. This decision would be decisive in the present case, but the present case is still stronger for the creditor. The funding act made the bonds issued under it payable to order or bearer, and made the coupons payable to bearer. The bonds and coupons were so far distinct and independent contracts that they could be separated from each other and transferred to different hands. This court has repeatedly held that such coupons have all the essential attributes of commercial paper; that they are separate claims against the state, and may be used to support separate and independent actions. The coupons held by Hartman, the petitioner, were distinct contracts, imposing their own separate obligations upon the state. Hartman was not the owner of the bonds to which they had been originally attached. In his hands they were as free and discharged from all liability on those ble, but receives an explanation by some writers, who make the rapt and viol different crimes. The rapt was only a seduction of a ward, with the intent to marry her, which is a misdemeanor; while the viol is what we understand by the word rape, and was punished capitally. This accounts for the difference of opinion amongst the old writers on the criminal law, whether rape was a felony or not before this statute. The viol or rape was felony in England as in France; the rapt on seduction was not. bonds as though they had never beer connected a rape by force, which at first seems unintelligiwith them, and argument is hardly nesessary to prove that an act which requires the holder of one contract to pay the taxes levied upon another contract held by a stranger, cannot be sustained. Such an act is not a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. It undertakes to impose upon one the burdens which should fall, if at all, upon another. The funding act stipulated that the coupons should be receivable for all taxes and dues to the state for their full amount, and upon this pledge the holders of the bonds of the state surrendered them and took new bonds for two-thirds of their amount. The Act of 1876 declares that the coupons shall not be thus received for taxes for their full amount, but only for such portion as may remain after a tax subsequently levied upon the bonds to which they were originally attached is deducted. If this act does not impair the contract with the bondholder, who was authorized to transfer to others the coupons with the quality of receivability for taxes annexed, it it difficult to see in what way it would be impaired, even though the tax on the bond should equal the whole face of the coupons. If against the express terms of its contract, the state can take a portion of the interest in the shape of a tax on the bonds, it may at its pleasure take the whole. This court is clear, therefore, that the Act of the Legislature of the State of Virginia, in 1876, requiring the tax on her bonds issued under the funding act of March 30, 1871, to be deducted from the coupons originally attached to them when tendered in payment of taxes or other dues to the state is, in the face of the previous contract with such bondholder contained in the funding act, a law imparing the obligation of a contract, and that it is, therefore, void. It follows that the petitioner was entitled to his mandamus to compel the treasurer of the city of Richmond to receive the coupons tendered to him in payment of taxes for their full amount. Justice MILLER, expressed his dissent from the opinion of the court, and gave as his reasons : 1. That no Legislature of a state has authority to bargain away the state's right of taxation; and 2, that in issuing the bonds and coupons which are the object of this controversy, the Legislature of Virginia, neither in terms nor by any past inference, made any contract that the bonds and coupons should not be subject to the same taxes as other property taxed by the state. A LAWYER'S RECREATION. By Statute of 13 Edward 1st, chap. XXXIV, printed in the old law French, a very extraordinary distinction is made between a rape, and Vouglans, an old author of some repute on the criminal law of France, in his chapter on the viol, cites a case that in circumstances and terms is precisely that of one of Sancho's most famous decisions whilst governor of his island, viz: "Un juge ayant condamne un particulier, qu'une "femme accusoit de viol, a lui donner une cer"taine somme par forme de dommage et inter"ets; il donna en meme tems a ce particulier “la permission d'enlever a cette femme l'argent 'qu'il vemoit de lui donner, ce que le jeune "homme n'ayant pu faire, a cause de la resistance vigoreuse que lui opposa cette femme; "le juge ordonna a cette derniere de restituer “la somme, sur le fondement qu'elle auroit pu "encore mieux defendre son corps, que son ar"gent, si elle l'eut voulu." 66 Forbes, in his Institutes of the Scotch law, lays it down that a woman may be convicted of ravishing a man. So one woman may be a principal to the ravishment of another, she being present to assist the man if necessary.— Dalton, 392, cap. 160. 'Tis said that Abbott, afterwards Ld. Tenterden, had an inclination to become a parson, but that he abandoned the idea and took to the law, because of a case cited by Buller from the Year Books, where the court lay down "that it is actionable to say of an attorney 'that he is a d-d fool,' for this is saying that he is unfit for the profession whereby he lives; but otherwise of a parson, because he may be a good parson and yet a d-d fool. In the old law French as it is reported, but aliter of a parson, par ce que on poet estre bon parson et d―d fool." A case is reported in Owen, 17, and in Cor. Eliz., 342, where one said of the plaintiff, these word, viz: "Peter Palmer is a paltry lawyer, and hath as much law as a jackanapes." It was held that these words were not actionable, because every man that hath more law than a jackanapes, has a much. But to say that he hath no more law than a jackanapes would be actionable. To say of a Justice of Peace, "he is a loggerheaded, and a slouch-headed, bussen the whole amount of the deficit as his stock bears to the whole amount of the capital stock of the bank at its par value. bellied hound" is not actionable: 1 Keb., 629. A, the attorney of B, brought an action against C, for saying to B,: "Your attorney is a bribing where an assessment upon shareholders is made by the knave, and hath taken twenty pounds of you to cozen me." Judge WARBURTON held the words not actionable, for an attorney cannot take a bribe of his own client.-Hob. 8, 9. The law against witches does not prove there be any, but it punishes the malice of those people that use such means to take away men's lives. If one should profess that by turning his hat thrice, and crying buz, he could take away a man's life, (though in truth he could do no such thing), yet this were a just law made, that whosoever should turn his hat thrice, and cry buz, with an intention to take away a man's life, shall be put to death.-Selden. I cannot help observing, that the common question asked the criminal, viz: Culprit, how wilt thou be tried? is improperly answered, by God and my country. It originally must have been, by God or my country, that is either by ordeal or by jury; for the question asked, supposes an option in the prisoner, and the answer is meant to assert his innocence, by declining neither sort of trial.—Barrington on Stat. The 11th ch. of 3d Henry, VIII, A. D., 1511, opens with this remarkable preamble in favor of the regular physicians: "For as much as the science and cunning of physick is daily within this realm exercised by a multitude of ignorant persons, of whom the greater part have no insight in the same, nor in any other kind of learning: Some also con no letters on the book, so far forth, that common artificers, as smiths, and weavers, and woman, boldly and accustomably, take upon them great cures, in which they partly use sorcery and witchcraft, and medicines noxious and nothing meet, to the high displeasure of God, great infamy to the faculty, and the grievous damage of the king's people." Supreme Court, U. S. M. S. UNITED STATES, ex rel., v. KNOX, Comptroller. The charter of a private corporation is a contract between the law making power and the corporators, and the rights and obligations of the latter are to be measured accordingly. The liability of shareholdess in a national bank is several and not joint, and the shareholders are not put in the relation of guarantors or sureties, "one for another," as to the amount which each may be required to pay. In fixing the amount of the separate liability of each of the shareholders, it is necessary to ascertain (1) the whole amount of the par value of all the stock held by all the shareholders; (2) the amount of the deficit to be paid after exhausting all the assets of the bank; (3) then to apply the rule that each shareholder shall contribute such sum as will bear the same proportion to comptroller, which, if paid, would be sufficient to discharge the indebtedness of the bank, the comptroller cannot be compelled to make another assessment upon the solvent shareholders to make good a deficiency in the first assessment, caused by the insolvency of some of the shareholders assessed. Opinion by SWAYNE, J. This case is a petition to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, for a writ of mandamus, directed to the Comptroller of the Currency. It was fully heard in that court upon the merits. The writ was refused, and judgment was rendered against the relator for costs, this writ of error was thereupon sued out, and the case is thus brought before us for review. There is no controversy as to the facts. The only question presented for our consideration is a question of law. The case made in the record, so far as it is necessary to be stated for the purposes of this opinion, is as follows: On the 7th of April, 1874, the Crescent City National Bank of New Orleans was, and for some time had been, insolvent and in the hands of a receiver. On that day, the comptroller assessed each shareholder seventy per cent. upon the par value of each share of his stock, and ordered the receiver to collect the assessment. This the receiver proceeded to do by filing a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Louisiana, against all the shareholders. Thereafter he obtained a decree against all the defendants severally, who were within the jurisdiction of the court, for the amount due from each one according to the assessment, and the cause was thereupon continued to await any further assessment the comptroller might deem it proper to make, and it is still pending. The capital stock of the bank was $500,000; seventy per cent. therefore, was $350,000. This sum, if it could have been collected in full, would have paid all the debts of the bank, But by reason of the and left a balance over. insolvency of many of the shareholders, the assessment netted only $112,658.13, and nothing, or very little more, will hereafter be realized from it. From the proceeds of the assessment and other assets, of the bank, eighty per cent. of the principal of its debts have been paid. The relator being a large creditor of the bank, requested the comptroller to order a further assessment of thirty per cent. upon each share of the capital stock, for the discharge of the balance of principal and interest still due to its creditors, and to direct the receiver to proceed as before to collect the amount of the new assessment. The comptroller refused, because the enforcement of such an assessment would compell the solvent shareholders to pay the sums and proportions due from the shareholders who are insolvent. He holds that no such liability is imposed on the solvent shareholders, and that he has, therefore, no right or power to make the assessment as requested. The point to be decided is, whether he is clothed with this power and duty, and whether the shareholders are thus liable. made joint, and that the shareholders were not intended to be put in the relation of guarantors and sureties, "one for another," as to the amount which each might be required to pay. In the process to be pursued to fix the amount of the separate liability of each of the shareholders, it is necessary to ascertain (1) the whole amount of the par value of all the stock held by all the shareholders; (2) the amount of the deficit to be paid after exhausting all the assets of the bank; (3) then to apply the rule that each shareholder shall contribute such sum as will bear the same proportion to the whole amount of the The first bank law was passed February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 668. The last clause of sec-deficit as his stock bears to the whole amount of tion 12 is as follows: "For all debts contracted by such association for circulation, deposits or otherwise, each shareholder shall be liable to the amount of the par value of the shares held by him, in addition to the amount invested in such shares." This provision was changed in 1864, and has been since, and is now in force, in these terms: The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares: " Rev. Statutes, U. S., Sec. 5151. The Act of 1863 made no provision for enforcing the personal liability of shareholders, while that of 1864, provides that it might be be done through a receiver appointed by the comptroller, and acting under his direction: Id. Sec. 5234. the capital stock of the bank at its par value. There is a limitation of this liability. It cannot in the aggregate exceed the entire amount of the par value of all the stock. The insolvency of one stockholder, or his being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, does not in anywise affect the liability of another; and if the bank itself, in such case, holds any of its stock, it is regarded in all respects as if such stock was in the hands of a natural person. and the extent of the several liability of the other stockholders, is computed accordingly: Crease v. Babcock, 10 Met. Mass., 525. These rules have been applied in several well considered judgments of other courts, where the words we have italicised were not in the statutes upon which they proceeded. We have found no case in conflict with them. See Crease v. Babcock, supra; Atwood v. R. I. Agricultural Bank, 1 R. I. Reps., 37; In the matter of The Hollister Bank, 27 N. Y., 393; Atkins v. Thornton, 19 Ga., 325; Robinson v. Lane, 19 Id 337; Wiswell v. Starr, 48 Maine, 401; see also Morse on Banking, 503. The difference between the clause creating the individual liability as it was originally, and as it was after it was amended and altered, is obvious and striking. The change was plainly made ex industria, to prevent the possibility of doubt as to the meaning of Congress. What the effect of the clause would have been with out the change, is a point we are not called upon to consider. The charter of a private corporation is a contract between the law making power and the corporators, and the rights and obligations of the latter are to be measured accord-be doubted that a court of equity, if its aid were ingly. By the common law the individual property of the stockholders was not liable for the debts of the corporation under any circumstances. Here the liability exists by virtue of the statute and the assent of the corporators to its provisions, given by the contract which they entered into with Congress in accepting the charter. With respect to the character of that liability, it is entirely clear from the language employed n creating it, that it is several and cannot be Although assessments made by the comptroller, under the circumstances of the first assessment in this case, and all other assessments, successive or otherwise, not exceeding the par value of all the stock of the bank, are conclusive upon the stockholders, yet if he were to attempt to enfore one made, clearly and palpably contrary to the view we have expressed, it cannot invoked, would promptly restrain him by injunction. Nothing in this opinion is intended in any wise to affect the authority of Kennedy v. Gib son, 8 Wall., 498, and Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. R., 673. On the contrary, we approve and reaffirm the rule laid down in those cases. The comptroller decided correctly as to his duty in this case. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is, therefore, affirmed. Supreme Court, Penn’a. E. H. WILSON and B. F. DOUGLASS, Defendants below, v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. Under an indictment charging conspiracy and forcible entry and detainer, the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy alone. Held, that the conviction for conspiracy was not inconsistent with an acquittal of the charge of forcible entry and detainer. The legal effect of such a record is to show that the defendants conspired to commit the act, but did not accomplish their object. vict them of a conspiracy to commit forcible entry and detainer, or forcible detainer. 4. The defendants having been acquitted on the counts of indictment for forcible entry and detainer, it is illogical and inconsistent to convict them of conspiracy to commit forcible entry and detainer or forcible detainer, when it appeared on the trial they went into the locus in quo and remain there still. 5. The verdict and the indictment are so inconsistent that sentence cannot be pronounced. The motion was overruled and the defendants were sentenced, each to pay a fine of $25.00, to The gist of the offense in conspiracy is the unlawful be imprisoned in the county jail for one hour combination and the offense is complete the moment such combination is formed. Section 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not, nor was it intended to interfere with the indictment and punishment of a common law conspiracy. and to pay the costs. This writ was then taken, counsel assigning for error: 1. Overruling the motion in arrest of judgment; 2. Sentencing the defendants un Error to the Court of Quarter Sessions of In- der the first count in the indictment; 3. Sendiana county. tencing the defendants on the finding of the jury. For plaintiffs in error, Hon. Harry White and S. M. Clark, Esq. Contra, Messrs. Weir & Gibson and John M. Banks, Esq. Opinion by PAXSON, J. Filed November 1, 1880. The defendants below were charged in the first count of the indictment with a conspiracy to enter upon certain premises described therein, and to hold and keep possession of the same; and in the second and third counts with forcible The plaintiffs in error, with twelve others, were charged in the court below, in an indictment containing three counts, as follows: First. That they "unlawfully and wickedly did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, with violence and a strong hand, to enter into and upon a certain piece or tract of land situate in the township of White, *** and with violence and a strong hand, unlawfully to expel, remove and put out [the prosecutors] from possession of the said premises and by force and with a strong hand to hold and keep possession of the same against the peace," etc. Second and third counts with forcible entry and de-entry and detainer. The jury convicted them tainer of the premises described in the first count. They were all acquitted on the two last counts, and also on the first count, with the exception of Douglass and Wilson, the jury returning the following verdict, which was filed: "We do find on conspiracy E. H. Wilson and Barney Douglass guilty. On forcible entry, not guilty. On forcible detainer, not guilty. Plaintiffs to pay two-thirds of costs and defendants pay one-third costs." of the conspiracy and acquitted them on the second and third counts. The court below sentenced them to pay a fine of $25.00, to be imprisoned in the county jail for one hour and to pay the costs of prosecution. The record having been removed into this court the defendants have assigned for error: 1. That the court below erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, and 2. That the court erred in sentencing the defendants upon the verdict of the A motion in arrest of judgment was made jury. for the following reasons assigned : 1. The count of the indictment on which the defendants have been convicted is for conspiracy at common law; if any crime at all is charged, a remedy having been provided for such offense by Act of 21st March, 1860, this remedy should have been strictly pursued and defendants cannot be sentenced under this indictment. 2. Defendants have not been convicted of any offense for which they can be sentenced under the laws of the Commonwealth. 3. Defendants having been acquitted on the counts of the indictment for forcible entry and detainer, it is illogical and inconsistent to con | No sufficient reason has been shown why the judgment should have been arrested. The record is without fault, and the conviction for conspiracy is not inconsistent with an acquittal of the charge of forcible entry and detainer. The legal effect of such a record is to show that the defendants conspired to commit the act, but did not accomplish their object. They may be punished for their unlawful agreement. The gist of the offense in conspiracy is the unlawful combination and the offense is complete the moment such combination is formed. We are unable to see any good reason why the defendants should not have been sentenced, |