"3. The Republic of China would feel crushed by its friend. That Government was our ally in the Second World War and for long bore alone the main burden of the Far Eastern war. It had many tempting opportunities to compromise with the Japanese on terms which would have been gravely detrimental to the United States. It never did so. We condemn the Soviets for having dishonored their 30year treaty pledge of 1945 to support the Chinese National Government as the Central Government of China. We are honor-bound to give our ally, to whom we are pledged by a mutual-defense treaty, a full measure of loyalty.

"4. The free Asian governments of the Pacific and Southeast Asia would be gravely perplexed. They are close to the vast Chinese land mass. Geographically and, to some extent, politically, they are separated as among themselves. The spirit and resolution of the United States provides an important unifying and fortifying influence. If we seemed to waver and to compromise with Chinese Communism, that would in turn weaken free Asia resistance to Chinese Communism and assist international Communism to score a great success in its program to encircle us." (Loc. Cit.)

Secretary Dulles then concluded his observation on the situation in China by saying:

"The Chinese people are, above all, individualists. We can confidently base our policies on the assumption that international Communism's rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing." (Ibid. Italics inserted)

The evaluation of the China situation and points made by then Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles remain substantially valid today, except Communist China's internal conditions have worsened and her position in the world is more isolated. Yet there is no indication that the militant Communist regime in Peking will relax its hard-line policies and is willing and able to fulfill its obligations towards other nations. Above all, Peking has not, and probably will not, abandon its declared policy of "overthrowing imperialism headed by the United States." If the statesmen of this Committee and the Senate were unable to contribute anything to end what Mr. Dulles called, "the passing phase" of Communist China, it is earnestly hoped that at least they will not contribute anything to prolong or strengthen the Communist tyrannical rule over the 700 million Chinese people, who may be used as an instrument of aggressive wars in the future.

DOES RECOGNITION MEAN APPROVAL?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pan, I believe you heard the testimony of the previous witnesses?

Dr. PAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I take it, however, from your statement that you do not accept the idea that recognition should be disassociated from approval. You think recognition should be a sign of approval?

Dr. PAN. Yes. In theory, one may claim that recognition of a state or government may or may not mean approval of its form of government or its policy and its ideology. However, in all practicality, recognition will lead and may lead to cooperation, existence.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that our recognition of some of the Communist countries means we approve of their systems of government?

Dr. PAN. The recognition tendered by the U.S. Government to other Communist countries may not indicate an approval of their government or form or ideology.

However, in some cases certain aids in the form of culture, in the form of economy, in the form of other means actually is help. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church, do you have a question?

Senator CHURCH. I think not, other than to say that I can think of many governments we recognize, where I certainly hope nobody regards recognition as a connotation of our approval. I think of Franco's government in Spain, for example, and the present military

dictatorship in Greece, and other governments that are wholly in conflict with the basic political concepts in this country, with which we nonetheless maintain relations, and toward which we have traditionally extended recognition. It seems to me that the resolution Senator Cranston has presented is consistent with what in fact has been the usual policy of the government, not only of this government but of almost all governments insofar as recognition is concerned.

Now, historically, this seems to me to be a sound proposition. If the witness cares to comment on that observation I would be happy to have his comment.

Dr. PAN. Thank you very much, Senator Church, for raising this question and by citing a few examples, which I know. What you said in these particular cases may be true. However, in some other cases, and even including the case you mentioned, say the case of the present government of Greece, which some people maintain is a dictatorial government, it does not mean approval of its form or ideology. However, is it true, may I ask you, Mr. Senator, is it true the United States has given certain aid to the Greek Government today?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, it is and I think the policy most unwise. It is also true we have permitted our troops to participate in joint maneuvers with Mr. Franco's, designed to put down a feigned uprising against Franco. This is outrageous from my point of view a mockery

of all the principles for which we purport to stand. But the question gets back to what the historical practice has been on recognition. I can find nothing in the history of that practice which would lead one to conclude that recognition connotes approval. I think the examples I have referred to bear that out.

U.S. RECOGNITION IMPLIES ASSISTANCE

Dr. PAN. I am not arguing with you whether it is wise or unwise to recognize these governments which you mention, nor do I argue with you whether you like it or not is another thing. But what I point out is this: In the face of the few cases you just cite, it is proof by recognizing those governments, the United States did help them. That is the point I want to point out, and with regard to the present situation, if Communist China were to be recognized, although the sense of this resolution does not say it is the aim of the government of the U.S. Government actually, Senator Cranston said this would clear the air of obstacles which would lead to recognition. Therefore, I think that premature recognition is a dangerous thing and also it would mean help. And Communist China is military enough, it does not even need recognition, it is aggressive and military enough. By intensifying and helping Communist China today would be just to strengthen the hands of the Mao leading faction.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I think your argument really goes to the question of whether or not it would be wise for the United States to recognize the Communist Government in China. That is one question. The resolution before us, it seems to me, is based upon an entirely different premise, which is that recognition in and of itself does not imply approval. There are many governments, like that of the Soviet Union, that we recognize but do not help, as well as others which we both recognize and help. But I don't think the two should be confused.

It appears to me that Mr. Cranston's resolution does conform with historical practice and I want to commend the Senator for introducing it. I think he has shown an initiative here that could be very helpful in clarifying the whole question of recognition.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON RECOGNITION
OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify the record on a couple of points if I may. I have been misquoted in the testimony. The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. I am sure this was not intentional, but somehow a quote was attributed to me that changes one of my words, takes out of context what I said, and ends with a period where I had a comma and said something more. So I would like to read for the record briefly what I actually said on the floor of the Senate. This is from the Congressional Record:

Adoption of this resolution will not mean that immediate recognition of China will follow. There are various problems that must be dealt with and negotiated, I am certain, prior to the time that we can establish diplomatic relations with Mainland China. However, the adoption of the resolution will clear the air all over the world and in so far as China is concerned it will remove one obstacle that would still stand in the way of recognition, even if other obstacles are in the course of time removed, and even if the time comes when establishing diplomatic relations with China would clearly serve the interests of America in terms of our security and serve the cause of peace.

That all was boiled down to the following in this testimony:

"The adoption of the resolution will clear the air all over the world and insofar as China is concerned it will remove the obstacle that will still stand in the way of recognition," which is, of course, not what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say there is a substantial difference.

STATE DEPARTMENT CRITERIA USED IN RECOGNITION

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert in the record, and not read it to you now, a statement from the Digest of International Law, by Whiteman, an official Department of State document stating the criteria that the Department normally uses in varying ways, and there are a myriad and long list of them, in deciding whether or not to recognize a government.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is it?

Senator CRANSTON. It is just four or five paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be inserted in the record. (The statement follows:)

STATEMENT FROM THE DIGEST OF INTERNational Law

In fairly recent years the United States, in determining whether or not to extend recognition to de facto governments, has considered the following three criteria. (Not always uniformally described):

1. Whether the government is in de facto control of the territory and in possession of the machinery of the state;

2. Whether it is administering the government with the assent or consent of the people, without substantial resistance to its authority, i.e., whether there is public acquiescence in the authority of the government; and

3. Whether the new government has indicated its willingness to comply with its international obligations under treaties and international law.

Other factors increasingly borne in mind, as appropriate, for example, are the existence or non-existence of evidence of foreign intervention in the establishment of the new regime; the political orientation of the government and its leaders; evidence of intention to observe democratic principles, particularly the holding of elections; the attitude of the new government toward private investment and economic improvement. Importantly, also, the interest of peoples, as distinguished from governments, is of concern. These, and other criteria, depending upon the international situation at the time, have been considered, with varying weight. Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like the following letter from the Department of State and statement from Louis Henkin, a former State Department official, included in the record.

(The material follows:)

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., June 16, 1969.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of May 28 requesting the comments of the Department of State on S. Res. 205, introduced by Senator Cranston on May 27.

The Department agrees with the principle set forth in the proposed resolution. S. Res. 205 would state the sense of the Senate to be that "when the United States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic representatives with it, this does not imply that the United States necessarily approves of the form, deology, or policy of that foreign government". This statement is consistent with the Department's established view of the effect of recognition. Adoption of S. Res. 205 by the Senate could be useful in dispelling any uncertainty that might exist as to the implications that flow from United States recognition of a foreign government or from the exchange of diplomatic representatives with it.

In your letter you also request that a Department witness participate in the hearings to be held on S. Res. 205 early in the week of June 16. We will be pleased to have a representative of the Department testify in these hearings.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

STATEMENT OF LOUIS HENKIN

My name is Louis Henkin. I am Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University. For some years I was an officer of the Department of State, in both Democratic and Republican Administrations. The views I express are, of course, my own.

It may seem surprising that Senator Cranston should feel the need to express the sense of the Senate as provided in his resolution. One might have thought that what his resolution says is very "old hat," reflecting what has been and is the policy of the United States. For many years we have recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with the governments of Soviet Russia and its satellites, of Franco Spain, of the Republic of South Africa. (Until he declared war against us we maintained relations with Hitler's Germany.) Surely, we do not approve of the form, ideology, or policy of these governments, and do not give them the slightest approbation by our recognition and diplomatic relations.

There would indeed be no need for the Cranston Resolution were it not that every now and then policy makers forget its basic wisdom. And once recognition is long delayed or relations long interrupted, these policies come to reflect disapproval of the governments involved and thereafter recognition or resumption of relations appears as an end to such disapprobation or even as affirmative approval. (I do not speak here of recognition of sovereignty over territory acquired by conquest-e.g., Soviet conquest of the Baltic Republics—which raises very different considerations.)

Confusion about the significance of recognition is unfortunate for orderly relations between nations and for the interests of the United States. In part, the fault is in the laws and practices of international society. Nations have not been careful to distinguish between recognition and maintaining diplomatic relations, or between maintaining formal relations and varying degrees of friendship. I have long thought that international society might well abolish the very concept of recognition and with it the confused and irrational consequences which it has accreted. An individual does not need to "recognize" another, nor does he presume not to: a person is a person and must be treated as such. The government of a country, too, is usually a fact and should be accepted and treated as such A government of a country is determined by its people and by domestic forces; the society of nations should accept whatever government there is. (It should adopt more-or-less objective criteria for defining a government and international machinery to resolve questionable cases.) For other nations to presume to recognize or not to recognize a government is really a form of intervention in the affairs of that country. Similarly, one might suggest that all governments should automatically have formal diplomatic relations with each other, even as they deal with each other in the United Nations. Like such common U.N. membership, diplomatic relations reflect that all governments are members of international society inevitably having "business" together. Approval or friendship has nothing to do with it: that is something else, to be reflected- -as between individuals-in special arrangements and special relationships.

There have been suggestions that international law requires governments to recognize those who in fact govern another country. I do not believe that that is yet the law; recognition remains a political act and governments feel free to recognize or not to recognize. Accepting that, I am wholly persuaded that a policy of virtually automatic recognition and establishing relations with those who are in fact the government of another country is in the interests of the United States. Such a policy, scrupulously adhered to, would prevent invidious or irrational discriminations among governments. It would relieve us of difficult judgments and choices on matters that are bascially the business of the people of other countries. Since we would recognize and maintain relations with all, we could no longer be charged with approving governments and policies we do not in fact favor. Nor can I see what interest the United States has in denying itself the benefits of diplomatic relations even with unfriendly countries. With them, too, relations give us information and understanding, enabling us to promote our interests, perhaps to seize opportunities for improving relations when we wish to. (The benefits which the other country has in return costs us very little, I believe.)

Sometimes, we know, there are civil wars in foreign countries, or lesser competitions between two groups each of which claims to govern. Sometimes the United States sees its interests with one such group rather than another and it may be tempted to extend or withhold recognition in order to influence the result. Increasingly, I believe, such interventions by the United States tend to redound against our interests: usually we would do better to abide the result. But, surely, when the competition is over and there is a government that governs it is neither rational, nor moral, nor wise to frustrate orderly international relations and to deny ourselves their fruits.

Recognition, of course, has always been the business of the President and formally the Senate has no part in such decisions. But responsible Presidents have long recognized that the Constitutional separation of powers is an invitation to cooperation rather than conflict. Surely, Presidents are not indifferent to the views of the Congress. In fact, in regard to recognition policy as elsewhere, officials of the Executive Branch have been known to act unwisely from fear that they might be misunderstood and be criticized on Capitol Hill. Senator Cranston's resolution would put the Senate on record in support of policies that are clearly in the nation's interest and would strengthen the hands of the President to pursue them.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon at 12 noon, the hearing was adjourned.)