land, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh, which have about 150,000 members, I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this august committee, for inviting us to express our views on the Senate Resolution, 205, known as the Cranston resolution. We have decided to ask Dr. Stephen Pan, a member of our organization, to be our spokesman to present our views on this important question. Dr. Pan was formerly professor of international relations at Georgetown University, Catholic University, director of Far Eastern studies at Seton Hall University and director of area studies at the University of Seven Seas. He is coauthor of Voice of Peking (1967) and Peking's Red Guards (1968). He was invited by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to testify on Vietnam and China in 1966. May I now introduce to you, Dr. Pan. The CHAIRMAN. Before Ďr. Pan proceeds, I wish to make it clear that this appearance was requested in a telegram from Mr. Young, which I will put in the record. The committee did not seek witnesses. We simply received a telegram and agreed to hear Dr. Pan. You may proceed. (The telegram referred to follows:) Hon. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, NEW YORK, N.Y., June 5, 1969. We who represent 150,000 Americans of Chinese ethnic origin in the eastern part of the United States, invite your attention to the fact that the Cranston resolution for a new approach to China problem is unrealistic, unworkable, and unwise. It would weaken the moral stand of the United States as leader of the free world and strengthen the position of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao to brutally deal with their enemies and the Chinese people at home and abroad. The Cranston resolution is intended to open the gate to accommodate the Peiping regime but the new constitution of the Chinese Communist Party has openly declared that it endeavors to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States. The said resolution seems to think that recognition of Communist China does not mean approval of its ideology form or policy of its rulers but actually it would strengthen its position in world politics and in the eyes of free peoples, it means total surrender on the part of United States. Furthermore any American recognition tendered to the Chinese Communist regime would enlarge its propaganda and subversive activities in this country. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee you must be aware of the fact that mainland China is presently under continuing turmoil and armed conflicts. If the Cranston resolution were adopted by your committee it would make "our friends sad and foes happy" for such a resolution may be well intended but its results would be adverse to the rights and interests of the United States. If and when your committee will have a public hearing may we respectfully request you to allow our voice and reasoning be heard without any discrimination. Several other hundred thousands of Americans of Chinese origin throughout this country also share our feeling and reasoning. Knowing you are a very fairminded man you would not ignore our humble request. Acknowledgement of this telegram will be greatly appreciated. GEORGE YOUNG, President of Chinese Consolidated and Benevolent Association of New York, Chinese Community Center, New York, N.Y. STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHAN PAN, CHINESE CONSOLIDATED AND BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK Dr. PAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor for me to be authorized by the Chinese communities of the eastern part of this country to speak to this important body of the Senate. We wish to thank all the members of this committee for allowing us to be heard on the serious question of "recognition." RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW "Recognition" in international law and the conduct of international relations is certainly a very complicated, misleading, and often misunderstood term. When a state, especially a great power, is considering the recognition of a new state or government, all the tangible and intangible factors involved should be carefully evaluated. According to leading authorities of international law, recognition involves moral, legal, and political considerations. It is not surprising to know that it was nearly 70 years after the declaration of independence by the Netherlands that it was recognized by Spain in the Treaty of Munster in 1648. The new dynasty of Braganza was established over Portugal by a revolt against Spain in 1640, and was not acknowledged by Spain until the Treaty of Lisbon in 1688 was signed, that is, about 44 years afterward. In the case of Texas, Congress in the summer of 1835 adopted a resolution urging the recognition of the independence of Texas. However, in December of the same year, President Andrew Jackson sent a special message to Congress recommending delay in its recognition. He reminded the members of Congress that his "predecessors' had cautiously tried to abstain from making hasty decisions about recognition, and unless they had "clearest evidence" otherwise they would not make a decision of recognizing a State or Government. U.S. NONRECOGNITION POLICY The antithesis to recognition is nonrecognition. The well-known "nonrecognition policy" of the United States was contained in the notes sent to China and Japan by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1915. Knowing that Japan had presented unreasonable and subjugating 21 demands to China, he sent identical notes to China and Japan on May 11, 1915, stating that The United States cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China. (US. Foreign Relations, Washington, 1915, p. 146). This helped China subsequently to cancel these demands at the Washington Conference in 1922. Shortly after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Henry Stimson, Secretary of State on January 7, 1932, sent identical notes to Japan and China reiterating the position of the United States by asserting that the American Government cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreements entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China. (Department of State, Press Releases, January 9, 1932, vol. 6, pp. 41-42.) Without this nonrecognition policy as declared by Secretary Stimson, the League of Nations would not have adopted a resolution on March 11, 1932, similar to the Stimson notes against Japan's fruits of conquest in Manchuria. The nonrecognition policy was continued by the Roosevelt administion from 1933 to 1941 and especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1943, the Cairo Conference was attended by Presi dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Based on the nonrecognition policy, they made a declaration stating Manchuria and other Chinese territories stolen by Japan shall be returned to China (Documents of American Foreign Relations, 1943, Vol. VI, pp. 232–4.) Thus, this legal basis of nonrecognition paved the way for the return of Manchuria to China after the V-J Day, although Soviet obstruction in that region had long delayed and prevented the Republic of China from retaking possession of this area. RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA OPPOSED The Cranston resolution attempts to set forth a principle regarding the recognition by the United States of foreign governments. It appears to avoid mentioning any nation. It tries to convey the idea. that American recognition of a foreign country "does not imply that the United States necessarily approves the form, ideology or policy of that foreign government." However, in his speech introducing the resolution on May 27, Senator Cranston said: "The adoption of this resolution will clear the air all over the world and insofar as China is concerned, it will remove the obstacle that would still stand in the way of recognition." In our view, American recognition of the Peking regime would strengthen Peking's position at home and abroad, as recognition would naturally imply a hope for friendship, cooperation and assistance between the nations concerned. Since 1966, Communist China has been embroiled in serious and bloody ideological and power struggles in the form of riots, demonstrations and armed conflicts between the Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao group and its adversaries. Mainland China is now in a condition of disorder, turmoil and anarchy. Such a situation continues to spread unabated throughout the nation. It would not serve American national interests to strengthen the hands of the Mao-Lin group to attack its enemies. Communist China has repeatedly declared that the United States is her archenemy. The new Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party and Lin Piao's "Political Report" made before the ninth CCP Congress solemnly declared their intention "to overthrow imperialism, headed by the United States." Any attempt to appease Communist China on the part of the United States would be fruitless. RESULTS OF OTHER NATIONS' RECOGNITION OF PEKING GOVERNMENT Peking's xenophobia and antiforeign agitations from 1966 to the present are well known to the world. Diplomats from Communist and non-Communist nations in Peking have been insulted and humiliated. Their property has been damaged and attacked. The United Kingdom was the first Western power to recognize Communist China. Yet her diplomats and consuls in Peking, Shanghai, and Macao have been attacked, and their property vandalized. The riots and demonstrations in Hong Kong in 1966 and 1967 are still vivid in the memory of all those victimized and those who read news reports. India was the first Asian nation to recognize the Peking regime. Yet India has been twice attacked by the Chinese People's Liberation Army within 10 years. President Sukarno of Indonesia was very friendly towards Peking. He claimed to be a good friend of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Nevertheless Peking had an important hand in the overthrow of his government in the coup d'etat of October 1966. Burma recognized Communist China in 1950. But the Burmese Government eventually felt compelled to denounce Peking's subversive activities in Rangoon and other Burmese towns and villages. Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk had to close two pro-Peking newspapers and arrest many Chinese Communist spies in Cambodia in 1967. Recently he announced that Cambodia is ready to resume. diplomatic relations with the United States. Finally, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, on June 7 this year declared that Communist China under Mao Tse-tung is preparing for war, conventional and nuclear, against the Soviet Union. The above-mentioned experiences of the various nations, Communist and non-Communist, which have recognized Communist China, should not be overlooked. CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. RECOGNITION OF PEKING If Communist China were recognized by the United States, it would increase Chinese Communist subversive activity and propaganda in this country. The tranquility and security of Chinese communities in this country may be threatened by the infiltration and penetration of the Chinese Communist agents. Such a threat may also extend to Americans of other origins to a lesser degree at the initial stage. Since the convening of the 9th CCP Congress, the political and military struggles among factions of the Communists have intensified and become more widespread. The rift between Peking and Moscow has widened and deepened. In spite of its internal and external difficulties, Peking's denunciation of President Nixon and his communique, made jointly with President Thieu, have violently increased. Peking's charges against Soviet Russia have also become more virulent. While the 700 million mainland Chinese are yearning for freedom, it would be unthinkable for the United States to strengthen the hands of the oppressive regime in Peking on its people through recognition. Secretary John Foster Dulles in 1957 predicted that Communist China is in "a passing and not a perpetual phase." Vice President Richard Nixon in 1958 declared that American support of the Republic of China involves "not the individual Chiang," but "the future hopes" of millions of Chinese there and overseas, "who hold tremendous power, the balance of power in some instances-in Indonesia, Malaysia, Indochina, even in the Philippines and Thailand." Dulles' and Nixon's views remain substantially valid, except that Communist China's internal situation has worsened and her position in the world has become more isolated. It is hoped that if the American statesmen are unable to contribute towards ending what Dulles called the "passing phase," at least, they will not contribute towards prolonging or strengthening the Chinese Communist regime by recognition. Thank you very much. (The full statement of Mr. Pan follows:) STATEMENT BY DR. STEPHEN PAN, AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE CHINESE CONSOLI DATED AND BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATIONS OF NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, D.C., NEW ENGLAND, PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE AND PITTSBURGH It is an honor for me to be authorized by the Chinese communities of the eastern part of this country to speak to this important body of the Senate. We wish to thank Senator Fulbright and the other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations for allowing us to be heard on the serious question of "recognition." RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW "Recognition" in international law and the conduct of international relations is certainly a very complicated, misleading and often misunderstood term. One may maintain, as does Senator Cranston, that recognition does not imply that the recognizing state necessarily approves of the form, ideology or policy of the recognized government. This is an over-simplified statement, though it is true that the recognizing state is not bound to endorse everything in the recognized state or government. Henry Wheaton, a classical writer on international law, in his Elements of International Law (in the Classics of International Law, edited by James Brown Scott, George G. Wilson, etc. London, 1936, p. 35) says: "There are, in truth, stages and degrees of recognition. Where the purpose of the foreign State is just and friendly, it will go not farther than its own necessities . . "The test is, did the necessities of the foreign State require the act, and did the act recognize no more than existed and than those necessities required? The acts referred to are special and casual and temporary, and are not inconsistent with a recognition of the fact, that contest is undecided." Furthermore, Wheaton maintained: "Whether this final step is justifiable, depends upon the same tests; namely, the necessities of foreign States, and the truth of the fact implied, that the State treated with was, at the time, in the condition de facto of an independent State. Where the necessities of the foreign State are spoken of, the term is to be understood in a liberal sense. It refers to a state of things when a just regard to the duties and rights of a government, in reference to the interests confided to it, requires its action." (Ibid.) He explained in more detail about the duties of a government to be recognized as follows: "It is among the duties of a government to keep open to its subjects commercial intercourse with all practicable parts of the world, the privileges of travel and sojourning, and all the forms of intercourse beneficial to humanity; and to make arrangements for the protection of its citizens in these pursuits." (Loc. Cit.). Using this criterion, it is questionable whether a nation, such as Communist China, would be able to fulfill her duties and rights. Wheaton concluded in the following words: "The justification of special acts short of absolute and formal recognition of sovereign independence, must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and little light can be thrown upon them by abstract statements." (Loc. Cit.). Thus, when a State, especially a great Power, is considering the recognition of a new State or a Government, all the tangible and intangible factors involved in that question should be carefully evaluated. It is not surprising to know that it was nearly 70 years after the Declaration of Independence by the Netherlands that it was recognized by Spain in the Treaty of Munster in 1648. The new Dynasty of Braganza was established over Portugal by a revolt against Spain in 1640, and was not acknowledged by Spain until the Treaty of Lisbon in 1688 was signed, i.e., about 44 years afterwards. In the case of Texas, after a year of fighting, the independence of Texas was declared in December 1835. A decisive battle against Mexico occurred at San Jacinto in April 1836, but Mexico refused to acknowledge its independence. In the summer of 1836, the U.S. Congress adopted a resolution stating: "That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States whenever satisfactory information should be received that it had in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power." (Wheaton, Elements of International Law, Op. Cit. p. 37) |