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The most important change came two decades later under Woodrow Wilson, when the dimension of democratic legitimacy was added to our recognition doctrine.

The addition has haunted us ever since. It has led to confusion both in America and in the rest of the world. It is difficult to be certain whether American recognition indicates approval of each regime we recognize.


For example, during John Foster Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State, he suggested that American recognition of a new government does imply our moral approval of that government.

Discussing possible recognition of the Communist regime in China in 1954, Dulles stated :

It is one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good. That explains our nonrecognition of the Communist regime.

Yet at another time during Mr. Dulles' stewardship, a seemingly contradictory statement was issued indicating that recognition of a foreign government does not imply our moral approval.

In a letter to Senator H. Alexander Smith, dated April 8, 1957, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hill said, regarding recognition of the Batista regime in Cuba:

one of the cornerstones of United States foreign policy with respect to Latin America is the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of these countries. The maintenance of diplomatic relations by the United States with a government does not imply approval or disapproval of that government's domestic policies or practices.

On the Democratic side, we have two equally contradictory statements. Secretary of State James Byrnes, commenting on recognition of a postwar government in Rumania, made a statement which strongly implied that recognition means approval.

He said:

The British and American Governments have agreed that they will recognize the Rumanian government as soon as they are satisfied that the government has been broadened to include two truly representative members of two important political parties not now represented in the government and assurances have been given regarding free elections, freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. These are the terms under which we will recognize this government. It is for us to say whether these terms have been complied with.

And during his tenure as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson made the following statement which implied that recognition does not imply approval :

We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries because we are on the same planet and must do business. We do not establish an embassy or legation in a foreign country to show approval of its government. We do so to have a channel through which to conduct essential governmental relations and to protect legitimate United States interests * * * if and when we recognize a government * * our act of recognition need not be taken to imply approval of it or its policies.


The confusion that results from these different statements of U.S. recognition policy was summed up succinctly in a statement Secretary Acheson himself made in 1950 concerning the withdrawal of our Ambassador from Spain in accordance with a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling on member states to withdraw ambassadors to express their disapproval of the Franco regime.

Mr. Acheson said:

It is traditional practice, once a state has been formally recognized, to exchange Ambassadors or Ministers and is usually without political significance . However, the withdrawal of Ambassadors from Spain disregarded this principle. By attaching moral significance to the refusal to maintain full diplomatic relations with Spain, this action has also implied moral significance to the maintenance of full diplomatic relations through the return of Ambassadors. This situation inevitably led to confusion in public opinion both here and abroad. On the one hand, the question of returning Ambassadors to Spain has tended to become identified with the larger issue of whether it is desirable to have closer relations with the present Spanish Government. On the other hand, public bewilderment has been increased over the inconsistency of accrediting Ambassadors to such countries as those in Eastern Europe whose regimes we do not condone while, at the same time, refusing to appoint an Ambassador to Spain.

These statements by various Secretaries of State serving at various times in recent years, point out the various and conflicting interpretations which have been made about recognition just recently during the post-World War II period. The confusion surrounding our policy has led to the belief, declared as fact by some authorities and denied as false by others, that recognition of a new foreign government does indeed imply approval of the regime recognized.

This, I submit, is a needless impediment to an effective foreign policy. It is an impediment which inevitably makes us look weak, vacillating and sometimes even silly in the eyes of a responsible public opinion at home and abroad.

Today we recognize, for example, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, South Africa, and the Soviet Union. We also recognize the Governments of Chile, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom.

Nobody would seriously suggest that we endorse the actions of all these governments equally, or that we necessarily approve of each and every one of their actions, either domestically or internationally.

If we in the Senate make it plain that recognition of a foreign government implies absolutely nothing concerning our Nation's judgment of the government recognized, we will cut through the maze surrounding our present policy. We will remove a formidable barrier that will otherwise still stand in the way should the time come when recognition of a particular government would otherwise be negotiable and when recognition would clearly serve our national interest.


I believe we should generally seek to establish more open communications with all governments. This would serve both our national interest and the broader interest of peace and security for all mankind. A move by us in this direction now might well encourage other governments to take similar steps. It could thus serve to open up and to broaden communications the world over.

Adoption of this resolution would by no means imply that we would be equally friendly with all nations. Recognition does not necessarily lead to close and intimate cooperation with a particular foreign government. There are values that we most certainly want to preserve, protect and project in our foreign policy. But let us seek effective ways to do this and let us abandon ineffective ways.

The evidence is overwhelming that withholding recognition from governments of which we disapprove, and with whom our relations are particularly hostile, has failed totally to advance our values or to achieve any other significant and enduring purposes.

Indeed, nonrecognition makes it difficult for us to transmit our values and to state clearly our purposes. It deprives us of an opportunity to determine accurately the effectiveness of our actions. It prevents us not only from exerting influence but from gaining insight.

It is a matter of crucial importance in the years ahead for our country to develop a recognition policy, along with other aspects of foreign policy, which will improve communication with those who would be our enemies—not make communication more difficult.

All too many wars have occurred as a result of a lack of communication, and a consequent failure to calculate properly the intentions, determination, strengths and weaknesses of a potential foe.

We have a hot line to Moscow simply because failure to communicate clearly with the Soviet Union in a moment of crisis could cause utter catastrophe.

Communication between states in this age of the atomic bomb is especially important. A lost signal, a missed statement of intention, a simple misunderstanding, might well lead to a devastated planet. I believe. Senate adoption of S. Res. 205 would be a positive step in the right direction.

Let me close by drawing an analogy to the U.S. Senate.

Originally, Senators were in effect ambassadors representing their separate States.

Even now, Senators come here from near and far to speak for widely divergent and often sharply conflicting views and interests. I do not suggest, of course, that there are any differences between Senators as deep as those between President Nixon and Chairman Mao, or between Secretary Rogers and Minister Gromyko.

We all know, however, how fundamental some of our differences are. And surely no two Senators, whether from the same State or from States separated by many thousands of miles, see all issues in the same way, no matter how many views they may share.

The bonds they develop on the issues they agree upon, the working relationships that grow as they work together on them, and the mutual respect that develops with it, diminish friction on the issues where they differ. Even Senators who are deeply, perhaps irreconcilably, divided on the most basic and burning issues of our time—issues of war and peace, issues of race and religion-can, if they try, find areas of agreement on other matters.

It can start with nothing more than a common liking for a particular place, or a special food. But if they share that small but mutual interest or taste-if they only talk together-soon they will discover some

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small public issue they look upon in like ways. And if they start working together on it, they will find some larger issue that they can agree upon, too.

This process slowly reduces the frictions and the tensions between them, even on those matters where their differences are deep and seemingly everlasting. Sometimes it follows that even on those issues, possible compromises will slowly come into focus.

So it is with nations, and their leaders and their people.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cranston, I think that is a remarkably fine statement. I might observe that I think perhaps it is a little too rational and sensible for the present world to absorb quickly and agreo with. Anway, it is a wonderful goal to aspire to whether or not we can achieve it.



I notice in the beginning of your statement you seem to feel that there is likely to be a reaction that this resolution is intended primarily to set the stage for recognition of China, and you go out of your way to state that that is not so. You hope to establish a universal principle which would be applicable to any country; is that correct?

Senator CRANSTON. That is right. I think it is as important to take a look at whom we presently recognize as to look at whom we do not presently recognize. We presently have diplomatic relations with a great many nations who plainly do many things that we do not approve of, and the suggestion in present policy is that we do approve of them, and I think that injures us at home and injures us abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Aren't there some other countries which we do not recognize today?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes; Outer Mongolia and Albania are the two countries where there is not the issue of a divided country to consider. Then you get into East Germany and North Korea and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there not a number of countries which we recognize, yet we are not particularly sympathetic with their domestic policies?

Senator CRANSTON. Not particularly sympathetic, puts it very mildly.

Thỏ CHAIRMAN. I wonder whether it is necessary for you to be so categoric when you say, “We must determine the role and the status of Taiwan, the future of the Nationalist China Government," I assume as a precondition to recognition of Red China. I notice a number of people have been saying in the press recently that really this is a China problem. It isn't necessary for the United States to set itself up as a mentor and make a determination. There is one thing that both the Government of Taiwan and China agree upon, that they are all part of one country; isn't that correct? Don't they still agree on that?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes; it is. Perhaps I should have said the status must be determined. I agree that it is not fundamentally our responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily by us. Is it really our responsibility to make that determination? Isn't it perhaps just as well if the Chinese find some way to determine that status?

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Senator CRANSTON. Until they do work it out among themselves, it seems to me that it will very difficult to establish it.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't that be a little better way to put it?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. I accept it. I should say this status should be determined, not that we should determine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to emphasize this tendency by us. We happen at the moment, as a large and powerful country, to assume to make all these decisions. This isn't a tendency one should be encouraging.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes; I totally agree with your comment.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Senator CRANSTON. And I accept your amendment to the statement.


The CHAIRMAN. I think you make a very good case. You have outlined the confusion very well indeed. I don't know that there is much I can add to it. You raise this question when you quote from a letter of the former Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Hill:"... one of the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy with respect to Latin America is the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of these countries.” Do you think that is still a cornerstone of American policy?

Senator "CRANSTON. If it is a cornerstone, we have ignored the cornerstone.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a considerable intervention in various ways in recent years.

I think it is an excellent statement, and I am afraid I can't find anything to criticize.

Senator Cooper, do you wish to ask Senator Cranston a question?

Senator COOPER. I am sorry I did not get here in time to hear Senator Cranston. I may say, though, we have talked about this subject at some length and I am familiar with his resolution. I think he has made a good statement. I have read it.




As I understand it, this resolution does not imply or require, of course-it could not anyway--that the United States recognize any particular government.

Senator CRANSTON. No. That would remain a decision to be made by the President and the Secretary of State. It would simply, I believe, give the President and the Secretary of State greater flexibility to serve basic American interests by removing an obstacle that presently stands in the way of recognition at a time when recognition may really be viewed by them as serving our interests.

Senator COOPER. It does not require that any particular country be recognized, and also if one is recognized, it is simply a case of recognition, not approval?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.
Senator COOPER. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I deeply appreciate this opportunity and appreciate your holding these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you made a fine statement.

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