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ment to take on the treaty relations of the sovereign, Professor CHIU argued, that from that moment on the ROC would not be bound by any treaty responsibilities.

The question was then raised whether the Export-Import Bank could not extend facilities to the PRC without full normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC. Mr. THEROUX agreed that such facilities did not depend upon the existence of full normalizations, but the Congress would expect certain requirements to be fulfilled within the terms of the Bank's mandate. These requirements could hold up the situation just as long as the normalization issue.

The question was asked whether there was much of a chance of a plebiscite on Taiwan. Would the people there want it? Professor CHIU noted that the United States appeared to have discouraged any such move. If a plebiscite occurred, the PRC would undoubtedly think that it had been promoted by the United States in an attempt to evade the "one China” issue. There was a problem of an identity crisis among the people on Taiwan, and it would be difficult to tell whether they would want a plebiscite now. In any event the PRC would reject any such plebiscite as invalid. Mr. HYNDMAN noted that there did appear to be more talk on Taiwan on this issue. A process of assimilation of the Taiwanese also seemed to have begun. Professor COHEN was of the view that such a plebiscite could be a nightmare for United States policy towards the PRC. The ROC's legitimacy is grounded on the theory that it was the government of all China; it did not seem likely that it would take the plebiscite route. In any event, what was needed now was a gradual evolution of events, not a dramatic change of policy like a plebiscite.

The question was again raised concerning Professor Chiu's view of the status of the Shanghai Communique. He had argued that the communique was not an international agreement because it was not in Treaties in Force. However, only treaties appear in Treaties in Force; there were also executive agreements, compacts and similar instruments. Professor Chiu, responded by arguing that though the communique might or might not appear to be a binding agreement in international law; for domestic purposes it was not and the Treaties in Force included not just treaties but also executive agreements. He went on to argue that once the PRC were recognized, the question would inevitably arise concerning the international status of Taiwan. The comment was made from the floor that the ROC would certainly remain a state for purposes of its international obligations, as long as it met the criteria of statehood. Domestic limitations in terms of its standing to sue, and the like, in United States courts could not determine the ROC's international obligations.

MICHAEL P. MALLOY, 10

Reporter.

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10 Office of Foreign Assets Control, United States Department of the Treasury.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT OF INTENTION TO

GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE PRC

DECEMBER 15, 1978

Following is the text of President Carter's speech in Washington, as made public by the White House, on normalizing relations with China.

Good evening, I would like to read a joint communiqué which is being issued simultaneously in Peking at this moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

"Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Jan. 1, 1979.

“The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of Jan. 1, 1979.

“The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

“Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

"Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

"Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

“The United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

“Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

“The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979."

"HISTORIC AGREEMENT"

Yesterday, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement.

On Jan. 1, 1979, our two Governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.

As a nation of gifted people who comprise one-fourth of the population of the earth, China plays an important role in world affairs-a role that can only grow more important in the years ahead. We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or

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expedient reasons. In recognizing that the Government of the People's Republic is the single Government of China, we are recognizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than a recognition of reality.

“LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP" Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We have already begun to rebuild some of those previous ties. Now, our rapidly expanding relationship requires the kind of structures that diplomatic relations

will make possible.

The change I am announcing tonight will be of long-term benefit to the peoples of both the United States and China—and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world.

Normalization and the expanded commercial and cultural relations it will bring with it-will contribute to the well-being of our own nation, and will enhance stability in Asia.

RELATIONS WILL BENEFIT THE WORLD These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we and our children will live.

We have already begun to inform our allies and the Congress of the details of our intended action. But I wish also to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan, with whom the American people have had and will have extensive close and friendly relations.

As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan.

BROAD TIES WITH TAIWAN PLEDGED

The people of the United States will maintain our current commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means. Many other countries are already successfully doing so.

These decisions and actions open a new and important chapter in world affairs.

To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Premier Teng has accepted my invitation to visit Washington at the end of January. His visit will give our Governments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin working together to enhance the cause of world peace.

These events are the result of long and serious negotiations begun by President Nixon in 1972, and continued by President Ford. The results bear witness to the steady, determined bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace will be the goal and the responsibility of all countries.

The normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than this—the advancement of peace.

It is in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take special pride in sharing this news with you tonight.

[Foreign Affairs Memorandum From: Douglas J. Bennet, Assistant

Secretary of State, December 1978]

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FUTURE RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

HISTORY OF NORMALIZATION

President Carter's announcement on December 15 that the United States and the People's Republic of China had agreed to establish full diplomatic relations was the culmination of long negotiations begun by President Nixon and continued by President Ford. In the Shanghai Communique, issued during President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972, the United States acknowledged "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." In that document, the United States also reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. The two sides made clear that normalization of relations was their common goal.

Soon after coming into office President Carter endorsed the Shanghai Communique and stated: “Normalization is the goal of our policy. I believe that the United States and the People's Republic have common interests in many places in the world. Given these and our bilateral interests, I look forward to strengthened cooperation between our two countries."

The administration's China policy has embodied three aims: (a) to enhance our consultative relations on matters of common international concern; (b) to expand our bilateral relations; and (c) to establish normal diplomatic relations. The administration has been prepared to move forward in any of these areas at an appropriate pace, while making clear that U.S. relations were not directed against any third party, and that the United States retained an interest in the peaceful and prosperous future of the people of Taiwan.

During the past year China, under the leadership of Premier Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, has moved rapidly to carry out an ambitious program of modernization and expanded contacts with the West. Domestically, Peking has acted to rectify the damage to its political and economic structure caused by the Cultural Revolution. Chinese leaders have traveled extensively abroad. The PRC has recently concluded, for example, economic agreements with the European Community and Japan and a Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan.

Our relationships with the PRC have expanded rapidly in the past 6 months. We have agreed to joint projects in energy, space, medicine, agriculture and other fields. The first of what is expected to be more than 500 Chinese students and research scholars have begun arriving in this country, and American students will soon leave for China. At least six U.S. oil firms are negotiating with the PRC for cooperative exploration of China's off-shore oil reserves. Trade with the PRC more than tripled this year over last to exceed $1 billion, and U.S. grain sales will exceed $500 million. China's foreign purchases between now and 1985 are expected to reach $80 billion.

In August of 1977 Secretary Vance visited Peking for exploratory talks on normalization with the new Chinese leadership. Secretary Vance also met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in New York that fall. He and Dr. Brzezinski met on many occasions with the chief of the Chinese Liaison Office here. During Dr. Brzezinski's visit to Peking in May of this year, the United States indicated that Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office in Peking, was ready to begin serious discussions with Foreign Minister Huang Hua to see whether normalization could be achieved on mutually acceptable terms.

Throughout the discussions, the President felt he had to reach a clear understanding with the Chinese on three important issues: (1) unofficial American presence in Taiwan after normalization; (2) the substance of the American commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan after normalization; and (3) our respective expectations concerning the future of Taiwan.

Both sides were aware that the Taiwan issue was the major stumbling block to normalization. President Carter was willing to pursue normalization only within the framework of our expectations for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. He made clear that the administration must be confident of a peaceful and prosperous future for the people of Taiwan. The President, who personally approved all instructions to Ambassador Woodcock, met with the Chinese Liaison Office Chief, Ambassador Chai, on September 19. In that meeting, as in other discussions of this vital matter, the President left no doubt that Taiwan had to be able to purchase selected defensive weapons in the United States.

In early November, we offered the PRC a draft of a possible joint communique. After further negotiations Ambassador Woodcock was invited to meet with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing on December 13. This was the crucial meeting. Teng indicated that the PRC was prepared to normalize on the basis of a position acceptable to the United States. After further discussions with Teng, the two sides agreed on the December 15 announcement.

The Joint Communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations reaffirms the principles agreed on by the two governments in the Shanghai Communique, and while acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China, stated that “the people of the United States will maintian cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” Simultaneously with the communique, the United States issued a formal statement of which the Chinese were aware in advance, expressing our confidence that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future and stating that the United States "continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” The parallel Chinese statement, released simultaneously, reaf

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