We have many affairs on Taiwan, and hence must deal with the authorities in de facto control. These dealings do not imply that the Taiwan authorities are legitimate, but merely that they are in power. There are many precedents for dealing with both the de jure and the de facto authorities, for example, the Franco government and the Royalist during the Spanish Civil War; the Vichy government and the French Committee on National Liberation during World War II; and, of course, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

The point is that recognition of one group as the de jure government of a state does not preclude us from also dealing with some other authorities when the first group does not exercise actual control over the entire territory of the state.

Mr. BEILENSON. In what context would we be stating that, in the context of the agreement with the People's Republic of China, or subsequent to it?

Mr. LI. I think that this can go either way. It depends on how explicit one feels we must be on this issue for our own domestic purposes.

Mr. BEILENSON. What the People's Republic of China would accept. Mr. LI. I think the People's Republic of China would accept the fact that it does not exercise administrative control over the island of Taiwan.

Mr. BEILENSON. But it may not want us to spell that out.

Mr. LI. That is right, but I think we can properly maintain the position that we can deal with the de facto authorities without conferring legitimacy on them.

Mr. COHEN. May I say on that point, there is a difference between a nation's articulation of its own maximum position, of its own preferred position, which is that Taiwan is Chinese territory, and the nation's terms for normalization of relations. Many states have normalized relations with Peking, saying nothing about Peking's claim to Taiwan. Others have merely taken note of the claim to Taiwan. Others have used the formulations, such as "We respect the claim,” whatever that means.

We have adopted our own particular formulation, the Shanghai Communique. So I think we have to distinguish between what the Chinese claim to be the facts of life, and what they insist upon as a part of normalization.

Finally, responding to this last point, I think that we are likely to do it within a separate statement rather than a joint communique, because Peking will not want to sully its own position.

The Shanghai Communique solved this problem by having certain portions of the communique where both sides agreed; certain portions where each party stated its own position; and then they came together on certain other things. There are a number of possibilities, I think, here.

Mrs. MEYNER. If you will excuse me, I have had some Russian ladies waiting in my office since 3 o'clock from the Women's Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

Thank you very, very much. It has been fascinating. I believe I am speaking for Mr. Beilenson also, when I say that we would very much like to spend many more hours than we have on this issue. Your

coming here and your testimony has meant a great deal, and I thank you so much.

I think that Mr. Beilenson does have a couple of additional questions, if you have the time. We would be very glad if you could stay for a few more minutes. You are very patient, because this has been a very interesting session, but a very long one.

Mr. BEILENSON [presiding]. May I presume upon your time, and ask you a couple more things?

Mr. VALEO. Could I stay with Mr. Li's analysis?
Mr. BEILENSON. Please go ahead.

DE FACTO AUTHORITIES

Mr. VALEO. On the concept of dealing with de facto authorities, I don't think that there is any question, this could be done and would be done, but I do think that it has to be in the context of what the Peoples Republic of China has said would be acceptable under the Japanese formula.

It would be in the context of some official group dealing with those authorities, and not an official consul of the United States.

Mr. LI. The British managed to have a consulate in Taiwan for many years.

Mr. VALEO. They don't have it now.

Mr. COHEN. Without having an embassy in Peking. They did not have fully normalized relations with Peking, because they insisted on the Taiwan consulate.

Mr. BEILENSON. I am correct in saying that there is some agreement that there need be no real problem in doing both things, recognizing Peking, and still treating with Taiwan as best we can?

It is not a very well put question, but the problem is to find a formula, I take it.

LOSING LEVERAGE

Mr. THEROUX. I would simply point out that that is a satisfactory and workable possibility, so long as it serves the interest of the People's Republic of China. When it no longer serves the interest of the People's Republic of China for the United States to be maintaining these various relationships with Taiwan, then I think short of the 7th Fleet, we would have no leverage to challenge the fact that Taiwan was a province of China, without powers to conduct foreign relations, and subject to administration by Peking.

Mr. BEILENSON. That leads me to my next question. In order for us to validly claim that we are maintaining an interest in the security of the people of Taiwan, do any of you agree, or feel that we have to have some sort of specific written or spoken commitment from Peking that they recognize the rights of ours to defend Taiwan from either invasion or blockades?

Mr. COHEN. John Foster Dulles tried ostensibly, in the 1950's, at least, to get such a commitment. Of course, no such commitment can be forthcoming because, as Peking points out, no government will commit itself to allow another state to defend the opposite party in a domestic civil war, which is the situation that has existed.

We cannot expect Peking to pledge itself to such a commitment, however desirable it would be. I disagree with Mr. Theroux that Peking has expressed its intention of liberating Taiwan by peaceful means, because they have taken various positions on that, and as a matter of principle would not renounce such a right, which is the way they see it.

I think the most we can hope for is Peking's acquiescence and our own reliable new forms of commitment to defend Taiwan. Even if Peking tomorrow gave us an agreement, what would it be worth? You may have a new government the next day of a radically different

nature.

What we have to do is to act in a way that we can rely on ourselves. I think all we can hope for is Peking's understanding in not upsetting this applecart. If it should, we would be very much in the position that we are today, if Peking decided that it was ready to face up to the 7th Fleet in order to get Taiwan.

This would disrupt the whole pattern of Peking's foreign relations in Asia and the world at an enormous price, raising the Soviet threat. We would still have a problem with Peking, even though we had normalized relations with Peking.

So I don't think that the specter that Mr. Theroux gives us really changes much.

Mr. BEILENSON. Am I correct in remembering your suggestion that we should be discussing reaching an agreement with PRC during the process of negotiations for normalization, as to what further unilateral or unofficial steps we may be taking in order to deal with Taiwan?

Mr. COHEN. I think that is important. When France normalized relations with Peking, it did not work out in advance with Peking the precise, concrete steps that would immediately follow.

The first thing that happened was that they got into a terrible row over the fact that the French did not want to insist that the Republic of China vacate the premises. You had a difficulty there right away. De Gaulle and Peking got into a considerable fight, and the French finally had to yield on Peking's terms.

We want to avoid that kind of unseemly risk. These things have to be worked out with Peking in advance.

VETO POWER

Mr. BEILENSON. Then we are giving Peking a further veto power, other than the one it has already asked for, in a sense, by giving them more-requiring that we comply with more than the three preconditions which they have already stated publicly.

Mr. COHEN. No; because what we would be doing is requiring that they accede to the countervailing measures we would have to take in order to make those three conditions acceptable to us, palatable to us, and we are under no obligation to make any deal.

There was some reference earlier to those who promote unconditional normalization. I certainly do not promote unconditional normalization. I think that we have to take into account the interests that we have already alluded to in connection with Taiwan, and the larger implications.

Mr. BEILENSON. You are stating that we should not accept those three conditions until such time that we have an understanding between the People's Republic of China and the United States as to some further understanding of our relationship with Taiwan thereafter.

Mr. COHEN. Each side has certain minimal needs that have to be met in the process of negotiations. It is a diplomatic bargain, in that sense. Mr. BEILENSON. You people disagree with that?

Mr. LI. Diagree is not the word. We are taking quite different approaches. I do not think we will be able to get everything to happen at once: We accept the three conditions, and Peking gives us an acceptable substitute for security. Our domestic debate is still too confused, and perhaps our differences with Peking still too wide. Hence, we are unlikely to be able to complete the entire normalization process in one immediate stroke. The result would be further impasse.

Mr. BEILENSON. Is it bad if we are?

Mr. LI. It is bad for a number of reasons, many of which were discussed yesterday. In addition, I think that we are now engaged in a national debate over normalization. If at the end of this debate, nothing positive happens and the impasse continues, the lack of progress may be interpreted as a rejection of normalization. Taken as a whole, the reasons given yesterday and today make a convincing case for moving ahead.

My proposal of recognizing the PRC now and then moving on to discussing the security issue, provides just the kind of interim progress that clearly advances the normalization process while being politically possible domestically.

Mr. BEILENSON. I am not sure that this is what you came here to talk about, but it would be helpful to us if any of you gentlemen might like to suggest what kind of a security or defense, mutual defense arrangement we should seek here. We cannot expect Taiwan to come to our aid. Should we have some kind of a defense understanding, or military understanding with Taiwan, and what should it be? Or do you have any particular feelings about that?

Obviously, we want to maintain economic ties to the extent we can, at least. We do 10 times as much business with them, and we want to continue to protect them economically as best we can.

Mr. VALEO. As a practical matter, it boils down to whether we can. continue arms sales or arms transfers or some sort. In all candor, I don't think that you can deal with that question until you have some better understanding of what the People's Republic's view is on this. If they oppose it, I don't know how you can go ahead.

It may very well come up in the case of anything that might contribute to a nuclear capacity in Taiwan.

Mr. COHEN. What we are talking about, fundamentally, is a continuation in a new form of our present commitment to come to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores against external attack, the assumption being that it could still come from the People's Republic of China, however unlikely this seems to be, given the current balance of political and military forces. If we are contemplating eventually dropping our own commitment, the critical thing will be: (1) Taiwan's capability to defend itself; and its continuing ability to obtain arms that it cannot manufacture from the United States or some other countries.

We do not know Peking's view on this, and this may be the critical conditions to be argued over, as Mr. Valeo implies, as well as other questions. I don't think that either side wants to see Taiwan go nuclear. That is not going to help to secure the Pacific for anybody.

INDEPENDENT TAIWAN

Nor do the Chinese have an interest in the kind of settlement that will promote an independent Taiwan, and this would be one of the risks Peking would perceive in Professor Li's preferred scenario.

So, I don't think that we are talking at this point about any changes in our current security commitments to Taiwan. In the future, however, we may be gradually reducing that commitment.

Mr. BEILENSON. Are there any questions that we have not asked, but which should be asked? Are there any questions that you gentlemen might want to ask of the other gentlemen?

Mr. LI. We have to pose the question to Peking properly. If we ask Peking whether we can keep the defense treaty, then the answer surely must be no. But if the question is whether we can talk about the time, manner, and methods by which the United States reduces and then terminates its military involvement in Taiwan, then there is plenty of room for talking.

Mr. VALEO. If you are suggesting that we have astute diplomats handle that question, then I could not agree with you more.

Mr. COHEN. May I say a final word?

If we cannot normalize in the near future, I share Professor Li's concern and that of witnesses who appeared here yesterday, who took a position that we have to somehow restore some momentum. There are other ideas, I think, for restoring momentum.

This committee, I gather, will discuss with Selig Harrison the idea he came out with the other day in his new book about trying to modify our respect for Taipei's claim over a certain undersea area beyond its territorial sea.

There is also the question of Peking's interest in acquisition of technology, whether we can loosen up on that to some extent without affecting our security relations.

There are a number of other things one can do to restore momentum, I think, to the relationship, although I favor, obviously, trying to strike a bargain on normalization, while proceeding with these other questions as well.

Mr. BEILENSON. My staff friends up here have asked me to ask at least one other question, which I suppose is sort of an international law question, which I will throw out and then you can answer, if you would like.

If everyone were to adopt a form of the Japanese solution on Taiwan, would the Government we now call the Republic of China continue to have an international personality, and what would be the status of private contracts with the Government?

Mr. COHEN. That Government is trying to puzzle out that very question today. You might well get a government that is known as the Republic of China (Taiwan) or on Taiwan, or a variant of that formula. That is, a novel kind of entity that is not recognized by any