the excluding decision was affirmed by the Assistant Commissioner. The case is now before us on appeal.

The record discloses that the appellant on August 11, 1949, was tried and convicted in the District Court, 8th Judicial District (U. S. Military Court for Germany) at Munich, Germany. He was convicted of violating sections 146 and 147 of the German Criminal Code (putting false money into circulation) and violation of Ordinance No. 1, article 2, section 27 (Possession of any currency having reason to believe it to be false or altered). The above offenses were committed on or about May 30, 1949, near Munich, Germany. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 4 months on each count, said sentences to run concurrently and to begin as of June 3, 1949. The remaining facts in this case have been adequately covered by the Assistant Commissioner in his order of February 28, 1950.

Whether the crime of violating sections 146 and 147 of the German Criminal Code, committed abroad, involves moral turpitude under the immigration laws is to be determined by standards prevailing in this country (39 Op. Atty. Gen. 95). After a careful study of the authorities cited by the Assistant Commissioner in his order of February 28, 1950, we are in agreement with the conclusion reached by him that the crime of putting false money into circulation is one that involves moral turpitude.

There is no basis for counsel's contention that this Board is not bound by the record in the instant case because of the fact that the appellant was not convicted by a civil court but by a United States Military Court. The courts in the United States zone of occupied Germany were established under the authority of the United States Military Government for Germany and we are bound by the decisions of the above courts just as we are bound by the decisions rendered by the courts situated in the United States. In any event, this Board cannot go behind the record of conviction of a crime for the purpose of reviewing the evidence and rendering an independent judgment on the guilt or innocence of the alien involved. U. S. ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F. (2d) 757.

For the reasons set forth above, we must affirm the decision entered by the Assistant Commissioner on February 28, 1950. The appeal will be dismissed.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

IN THE MATTER OF W

In STATUS DETERMINATION Proceedings

1200-34445

Decided by Central Office March 9, 1950

Citizenship-Acquisition after birth abroad (1930) by naturalization of father (1944) before child's eighteenth birthday, the mother having been a United States citizen at and since the child's birth, and the child having taken up permanent residence here before its eighteenth birthday (1937)-Section 313 of the Nationality Act of 1940.

Citizenship-Expatriation by oath of allegiance-Section 2, act of March 2, 1907-Oath taken by minor (before January 13, 1941)—Affirmation upon reaching majority.

(1) A child born abroad in 1930, who took up permanent residence in the United States in 1937 (when under 18 years of age), did not acquire United States citizenship under the provisions of section 313 of the Nationality Act of 1940 through the naturalization of his father here in 1944, where the evidence fails to establish that his mother continued to be a United States citizen from the time of the child's birth up to when the father became naturalized (1944) ; nor does the evidence establish that the mother reacquired United States citizenship so that both parents were United States citizens after the child's entry in 1937 and before he reached his eighteenth birthday in 1948 (sec. 314, Nationality Act of 1940).

(2) Before January 13, 1941, a minor could not expatriate himself during minority and being under a disability was unable to take a binding oath of allegiance, but under certain circumstances such oath may be confirmed after the person attains his majority.

(3) Where a United States citizen, while a minor, takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign state and accepts a teaching post there pursuant to a contract which by its terms will not expire until a date occurring during the subject's majority, the mere fulfillment of such agreement does not amount to an affirmation of the oath inasmuch as the party involved is merely complying with contractual obligations assumed during minority, which cannot be terminated by reasonable and approximate means; but where the teaching of school there continues voluntarily after attaining majority, there being no compulsion by any contractual relationship, this constituted a course of conduct having a direct relationship to the purpose for which the oath of allegiance was taken originally and amounted to an affirmation of such oath, thereby effecting expatriation.

BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE

Discussion: The above-named subject claims that he derived United States citizenship on February 14, 1944, through the naturalization of his father, LJ-W-, by the United States District Court at Seattle, Wash., on February 14, 1944, at which time subject had not reached his eighteenth birthday and had resided permanently in the United States since March 9, 1937, his mother AMW, being a citizen of the United States at the time of subject's birth and never thereafter ceasing to be a citizen of the United States.

The question presented is whether subject's mother, who was born in the United States, lost her United States nationality, in view of her taking an oath of allegiance to Canada while a minor and possible confirmation of such oath by her conduct upon attaining majority. The record discloses that subject's mother, A▬▬▬ M▬▬▬ W— nee G―, was born in McDonald, Pa., on October 7, 1908. In November 1908, she was taken to Canada by her parents. On December 15, 1925, while she was in attendance at the Provincial Normal School (Teacher Training College), in Canada she took an oath of allegiance before a Saskatchewan Commissioner for Oaths. The record discloses that the oath taken was an unqualified oath of allegiance. Thereafter she taught school in the following Districts as is shown below:

1926-Carlsbad School District #3347 from March 16, 1926, until December 23, 1926.

1927-Red Rock School District #1314 from February 14, 1927, until December 23, 1927.

1928-Pan Muir School District #3292 from August 6, 1928, until December 21, 1928.

1929-Pan Muir School District #3292 from February 11, 1929, until December 20, 1929.

1930-Pan Muir School District #3292 from February 10, 1930, until June 30, 1930.

1931-Scott School District #2255, no record of length of substitute teaching period.

The Director of Teacher Training of the Department of Education, Province of Saskatchewan has alleged in a letter dated January 11, 1950, that subject's mother would have had to sign a new contract each time she changed her school. He further alleged that there is a record of agreements for 1926 with the Carlsbad School District, for 1927 with the Red Rock School District, for 1928 with the Pan Muir School District and that there is no record of an agreement for the Scott School District. Subject's mother has testified that she taught school for about 4 years from 1926 to about 1929, that she believed that she was teaching school when she became 21 years of age, that she

could not recall about taking any oath but that she had to sign contracts for teaching school.

Subject's parents were married on June 19, 1930, in Canada, and subject was born on September 27, 1930, in Canada. His parents have testified that they are the natural parents of subject. Subject and his parents were lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on March 9, 1937. Subject's mother was admitted as an immigrant pursuant to the provisions of section 4 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1924 and it is stated in her immigration visa that she was a Canadian through her father's naturalization. The evidence of record, however, discloses that her father, J—— G—, was naturalized Gas a Canadian citizen on April 30, 1930, at which time subject's mother had already attained her majority.

Subject's father, LJ-W , was naturalized as a United States citizen by the United States District Court at Seattle, Wash., on February 14, 1944, receiving Certificate of Naturalization No. 5394886. The only manner in which subject could derive United States citizenship is under the provisions of section 313 of the Nationality Act of 1940. In order to establish his claim to citizenship, he must establish that his mother was a United States citizen at the time of his entry into the United States on March 9, 1937, or at any time thereafter until he attained his eighteenth birthday on September 27, 1948. Therefore the sole issue involved is whether or not subject's mother was a United States citizen during the period mentioned.

It is well established that prior to the effective date of the Nationality Act, a minor could not expatriate himself during minority and being under a disability is unable to take a binding oath of allegiance (U.S. ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F. (2d) 44). However, it is also well settled that an oath of allegiance taken during minority may under certain circumstances be confirmed by the person involved after attaining majority and thereby result in expatriation. In the instant case, with the exception of the continuation by subject's mother in her teaching position in Canada up to and including 1931, there is nothing in the record to indicate that, after attaining majority on October 7, 1929, subject's mother committed any voluntary overt act which could be construed as confirming the oath of allegiance which she took on December 15, 1925, at the age of 17 years. Whether continuing, subsequent to reaching majority, to teach school in a foreign country is an affirmation of an oath of allegiance taken while a minor in order to qualify for such position, is wholly dependent upon the particular circumstances in each individual's case (Matter of H- L 23/83641, C. O., October 30, 1942).

Where a United States citizen, while a minor, takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign state and accepts a teaching post pursuant to a

(G——) G

J

1306

contract which by its terms will not expire until a date occurring during the subject's majority, it has been held that the fulfillment of such agreement alone does not amount to an affirmation of the oath inasmuch as the party involved is merely complying with contractual obligations assumed during minority (Matter of E -S— 0. 0—, A6003057, January 10, 1945). It would appear from all of the foregoing that a determining factor in such cases is whether the individual involved, after attaining majority, has a reasonable and approximate means of terminating his teaching position. (In re: M S-21 A-1260, October 3, 1947; In re: R1354, May 27, 1947.) The record discloses that subject's mother signed a new contract in 1928 in connection with her teaching in the Pan Muir School District. She taught in this school district over a period of 3 years. The last period of teaching in this school district was from February 10, 1930, until June 30, 1930, during which period she had already attained her majority. While it does not appear that an agreement was made for teaching subsequent to 1930, it does appear that she taught in the Scott School District in 1931, at which time she had already attained her majority. Thus it appears that after attaining her majority, subject's mother taught for a period of 6 months in the Pan Muir School District in 1930 and taught for a period of time in 1931 in the Scott School District. While it might be said that her teaching in the Pan Muir School District during 1930 was in continuance of her contractual obligation which she assumed during her minority, it does not appear that she was compelled by any contractual relationship to teach school in the Scott School District in 1931. Accordingly, her voluntary continuance of her teaching position, after attaining her majority, constituted a course of conduct having a direct relationship to the purpose for which the oath of allegiance was originally taken on December 15, 1925, and amounted to an affirmation of the oath of allegiance. It is, therefore, concluded that subject's mother, upon attaining her majority, affirmed the oath of allegiance taken during her minority and thereby lost her United States nationality pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of the act of March 2, 1907.

Subject, having failed to establish that his mother was a United States citizen at the time of his entry into the United States on March 9, 1937, or at any time thereafter until he attained his 18th birthday, has failed to establish that he derived United States citizenship. He must, therefore, be deemed not to be a citizen of the United States. It is ordered, That the application of LCJ

a certificate of citizenship be denied.

W for