Opinion of the court. of every ten years for the period of ninety-nine years. The plaintiff now contends,-because the defendant terminated the lease before the first ten years had expired, by virtue of a clause authorizing the lessor to do so for non-payment of debt, that, therefore, defendant became liable to pay him. the appraised value of the building. He accordingly gave a notice of his claim, and of his readiness to join in appointing appraisers, and then brought this suit. It will be observed that while the right thus claimed is one growing out of the contract, and, as would reasonably be supposed, is for the failure to perform some obligation which that contract imposed, the action is neither covenant nor assumpsit, nor any other form of action founded on contract, but is an action on the case. And the counsel who framed the declaration objects in this court, "that the court below treated the case as one in an action of covenant, to enforce as against defendant Smith, the provision of the lease, upon the covenant on the part of Link as to the purchase of the building at the end of the term." One obvious reason why plaintiff does not wish to be considered as suing on the contract is, the difficulty of holding that the covenant to purchase is one which runs with the land, or which, in any other manner, binds Smith as assignee of Link. An action of covenant would also be liable to the objection that the contingency on which the lessor was bound either to renew the lease or purchase the building, had never arisen. To avoid these difficulties, the plaintiff brings an action on the case, in which he sets out this covenant with the entire lease and the other facts of the case, and seems to suppose that by virtue of the flexibility of this form of action, it may be found to embrace some principle which will justify a recovery. We have already seen that the law imposes upon the defendant no obligation to pay for the building apart from the contract. If the contract, when examined in the light of the facts proved, imposes no such obligation, we are at a loss to perceive what other ground of liability can be asserted against defendant. Opinion of the court. It is argued that the plaintiff's assignor became the owner, and had title or estate in the building as separated and distinguished from the land; and while the defendant had the right to enter, take possession, and hold for a failure to pay rent, that right was in some way subordinate to plaintiff's right to the house. But if we concede so singular a proposition as that the title to the soil was in defendant, while that of the building was in plaintiff, it by no means follows that defendant is bound to purchase plaintiff's building. The utmost that can be claimed on that subject is that Smith is bound by the covenant of Link, the lessor, to purchase at the end of ten years or renew the lease. He may always exercise his option in favor of the latter proposition, and by the contract may never be bound to purchase. So that if the title to the building is in plaintiff, and defendant has wrongful possession of it, we revert again to the proposition that trespass, or some form of action for use and occupation, is all the legal remedy which the plaintiff has. But we cannot concede that plaintiff or his assignor had at any time the legal title to the building as distinct from the lot. The well-settled rule is, that such erections as this become a part of the land as each stone and brick are added to the structure. The only exceptions to this rule are the class of fixtures already adverted to, and such rights as may grow out of express contract. The contract before us was not intended to change this rule. The agreement to purchase means nothing more than that, in a certain event, the lessor will pay the lessce the value of such building, but there is no implication of any general title or ownership in the lessee apart from that event. This contingency has not occurred, and that it can never occur is the fault of the plaintiff and his assignor. This observation is also applicable to the supposed hardship of taking the building, the product of the plaintiff's money and labor, without compensation. It is from plaintiff's own default that the right to do this arises. He had his option to pay the rent due defendant, and retain the right to payment for his building when the time should arrive, or to give up his building, and with its loss relieve Opinion of the court. himself of the burden of paying rent. He chose the latter with full knowledge, and there is no injustice in holding him to the consequence of his choice. The covenant for re-entry provides that, in default of payment of rent, the lessor may enter "and the said premises repossess and enjoy, as in his first and former estate." The plaintiff insists that the building is no part of such former estate, and defendant, therefore, does not become its owner by virtue of the re-entry. We have already shown that the building does become a part of the land as it is built. No such meaning was ever before attached to the use of the word estate in a legal document. It is used in reference to the nature of defendant's interest in the property, and not to the extent of improvements on the soil. As if the lessor had a fee simple estate, it reverted to him again as a fee simple. If he had a term for years, he was in again as part of his term. But it had no relation to the question of whether that estate might be more or less valuable when repossessed, or might bring to him more or less buildings. We hold, then, 1. That without the aid of a special contract, the law imposes no obligation on the landlord to pay his tenant for buildings erected on the demised premises. 2. That treating the parties to this suit as standing in the places of the original lessor and lessee, no obligation arises from the contract in this case, that the lessor shall purchase or pay for the building erected on said premises, except as an option, to be exercised at the end of each period of ten years. 3. That the act of defendant in re-entering and possessing himself of the premises for plaintiff's failure to pay rent, imposes upon him no obligation to pay plaintiff the value of the building. As the ruling of the court, to which exception was taken, was in conformity to these principles, the judgment must be AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. Statement of the case. LEVY COURT v. Coroner. 1. The Levy Court of Washington County, in the District of Columbia, if not a corporation in the full sense of the term, is a quasi corporation; and can sue and be sued in regard to any matter in which, by law, it has rights to be enforced, or is under obligations which it refuses to fulfil. 2. The fees allowed by the eighth section of the act of Congress of July 8, 1838, to the coroners of the counties of Washington and Alexandria, and to jurors and witnesses who may be lawfully summoned by them to any inquest, are payable by the Levy Court of the county, not by the Federal Government. 3. Jurors and witnesses summoned in form by the coroner's summons, regularly served, are so far "lawfully summoned" under the eighth section of the act of July 8, 1838, just named, that they may be allowed their fees, though the case of death in which they were summoned was strictly not one for a coroner's view, and though the coroner himself would be entitled to none. Fees advanced by the coroner to jurors and witnesses in such a cause may be properly reimbursed to him, and consistently with a refusal to pay him those claimed as his own. THE Coroner of the County of Washington, D. C., brought assumpsit in the Circuit Court of the District against what is called the "Levy Court" of Washington, for his fees; fees for "viewing the body," and fees which he had advanced to jurors and witnesses at inquests called by him for that purpose. Three questions arose: 1. A preliminary one; namely, whether the "Levy Court" was a body capable of being sued at all? 2. If it was, whether it was the Levy Court or the Federal Government which was bound to pay the fees of coroners and their inquests, &c. 3. If it was the Levy Court which was bound to pay them, whether the coroner could recover fees advanced to jurors and witnesses on occasions where the death, though sudden, had not occurred from other than natural causes; cases, for example, where the death came from apoplexy, fits, excessive and habitual intemperance, and other cases which the coroner considered had occurred from "misadventure," but which Statement of the case. might not have fallen within that term as interpreted by the law. AS RESPECTED THE FIRST QUESTION,-the preliminary one, of whether the Levy Court was a body capable of being sucd, it appeared that this body derived its powers from a statute of Maryland, passed A. D. 1794, entitled "An act for the establishment and regulation of the Levy Courts in the several counties of this State." This authorized them to adjust the expenses of the county, and to impose an assessment for their payment, and to appoint a collector, who shall give bond to the State. Suits were directed to be brought against the collector, and judgments entered in the name of the State. By other statutes they are charged with the expenses of the county relating to roads, bridges, the poor and poor-houses, the orphans' court, the jail, &c., and invested with power to levy such expenses by taxes. One of these statutes calls them Commissioners of the County, and some acts of Congress speak of them in the same terms. AS RESPECTED THE SECOND QUESTION-that is to say, whether the fees of the coroner, his inquests and witnesses, were payable by the Federal Government, or by the Levy Court itself, it is necessary to state the history of the legislation under which the claim was made. Prior to the year 1838, there was no compensation allowed in the District by law to jurors and witnesses for attending inquests on the coroner's summons. They were compelled to attend by due process for the public good. The coroner himself, however, by an old statute of Maryland, passed A. D. 1779, but in force in the District, had a fixed fee-two hundred and fifty pounds of tobacco-for each inquest, without regard to the time which he might be required to give to it, or the trouble which it cost. This fee the statute made payable, in the first place, out of the estate of the dovedent, and, in the absence of such estate, by the Levy Court. On the 7th of July, 1838, Congress passed an act,* the 5 Stat. at Large, 306. |