bring the Department of Justice into conflict with a judicial tribunal. 20 Op. 618.

231. The Attorney-General should not answer the question as to whether "building, loan, and savings associations" are "corporations doing the business of bankers, brokers, or savings institutions" within the meaning of section 5243, Revised Statutes, and as such prohibited from using the word "national" as a portion of their name or title, for the reason that the designation given does not afford sufficient information, and the question seems to be one for judicial rather than executive determination. 20 Op. 673.

232. It is inexpedient for the AttorneyGeneral to render an official opinion as to whether a civil suit or criminal prosecution if brought by the Government ought to be decided by the courts in its favor, such questions being essentially judicial in character. 20 Op. 702.

233. The Attorney-General should not express an official opinion upon a judicial question as to which the circuit courts are in conflict. 20 Op. 729.

234. The Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon a judicial question, or one not arising in the administration of a Department within the meaning of section 356, Revised Statutes. 21 Op. 369.

235. Whether the statute of limitations does or does not bar a claim on behalf of the Government is a judicial question to be determined by the courts and not by the AttorneyGeneral. 21 Op. 557.

236. The question whether a proceeding under section 3456, Revised Statutes, or any other law would or would not be successful, is judicial in its nature and one on which it is not necessary or proper for the Attorney-General to give an official opinion. 22 Op. 181.

237. It is not the practice of the Department of Justice to give an opinion in a matter where the question involved is disputable and is the subject of a pending suit, as such action would be equivalent to expressing an opinion as to whether the question ought to be decided in favor of the Government, and might bring the Department into conflict with a judicial tribunal. 23 Op. 221.

238. Question pending before the court.The question of the right of transit of Chinese persons from a port of the United States to the territory of Mexico, or from a port of the

United States directly by sea to a foreign port, being now before the courts, it would not be proper for the Attorney-General to express an opinion thereon. 23 Op. 585.

239. Question committed to judicial review.-The Department will not consider any question committed to judicial review. To do so might bring it into conflict with a judicial tribunal. 24 Op. 59.

240. Conclusions of a Federal court, until reversed by a higher court, are binding upon the Attorney-General. Ib.

241. The Attorney-General can not properly pass upon the question whether the courts in this country have authority to execute letters rogatory issued out of the German patent office, as that is a matter for judicial and not for executive determination. 24 Op. 69.

242. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion as to whether a proposed instruction to customs officials to inquire into the bona fides of a journey and the ownership of goods imported can be enforced on proof that the object of the journey was to purchase goods, as the latter is a hypothetical as well as a judicial question. 25 Op. 94.

243. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion as to the liability of the postmaster at Baltimore, Md., for a sum of money paid by him to a former clerk in the Baltimore post-office and for which no service was performed, for the reason that the question is essentially a judicial one, amounting to an inquiry whether in regular legal proceedings a court and jury would hold that officer liable. Advised, however, that the circumstances may be regarded as showing a prima facie case of liability and calling for action in the way of securing a judicial determination of the question of liability. 25 Op.

97.

244. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether a willful refusal to give true answers to inquiries concerning statistics which, by section 6 of the permanent census act of March 6, 1902 (32 Stat. 52), the Department of Commerce and Labor is authorized to collect would subject a person to the penalties prescribed by section 22 of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1020), for the reason that the question is preeminently one for judicial and not executive determination. 25 Op. 369.

s. Payment or Disbursement-Comptroller of the Treasury.

245. The Attorney-General declines to advise upon a question of refund, for the reason that the question can now be asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury. 21 Op. 188.

246. The question as to what appropriation the expense of printing the 760 copies of printing laws in slip form, authorized by section 56 of the act of January 12, 1895 (28 Stat. 609), is to be charged is one which may be asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury, and should not be answered by the Attorney-General. 21 Op. 405.

247. On questions of disbursements of money and payment of claims which are relegated by law to the Comptroller, the Attorney-General should not render an opinion. 21 Op. 530. 248. The Attorney-General should not render an opinion on a question involving the disbursement of money or the payment of claims, as the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury upon such questions is final and binding. 22 Op. 581.

249. Except in matters of great importance the Attorney-General will not express an opinion upon any question involving a payment to be made by or under the head of an Executive Department. That duty, by the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), is imposed upon the Comptroller of the Treasury, whose opinion is binding and conclusive. 23 Op. 1. 250. The claim of Amelia Mary Hyde, administratrix, being one for the payment of money, and actually pending before the Treasury Department, the Attorney-General deems it inexpedient to consider it. Under the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), the question should be referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury for his decision. 23 Op. 2.

251. The claim of Dudley & Michener for the payment of a sum of money as compensation for the cancellation by the War Department of a contract entered into between that Department and the claimants for furnishing the Government with Mauser rifles is one which, under the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), and the decisions of this Department should be referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury for his opinion. 23 Op. 86.

252. The Attorney-General will not render an opinion upon questions which involve the

payment of money by the Treasury Department. That duty, by section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), is imposed upon the Comptroller of the Treasury. 23 Op. 431.

253. It is neither advisable nor necessary for the Attorney-General to render a decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by or under the head of any Executive Department. Under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), the Comptroller of the Treasury is charged with this duty, and his decision is made final as to all executive officers. 23 Op. 468.

254. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to refund a fine exacted, in lieu of the payment of duties upon certain merchandise brought into the United States from Porto Rico after the ratification of the treaty of 1898 with Spain and before the taking effect of the Porto Rican act, due protest against the exaction not having been made. That duty, by section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), is imposed upon the Comptroller of the Treasury. 23 Op. 586.

255. It is not deemed necessary or desirable for the Attorney-General to express an opinion upon the question of granting extra compensation in lieu of annual leave to certain former employees of the Census Office, under a proviso to the deficiency appropriation act of June 30, 1902 (32 Stat. 571), that being a matter relating solely to payments out of the Treasury. By section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), it is made the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasury to determine such questions. 24 Op. 85.

256. Payments out of the Treasury-Power of refund.-The Comptroller of the Treasury, rather than the Attorney-General, should pass upon the question of the power of refund and payment out of the Treasury of duty overpaid on an importation of merchandise. Opinions of March 26, 1901 (23 Op. 431), and July 20, 1901 (23 Op. 468), followed. 24 Op. 553.

257. Question already decided by the Comptroller involving a payment.-The AttorneyGeneral declines to express an opinion upon the question whether a retired officer advanced in rank and pay by the Executive under the act of April 23, 1904, may be paid at the advanced rate before the Senate has

consented to the advancement, as that question has been decided by the Comptroller of the Treasury, whose decision, under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), is conclusive in law. 25 Op. 185.

258. Exception - Matters of great importance. The opinion of the Attorney-General should not be rendered upon questions which, under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 207), could be referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury for decision, except in matters of great importance. 21 Op. 178.

259. A question affecting all the Executive Departments is answered by the Attorney-General, as it falls within the exception to the rule that his opinion should not be rendered upon questions which, under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894, can be referred to the Comptroller for decision, except in matters of great importance, inasmuch as a conflict of precedents might arise. 21 Op. 181.

260. An opinion which could have been asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury is, notwithstanding, given by the AttorneyGeneral, it appearing that the question is one of importance and the Comptroller joins in requesting it. 21 Op. 224.

261. An important question as to refund, submitted at the request of the Comptroller of the Treasury, is answered by the AttorneyGeneral. 21 Op. 402.

262. Questions of unusual importance involving a payment of money where the Comp

troller concurs or joins in the request for an opinion are exceptions to the general rule. 25 Op. 271.

263. Questions involving payments to be made from Treasury-Rule not without exception. The authority conferred upon the Comptroller of the Treasury by section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat. 208), to decide questions involving payments to be made from the Treasury is complete; but that act does not establish a rule which is universal and without exception. Congress did not, by that enactment intend to shorten the reach of sections 354 and 356, Revised Statutes, or to repeal pro tanto those sections. 25 Op. 301.

264. Where a question is presented to the Attorney-General in accordance with law for decision, and he is of opinion that the nature of the question is general and important in other respects than disbursement, and therefore conceives that it is proper for him to de18456-08-————4

liver his opinion, it is final and authoritative under the law, and should be so treated by the accounting officers of the Treasury, even though the question involves a payment to be made from the Treasury. Ib.

265. When the Comptroller of the Treasury waives his right to determine a matter involving disbursements within the scope of his authority under the law and requests or suggests a ruling by the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General's opinion should be controlling upon the accounting officers of the Treasury and should be followed by them unless contrary to some authoritative judicial decision. Ib.

266. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether the rent of a letter box in a post-office by an officer of the Army can, under section 3648, Revised Statutes, be paid in advance, for the reason that the precise question, which involves a payment of money from the Treasury, has been passed upon by the Comptroller of the Treasury; and as the question is not one of importance in other directions than disbursements, the decision of the Comptroller will be regarded as conclusive. 25 Op. 614.

268. The Attorney-General is not authorized to give his opinion upon the application of the eight-hour law to a proposed contract, where the contractors whose bids have been accepted desire to be advised before signing the contract what portion of the work that law will affect, as it is not a question which the Secretary of the Treasury is called upon to decide. 20 Op. 463.

269. It is not the duty of the AttorneyGeneral, nor has he the right, to give an official opinion for the guidance of persons proposing to enter into contract relations with the United States. 20 Op. 465.

w. Reconsideration of Opinions.

273. A question once fully considered and answered by one Attorney-General can not with propriety be reconsidered by his successor, unless in some extraordinary case. 21 Op. 24. 274. A claim once fully considered and held unlawful by one Attorney-General can not, with propriety, be reconsidered by his successor, at least except in some extraordinary case. 21 Op. 264.

275. The principle announced in the opinion of Attorney-General Olney (21 Op. 23), that "a question once definitely answered by a former Attorney-General and left at rest for a long term of years should be reconsidered only in a very exceptional case," concurred in. 24 Op. 53.

x. Solicitor of the Treasury.

276. The Attorney-General will not, at the request of the Solicitor of the Treasury, consider and express his views as to the correctness of an opinion prepared by the latter upon a question submitted to him by the Secretary of the Treasury. 18 Op. 57. See also TREASURY DEPARTMENT, II, j.

y. Civil Service Commission.

277. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question submitted by the Civil Service Commission as to whether the Secretary of the Interior in employing |

persons to make the transcripts of records and plats in the General Land Office authorized by the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat. 483), may select such persons without regard to the civil service act and rules, for the reason that the Secretary of the Interior and the Civil Service Commission have had no conference respecting the question and no

disagreement thereon, as is required by the Executive order of November 29, 1904, before the matter may be submitted to the AttorneyGeneral for his opinion. 25 Op. 492.

COMPENSATION OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

FOR SERVICES IN EXAMINING TITLES TO LAND. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, 26-28. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL II, 8-Payment or disbursement.

DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, II, h-Departmental practice and Regulations.

MATTERS ONCE PASSED UPON. See ATTORNEYGENERAL, II, w-Reconsideration. OPINIONS IN ADVANCE. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, II, c-Opinions in advance.

SCOPE OF STATUTORY PROVISION. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, II, k-Definitions. REASONABLENESS OF FEES. See ATTORNEYGENERAL, II, i—Administration, discretion, etc.

ATTORNEYS.

Employment by an Executive Department prior to 1870-Payment.-An attorney was employed by the War Department in 1868 to defend certain parties against whom suits were brought, in the result of which the Government was interested. The suits were not determined until some time after the passage of the act of June 22, 1870 (16 Stat. 162), up to which time the attorney was continued therein: Advised that the authority under which the attorney was originally employed was sufficient, and that the Secretary of War is authorized to pay for his services out of any fund under his control which may be available for that purpose. 18 Op. 124. See also UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS.

BEDEAU, CAPT. ADAM.

See ARMY, II, c, 106–109.

BADGES OF MILITARY ASSOCIATIONS.

Right to wear.-The words "members of said organizations in their own right," as used in the joint resolution of September 25, 1890 (26 Stat. 681), which provides that the distinctive badges adopted by the military associations of men who served in the armies and navies of the United States during the various wars waged by the United States may be worn upon all occasions of ceremony by officers and enlisted men of the Army and Navy of the United States, include all those who, under the rules of these orders, were eligible for membership, either because of their own service or because of their kinship to one who had been in the service. 23 Op. 454.

BAGGAGE RECEIPT.

See INTERNAL REVENUE, II, f, 94.

II. National Banks.

2. Amendment of articles of association.— National banking associations organized under the act of February 25, 1863 (12 Stat. 665), may amend their articles of association where this would not be in conflict with the provisions of the statute. 17 Op. 288.

3. Same. Where such associations are so organized for a period of less than twenty years from the date of the' act, they can not, by amending their articles, extend the period to twenty years from such date. lb.

4. Same. Where the articles provide for an increase of capital, and the maximum of such increase is once fixed by the determination of the Comptroller of the Currency, both his power and that of the association over the subject are exhausted. A further increase and a new maximum can not be effected by an amendment of the articles. Ib.

5. Same. An amendment of the articles providing for an increase of the number of directors would not be inconsistent with the provision of section 5139, Revised Statutes, declaring that "No change shall be made in the articles of association by which the rights, remedies, or security of the existing creditors of the association shall be impaired." Ib.

6. Same. The stockholders of an expiring association may organize a new one, and adopt for the latter the name of the former. Ib.

7. Same. An association may, upon the expiration of the period limited for its duration, convert itself into a State bank under the