60. An opinion can not be given by the Attorney-General upon a case not actually arising in the Department the head of which requests the opinion. 21 Op. 178.

61. The Attorney-General will not answer questions not presently arising in the administration of a Department whence the inquiry arises. 21 Op. 186.

62. The Attorney-General can not be called upon for an opinion unless specific questions of law are formulated which relate to an existing question calling for the action of the Department requesting it. 21 Op. 201.

63. Exception made.-A question of the legality of a provision of long standing in contracts of the War and Navy Departments determined, as presented, in general terms, although a strict regard to the rule of the Department of Justice which forbids the expression of an official opinion upon any question of law which has not arisen in an existing case and presented upon a definite statement of facts, might warrant a refusal of an opinion thereon. 21 Op. 207.

64. The Attorney-General can give no opinion upon a case not actually arising in the Department the head of which requests the opinion. 21 Op. 219.

65. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a matter not pending in the administration of a Department. 21 Op. 240.

66. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a question proposed by the Secretary of War, where no occasion has arisen for his official action. 21 Op. 457.

67. Under section 356 of the Revised Statutes the head of an Executive Department is authorized to require the opinion of the Attorney-General only on questions arising in the administration of his Department. 21 Op. 478

68. The Attorney-General is not permit ted by statute or precedent to respond to a request for an opinion which appears to present but a moot case and does not show what the facts are or that the case has presently arisen in the administration of the Department. 21 Op. 506.

69. The Attorney-General is not permitted to give an opinion as to the construction or interpretation of a statute except in an actual case which has arisen before one of the Executive Departments calling for its action in the regular course of its affairs. 21 Op. 510.

70. Same. The question as to whether a retired officer is eligible to hold certain diplomatic or consular appointments without affecting his position on the retired list, with rank and pay, is one of private concern only, and not a subject with which the United States can be interested until some action has been taken by such officer. Ib.

71. The cases in which the AttorneyGeneral is authorized to give opinions to the heads of Executive Departments are such as are actually pending in such Departments and involving the legal questions submitted. 21 Op. 568.

72. The rule of the Attorney-General in declining to give an opinion in a case where it is doubtful whether a question of law is raised in the administration of the Department requesting it was disregarded in an instance where it appeared that proper cases raising such a question were pending in several of the other Executive Departments. 21 Op. 579.

73. The Attorney-General is precluded from giving an opinion upon a matter not actually or presently arising in the administration of a Department. 22 Op. 77.

74. The Attorney-General is not authorized to answer an inquiry made of the Treasury Department with reference to an increase in the amount of subsidiary silver coinage, whether regarded as an abstract question of law or an inquiry into the legality of the course of a predecessor in office in matters not now demanding official action. 22 Op. 85.

75. To authorize the expression of an opinion upon a question of law it is necessary that a statement of facts be submitted showing that the question has actually arisen in the administration of a Department in an existing case calling for action. Ib.

76. The question of the validity of a proposed regulation of the Treasury Department providing that in case a Chinese laborer who has left the United States upon a valid return certificate is delayed beyond one year from the date of his departure by reason of sickness or other disability beyond his control, the consular representative of the United States shall certify to such facts before the Chinaman shall be admitted into this country, not being a question actually or presently arising in the administration of the Treasury Department, the Attorney-General declines to express his opinion thereon. 23 Op. 582.

77. Same. Should this proposed regulation be promulgated, and the question of its validity arise in that Department, as upon an appeal under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. 390), the right and duty of the AttorneyGeneral to reply to the question would be untrammeled. Ib.

78. Case actually arising.-The settled policy of the Department is that no opinion should be rendered upon any question of law unless it is specifically formulated in a case actually arising in the administration of a Department, and accompanied by a statement or finding of the facts involved. 24 Op. 59. 79. Same.-The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether the joint resolution of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 750), construing the pension act of June 27, 1890 (26 Stat. 182), has any retroactive force, for the reason that the question is not predicated upon an actual case arising in the Interior Department, and for the further reason that that Department has an officer clothed with authority to determine questions of that nature in the first instance coming up on appeal from the Pension Bureau. 24 Op. 556.

80. The Attorney-General declines to answer the question whether citizens of the Philippine Islands are entitled to the benefits of the patent laws of the United States, there being no case involving that question pending before the Department making the inquiry. 25 Op. 179.

81. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question propounded by the Secretary of the Interior as to whether the preliminary draft of Title LXVIII, "Railway and Telegraph Companies," submitted to him by the Commission to Revise and Codify the Laws of the United States, correctly embodies the provisions of existing law upon the subject, for the reason that the inquiry does not present a question of law arising in the administration of his Department. 25 Op. 584.

c. Opinion in Advance-For Future Action.

82. The Attorney-General declines to give an opinion in advance, where no case actually existing is presented, as to what would in future be held upon indefinite and varying facts. 19 Op. 414.

83. The Attorney-General can not be asked to examine and approve codes of rules or forms of applications, etc., adopted by a Department, to apply to cases arising in the future. 20 Op. 738.

84. The Attorney-General can not state as a basis for future Departmental action, the classes of Chinese persons whose occupations would place them within the category of laborer. He can only answer as to each case when it arises. 20 Op. 602.

d. Moot Questions.

85. An opinion is given upon a mere moot question, although in accordance with custom it might with propriety be declined. 21 Op.

320.

86. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon an inquiry which appears to present but a moot case. 21 Op. 506.

87. A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General must not relate to a mere moot question, but to one which requires immediate action, the answer to which is necessary for the protection of the officer making the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the action which he is about to take. 21 Op. 509.

e. Hypothetical Questions.

88. The Attorney-General will not answer a purely hypothetical question. 20 Op. 288.

89. The question as to whether the parts of a vessel which a British subject proposes to take to Alaska by ocean steamer for use on the Yukon River will be subject to duty, being a hypothetical one, is not answered. Op. 77.

22

90. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether the Postmaster-General should enter into a contract with the Return Postage Clearing Company for the institution of the "reply envelope and postal card" scheme, for the

reason that the question is hypothetical in its nature and involves considerations of administrative discretion and judgment, and of practicability and advisability, which must be determined solely by the PostmasterGeneral. 24 Op. 118.

91. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion as to whether a proposed instruction to customs officials to inquire into the bona fides of a journey and the ownership of goods imported can be enforced on proof

action of the head of Department at whose request and to whom an opinion is given, nor could he with propriety express any judgment concerning the disposition of the matter to which the opinion relates, that being something wholly within the administrative sphere of such head of Department. 17 Op. 332. 106. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether the Postmaster-General should enter into a contract with the Return Postage Clearing Company for the institution of the "reply envelope and postal card" scheme, for the reason that the question is hypothetical in its nature and involves considerations of administrative discretion and judgment, and of practicability and advisability, which must be determined solely by the Postmaster-General. 24 Op. 118.

107. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question of the propriety of the Secretary of the Interior permitting one Boysen to go upon the Shoshone Indian Reservation and make examinations prior to the completion and approval of the surveys of the ceded portion (33 Stat. 1020), it not being within his province to pass upon the propriety of the exercise by the Secretary of the Interior of his official discretion. 25 Op. 524.

108. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion as to the propriety of a proposed instruction to customs officials to inquire into the bona fides of the journey and the ownership of goods imported in such cases, as he is not authorized to express his views upon matters of propriety involving | executive judgment and discretion; neither may he express an opinion as to whether the above provision can be enforced on proof that the object of the journey was to purchase goods, as the latter is a hypothetical as well as a judicial question. The legality of such an instruction, however, can not be seriously questioned. 25 Op. 94.

109. The Attorney-General is not authorized to give an official opinion as to "the course which should be taken" by another Department, as that involves questions of fact and considerations of expediency. 21 Op. 73. 110. A question as to what course should be pursued by an Ex cutive Department involves matters of fact upon which the Attorney-General may not have knowledge

112. The Attorney-General has no authority to give an opinion upon the reasonableness of fees demanded by persons proposing to act as attorneys for Indian litigants. 20 Op. 620.

113. The nature of the evidence required from applicants for leave and sufficiency of reasons for extending or limiting hours of labor are matters within the discretion of the Secretary as to which the Attorney-General can not advise. 20 Op. 728.

j. Matters belonging to the Department of Justice-Suits-Prosecutions.

114. The question whether an action for the recovery of duties on goods previously smuggled is maintainable, is one arising in the Department of Justice, and therefore the Attorney-General's opinion can not be asked upon it by the Treasury Department. 20 Op. 714.

115. It is inexpedient for the AttorneyGeneral to render an official opinion as to whether a civil suit or criminal prosecution if brought by the Government ought to be decided by the courts in its favor, such questions being essentially judicial in character. 20 Op. 702.

116. The advisability of bringing suit is not a question of law upon which the AttorneyGeneral's opinion may be asked. Ib.

117. The Attorney-General can not properly be asked for advice as to whether or not a prosecution should be instituted. 20 Op. 673.

118. The question whether or not to commence a civil action or criminal prosecution must ordinarily be decided by some officer of the Department of Justice, and the AttorneyGeneral is not authorized to give the head of another Department a legal opinion upon such a question. 21 Op. 509.

119. The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion regarding the act of May 16, 1884 (23 Stat. 22), because that act relates only to criminal proceedings, and the question whether or not a crime has been committed is one that in but rare instances can arise except in the Department of Justice. 21 Op. 133.

120. The Attorney-General should not give an opinion upon a question as to whether or not there is sufficient probability of securing a verdict to warrant a prosecution, as that is not purely a matter of law. Ib.

121. Compromise of pending litigation.Except as modified by sections 3229 and 2469, Revised Statutes, the power to determine whether a compromise should be made of pending litigation would seem to rest with the Attorney-General, such suits being necessarily under his control and subject to his direction. 23 Op. 507.

122. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon the question whether proceedings by court-martial would bar proceedings in the civil courts for an assault or other crime involved in the offense of hazing, for the reason that it would be of no assistance to those officers in the proper discharge of their duties, and should such action be taken, the matter would be one peculiarly for the consideration of his Department. 25 Op. 543.

k. Definitions.

123. The Attorney-General can not properly attempt to frame a definition of statutory language to cover all future cases. 20 Op. 649. 124. The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion as to the scope of a statutory provision further than to answer questions presently arising in the administration of the Department making the inquiry. 21 Op. 106. 125. The Attorney-General can not undertake to give a general definition of a word or phrase applicable to all cases possibly arising therefrom. 21 Op. 109.

1. Evidence and Papers, Examination of, to Form Conclusions of Facts.

126. The Attorney-General's advisory powers do not extend to an examination of evidence to ascertain what is established by a preponderance of testimony. 17 Op. 172.

127. A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General on questions of law arising in any case should be accompanied by a statement of the facts of the case as well as of the questions on which advice is desired. The Attorney-General declines to settle the facts ex parte from papers submitted and then proceed to give an opinion thereon. 18 Op. 487.

128. The Attorney-General has no power to find facts in any case in which his opinion is requested, but must confine himself to the facts appearing in connection with the request. 19 Op. 115.

129. Will not examine papers submitted to ascertain facts involved.-The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion in a matter where no statement of facts and no question of law is submitted, but where numerous papers are referred with a request for an opinion in view of all the facts presented. 19 Op. 396.

130. The Department of Justice has uniformly declined to find the facts involved in a request for an opinion. At least this has been the rule ever since the year 1820. The facts must be stated by the Department asking for the opinion. (See 1 Op. 346; 3 Op. 309; 5 Op. 626; 10 Op. 267; 12 Op. 206.) 19 Op. 466.

131. The Attorney-General is not at liberty under the law, which requires him to give his opinion "upon questions of law" (secs. 354-357 Rev. Stat.), to make a finding of facts upon evidence submitted. 19 Op. 547.

132. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion upon a question which requires him to look into the evidence and form a conclusion as to the facts involved. (See 7 Op. 494; 14 Op. 367, 368, 541; 10 Op. 267; 11 Op. 189; 18 Op. 487, 489.) 19 Op. 672.

133. The Attorney-General can not pass upon the question as to whether a bridge is an "unreasonable" obstruction, and its maintenance a violation of law, as its determination involves an examination of all the facts, circumstances, and equities surrounding the case. 19 Op. 676.

184. The Attorney-General must confine himself to the case stated for an opinion and is not authorized to look into the evidence. 19 Op. 684.

135. It is not within the province of the Attorney-General to make a finding of facts in a case submitted for his opinion upon questions of law arising thereon. The facts of the case should be ascertained and presented by the officer requesting the opinion. 19 Op. 696.

136. The Attorney-General can not consider questions of fact on evidence submitted. 20 Op. 253.

137. The Attorney-General can not investigate the papers and records for the purpose of