ized, under the act of May 11, 1898 (30 Stat. 404), to nominate candidates for appointment as officers in the naval battalion. 22 Op. 237. IX. Claims against the District 71. Claim of Samuel Strong-Payment of award. Where a special tribunal of arbitrators appointed under a joint resolution of July 10, 1888 (25 Stat. 1248), to arbitrate and settle certain claims of Samuel Strong against the District of Columbia, which resolution provided that payment of the award should be made "in the same manner that judgments against the District of Columbia are paid when ordered by the Court of Claims," and where various assignments of the claim were made both before and after the award, and the claimant was enjoined by the Supreme Court of the District from receiving payment of the award; and where the several suits were consolidated and receivers appointed by the court to receive payment of the award, and the claimant also demands payment thereof to him, Held that the Secretary of the Treasury can not properly pay the award either to the re ceivers or to the claimant, but should hold See NAVY, VII, 194. DOUBLE PENSIONS. 72. Same-When payment may be made. See PENSIONS, 5-7. It is only when payment is made under the compulsion of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction that the party paying is relieved of liability as to the money paid, and the Secretary of the Treasury is not subject to the jurisdiction of the said court with regard to the fund in question. Ib. 73. Same. The case of George H. Giddings (16 Op. 367) distinguished from the present Ib. case. DRAFT ACT. (Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 731.) DRAFTSMEN. 74. Same-Settlement.-Questions arising See CIVIL SERVICE, IV, a. in settlement of an award made under a joint resolution of Congress approved July 10, 1888 (25 Stat. 1248), to arbitrate and settle certain questions at issue between the District of Columbia and Samuel Strong, relative to the DRAWBACK. amount of the award, parties to whom pay- See CUSTOMS LAW, VI, b. DRAGOON BARRACKS LOT, ST. AUGUSTINE, FLA. See UNITED STATES, 88. DRAWBRIDGES. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 159, 162-164. DREDGE. See NAVIGABLE WATERS. II, 62, 63, DRY DOCK. See CONTRACT, II, 84; EIGHT HOUR LAW, 24; NAVY DEPARTMENT, II, 21. DUE PROCESS OF LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; WORDS AND PHRASES, 66. DUTIABLE VALUE. See CUSTOMS LAW, IV, a. EADS CONTRACT. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, II, b. EAGLE. DEVICE ON FIRE ARMS. See FIRE ARMS. EAST RIVER. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 3. EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 1. Construction of.-The opinions of former Attorneys-General construing the provisions of the act of June 25, 1868 (15 Stat. 72), known as the eight-hour law (sec. 3738, Rev. Stats.), reviewed, and the following conclusions deduced therefrom (17 Op. 341): 2. That the act prescribes the length of time which shall constitute a day's work, but it does not establish any rule by which the compensation for a day's work shall be determined. Ib. 3. That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages simply because of the reduction thereby made in the length of the day's work; but, on the other hand, it does not require that the same wages shall be paid therefor as are received by those who in similar private employments work a greater length of time per day. Ib. 4. That it does not forbid the making of contracts for labor, fixing a different length of time for the day's work than that prescribed in the law. Ib. 5. That this exposition of the act is in harmony with the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Martin (94 U.S. 400). Ib. 6. The act of June 28, 1868 (15 Stat. 77), embraced in section 3738, Revised Statutes, known as the eight-hour law, prescribes the length of time which shall constitute a day's work for employees of the Government; but it does not establish any rule by which the compensation for a day's work shall be determined— this being left to be fixed in the ordinary or customary manner where the law does not otherwise provide. 18 Op. 389. 7. Same. That act does not contemplate a reduction of wages simply because of the reduction thereby made in the length of the day's work; but, on the other hand, it does not require that the same wages shall be paid therefor as are received by those who, in similar private employments, work a greater length of time per day. This matter of wages is to be dealt with as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, having due regard to the public interests. Ib. 8. Same. It does not forbid the making of contracts for labor, fixing a different length of time for the day's work than that prescribed in the law. Ib. 9. Same. The provisions of the act are not applicable to mechanics, workmen, and laborers who are in the employment of a contractor of the United States. It was not intended that the act should extend to any others than the immediate employees of the Government. Ib. 10. Same. All persons who are employed and paid by the day are included within the act, even though they do not fall within the strict language of "laborers, workmen, and mechanics." Ib. 11. Same. Where there is a special agreement between the employer-in this case the Government-and the laborer that the laborer shall work less or more than eight hours a day, and it is reasonable, there is nothing in the statute to prohibit such a contract. Ib. 12. Same. Where the employees understood that they were to work nine or ten hours per day or to be discharged, and continued in employment with that understanding, they must be held to the conditions of a contract both voluntary and reasonable, and they can not now recover as for overtime. Ib. 13. Same. The act is a legislative declaration that for the persons described therein eight hours a day is a reasonable day's labor; and where the public interests can be subserved, this should be a guide to officers, both civil and military, in contracting for the public service. Ib. 14. The eight-hour law merely prescribes a unit of measure for a day's labor in the absence of any specific contract. 19 Op. 685. 15. In awarding contracts for supplies for the Government under section 3709, Revised Statutes, no account can be taken of the fact that the contractor's employees work over eight hours a day. Ib. 16. The eight-hour law, act of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), as to laborers and mechanics in the direct employ of the Government and of the District of Columbia, is of general application, and the limitation as to public works in that act applies only to such persons as are in the employ of contractors and subcontractors. 20 Op. 459. 17. Same.-Whether or not specified persons are such laborers is a question of fact not for the Attorney-General to determine. ль. 18. The Attorney-General is not authorized to give his opinion upon the application of the eight-hour law to a proposed contract, where the contractors whose bids have been accepted desire to be advised before signing the contract what portion of the work that law will affect, as it is not a question which the Secretary of the Treasury is called upon to decide. 20 Op. 463. 19. Same. It is not permissible for the Attorney-General to give an opinion upon the application of the eight-hour law to contracts for the construction of levees on the Mississippi River, as that is not a question arising in the administration of one of the Departments. 20 Op. 465. 20. Same. The Attorney-General declines to express an opinion as to whether certain employees of the Mississippi Commission are "laborers" or "mechanics" within the meaning of the act of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), for the reason that those words are used in the statute in their ordinary sense, and the determination of that question is, therefore, a matter of administration only, involving the ascertainment of a question of fact, upon which the Attorney-General is not authorized to express an opinion. 20 Op. 487. 21. Same. The Attorney-General declines to give an opinion as to whether the so-called eight-hour law is applicable to a certain contract for public work, for the reason that the contractor and not the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for a violation of the law. 20 Op. 500. 22. The eight-hour law (act of Aug. 1, 1892, 27 Stat. 340), providing that laborers employed on public works of the United States shall be limited in service to eight hours a day, does not apply to a contract for furnishing materials such as post-office lock boxes, to be used in a Government building. 20 Op. 454. 23. A bid which was formally accepted four days prior to the act of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), limiting to eight hours daily labor upon public works of the United States, but which left the determination of minor details and the formal execution of the contract to a later date, was not a contract within the meaning of section 3 of that act. 20 Op. 445. 24. Same.-A timber dry dock is one of the "public works" of the United States under the eight-hour law of August 1, 1892. Ib. 25. Certain employees at the Fort Leavenworth military prison, some of them desig not nated "foremen of mechanics," are 26. Panama Canal.-The act of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), which limits and restricts to eight hours the daily service of laborers and mechanics employed by the Government of the United States or by any contractor or subcontractor upon the public works of the United States, applies to the employment of laborers and mechanics in the construction of the Panama Canal. 25 Op. 441. 27. Same. That act, however, does not apply to the office force of the Isthmian Canal Commission stationed on the Isthmus of Panama, or to any of the employees of the Government who are not within the ordinary meaning of the words "laborers and mechanics." Ib. 28. Same. The scope of the act is not limited by the territorial jurisdiction of Congress, but is coextensive with the subjectmatter to which it was directed, to wit, the conduct of officers and agents of the United States in respect to the hours of labor of mechanics and laborers upon all public works of the United States. Ib. 19, 1888 (25 Stat. 613), to send a special messenger to the district judge holding the certificates of the votes of his State, in each of the four States where the messenger has failed to deliver to the President on the fourth Monday in January, 1893, the package containing the certificate of the votes of his State. 20 Op. 522. 2. The expression "whenever a certificate of votes from any State has not been received," as found in the act of October 19, 1888 (25 Stat. 613), should be construed so as to read "whenever any certificate of votes required by law from any State has not been received." Ib. 29. Same. Congress may fix the hours of labor upon all the works of the United States, wherever conducted, and make the law binding upon the officers of the United States and, See UTAH. through the agency of contracts, upon all contractors with the United States. 30. Panama Railroad.—The words "laborers and mechanics" as used in the eight-hour law of August 1, 1892 (27 Stat. 340), apply to all persons who may fairly come within the description of laborers and mechanics, whether they are paid by the year, by the month, or by the day. 25 Op. 465. 31. Same.-The above-named act does not apply to laborers and mechanics in the employment of the Panama Railroad and Steamship Line, such persons being employed by the corporation and not by the United States. Ib. SALE OF. ELECTION LAWS. "ELEU," STEAM TUG. ELIGIBILITY. See CIVIL SERVICE, III, a; POSTAL SERVICE, ELLIS, E. JOHN. CONTRACT WITH INDIANS. See INDIANS, V, 128-134. ELECTORAL VOTES. ELLIS ISLAND. 1. It is the duty of the Secretary of State, under the provisions of section 141, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of October See IMMIGRATION, VII. EMERGENCY PURCHASES. See ARMY, I, g. OF TROOPS. See ARMY, 1-9. OF HONORABLY DISCHARGED SOLDIERS. See EMINENT DOMAIN. 1. The Secretary of War has full authority under the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894, (28 Stat. 359), and the act of April 24, See NAVY, IV. 2. Same. If a change in the location of an existing railroad is a necessity in the building of said boat railway, the acquisition by the Secretary of War of the necessary land to make such a change is merely an incident to the enterprise intrusted to him. Ib. ENGINEER CORPS. ENGINEER'S LICENSE. ALTERATION OF. See STEAMBOAT INSPECTION ENGRAVING AND PRINTING. ENTRY. 3. Philippine insular government-Land required by United States for military posts.-A See PUBLIC PRINTING, III. good title can be acquired by the United States to land in the Philippine Islands required for use as military posts under either section, 1 or 2, of the act of the Philippine Commission of March 5, 1903 (No. 665), the method provided by section 1 being slightly more circuitous than that provided by section 2, in that it provides for condemnation by the Philippine insular government and subsequent transfer to the United States. 24 Op. 640. 4. States may acquire land by condemnation for the Federal Government. Decision in the case of Trombley v. Humphrey (23 Mich. 472), held to be erroneous. Ib. 5. The Philippine government derives the power of eminent domain from section 63 of the organic act (32 Stat. 706). Ib. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury can not by contract bind the Government to exercise its See CUSTOMS LAWS, III, a; SHIPPING, I, f; EQUITY. A bill in equity will not lie against the State of Minnesota for the purpose of vacating a patent issued to that State under the swamp-land grant, on the mere ground that the land thus patented was not in fact swamp land. 19 Op. 684. See also CALIFORNIA DÉBRIS COMMISSION, 5. ESCHEAT. power of eminent domain to enable persons to See UNITED STATES NAVAL ASYLUM AT PHILsell to the Government land which they do not own. 19 Op. 269. CONDEMNATION. See PUBLIC BUILDINGS, 2, ADELPHIA. EVICTION. 11, 14, 19-21; RESERVATIONS AND PARKS, 7, See DISTRICT OF COLUMbia, 42–47. 29; UNITED STATES, V, 73, 75-80. EMPLOYMENT. OF COUNSEL. See DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL- EVIDENCE. 1. In conspiracy cases, proof of the acts and declarations of the alleged conspirators may be introduced, although not properly admissible at the time, because community of intent and |