MATURE-MATURITY.-The time when a bill of exchange or promissory note becomes due.1 v. Milnes, 8 East 445; Fisher v. Pimbley, 11 East 193. "For Matter of Form."-The plaintiff's assignee in bankruptcy commenced an action in his own name, to enforce this claim and failed, because it was brought in the name of the wrong party, the present plaintiff then and now being the owner, having purchased it of the assignce. Held, that the failure was "for matter of form" within section 973 R. L. (Vermont), whereby a claim is saved from the operation of the statute of limitations; and that this claim was not barred, the second action having been commenced within one year from the determination of the original action. Premo 7. Lee, 56 Vt. Co; Goff v. Robinson, 60 Vt. 633; Spear v. Braintree, 47 Vt. 729. A Matter Depending in the Court.”The act 3 Geo. IV, ch. 102, giving increased jurisdiction to the court, is to be construed liberally for the dispatch of business; and an affidavit sworn during term is sufficient to bring the subject matter before the court, as "a matter depending in the court" within the terms of the act and the king's warrant founded thereon. Ex parte Smith, Dowl. & Ry. 382. "Matters of subsistence for man" comprehend all articles or things, whether animal or vegetable, living or dead, which are used for food, and whether they are consumed in the form in which they are bought from the producer or are only consumed after undergoing a process of preparation, which is greater or less according to the character of the article. Sledd 7. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 813. v. 1 See Bills & Notes, vol. 2, p. 396. "To be Mature" Equivalent to "To be Suable." In Taylor . Mayor etc., City of New York, 82 N. Y. IS, FOLGER, C. J., observes: "The phrases ** cause of action" and "right of action" are used, because ordinarily, and in the absence of some especial vircumstance, when a debt is mature it may be demanded and sued upon, and payment of right and by its terms be then exacted; because, in general, the phrases "to be mature" and "to be suable" both express the same fact as to the debt. It is the condition or state of the demand at the time that is looked at. See also Wells 7. Stewart, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 40; Martin v. Kunz Muller, 37 N. Y. 396. In Osborne & Co. v. Campbell, 6 Lanc. Law Rev. 206, an action was brought against the defendant on the following contract endorsed on the back of a note given by S. G. Welliver to the plaintiff. "For value received I or we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity and at all times thereafter, and waive demand, protest and notice of nonpayment thereof. (Signed) W. A. Campbell." RICE, P. J.. observes: "Though the word guarantee is used, yet as the guaranty is to pay "when due" or "at maturity" the undertaking obviously has reference to the liquidation of the note at the time specified, and not to the solvency of the maker. Maturity in a Will.-In Executors of Condict v. King, 13 N. J. E. 380, the chancellor observes: The term maturity is not synonymous with legal majority. As used by the testator, it may well be held to import maturity of mind and character, the combined result of age and education." "Pay Bonds at Maturity."-As commonly understood, the word “ maturity,” in its application to bonds and other similar instruments, applies to the time fixed for their payment, which is the termination of the period they have to run. A provision in a charter that the grants thereby made are upon the condition that the company "shall pay said bonds at maturity," while it implies an obligation to pay both principal and interest when the bonds shall become due. does not imply an obligation to pay the interest as it semi-annually accrues. United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 91 U. S. 72. "After Maturity."-Where a promissory note payable on a certain day bears interest "after maturity," interest should be computed from the day 978 "must MAY (See also INTERPRETATION; STATUTES; WILLS)— 1. Definition.--Is permitted to; has liberty to.1 The word "may" in a statute is sometimes used in a mandatory, and sometimes in a directory and permissive sense. It has always been construed or "shall" whenever it can be seen that the legislative intent was to impose a duty and not simply a privilege or discretionary power, and where the public is interested and the public or third persons have a claim de jure, to have the power exercised. But it is only where it is necessary to give effect to the clear policy and intention of the legislature that it can be construed in a mandatory sense, and where there is nothing in the connection of the language or in the sense and policy of the provision to require an unusual interpretation, its use is merely permissive and discretionary.4 In contracts, deeds, wills and other private writings the construction of the word must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, its relation to the context of the instrument in some cases being the test. While in others it may be interpreted solely by the intention of the party creating the instrument.5 fixed for payment, and not from the expiration of the days of grace. Wheeless 7. Williams & Daniels, 62 Miss. 369; Bank of Utica v. Wager, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 766; Weems v. Ventress, 14 La. An. 267. The words "at maturity" refer to and include the whole day, unless specially and distinctly limited to a certain hour of the day. Leigh v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. of New York, 26 La. An. 436. Matured.-A judgment is matured (within meaning of 2 Ind. Rev. Stat., p. 62. § 51, requiring a set-off to be "matured") although the time of stay of execution has not expired. Hays v. Boyer, 59 Ind. 341. 1. Bouv. L. Dict. 2. Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.) 434; Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. (U. S.) 248. 3. Malcolm v. Rodgers, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 193. 4. Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 64. 5. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 23 W. N. C. (Pa.) 42. "May."-Should be construed, in a statute, to mean "shall" wherever the rights of third persons or the public good requires. Steines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; State v. Saline County Court, 48 Mo. 390; James v. Dexter, 112 Ill. 489. In construing statutes the word "may" will be considered as mandatory only, for the purpose of sustaining or The words "may" and "shall" should be considered in the construction of the law as convertible terms. Cooke v. Spears, 2 Cal. 412. Mandatory. In the following cases the word "may" has been held to be mandatory: Rex v. Barlow. Carth. 293, Salk. 609. "that church wardens may make a rate." See also Rex 7. Derby, Skin. 370. Blackwell's Case, I Vern. 152, that the chanceller may grant a commission of bankrupt. Rex v. Hastings, 1 Dowl. & R. 148, that the mayor might for the future hereafter have and hold court of record. a Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 Ill. 471, that a chattel mortgage may be acknowledged before a justice of the peace of the town or district where the mortgagor resides. State v. State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498, that if any election returns shall be found to be so informal or incomplete that the board cannot canvass them, they may dispatch a messenger to the inspectors who made the returns, etc. People v. Brooks, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 457, that affidavits may be taken before commissioners of deeds. See also Caniff v. New York, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 430. Adriance v. Supervisors, 12 How. Pr. N. Y. 224, that supervisors may correct an erroneous assessment. Randolph Co. v. Rolls, 18 Ill. 29, that all actions against any county may be prosecuted in the circuit court of that county. See also Schuyler Co. v. Mercer Co., 9 Ill. 20. St. Louis R. v. Teters, 68 Ill. 144, that a court may grant a continuance, if the absence of one of the attorneys is occasioned by his being a member of the legislature, and then in attendance on its sessions Gillinwater v. Mississippi R., 13 Ill. 3, that a certain number of corporators may present a petition to the legislature before they become incorporated. See also Miñor v. Mechanics' Bank, Pet. (U. S.) 64. Chicago & A. R. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 414. Where one section of an act provides that a common informer "may" sue for a penalty, another that the State's attorney "may" sue, the latter has no exclusive right to bring suit. Rockwell 7. Clark, 44 Conn. 534, that when any married woman shall carry on any business, and any right of action shall accrue to her therefrom, she may sue upon the same as if she were unmarried. See also Rumsey v. Lake, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339; Van Cleve v. Rook, 11 Vr. (N. J.) 25. Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. (U. S.) 248, a provision, that a municipality may sell one lot for the taxes assessed on several, restricts them to selling only one if that will produce the amount. See also Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.) 434 Walley's Case, 11 Nev. 260, that the court may, of its own motion, or on application, set apart for the use of the family of the deceased all personal property which is by law exempt from execution. See also Balentine's Case, 45 Cal. 696. Stines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 167, that an act concerning issuing bonds for roads, etc, provided that before any expenditures shall be made the county courts may, for the purpose of information, submit the amount of the proposed expenditures to the voters of the respective counties. People v. Commissioners, 4 Neb. 150, that county commissioners may let contracts to the lowest responsible bidder. Low v. Dunham. 61 Me. 566, that in proceedings to enforce a maritime lien, the court may issue an order to sell the vessel. Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 435, that a board of supervisors may, if deemed advisable, levy a special Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 705, that a city council may, if it believe that the public good and the best interests of the city require it, levy a tax to pay its funded debt. See also Cairo v. Campbell, 116, 305. Phelps v. Hawley, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 160; 52 N. Y. 23, that if a private bridge be destroyed and not rebuilt by the company within a certain time, it shall thereupon become a public bridge and may be maintained at the expense of the county. See also Newport Bridge Case, 2 El. & El. 377. Scully. Ackmeyer, 2 Cin. (Ohio) 296, that an assessment may be recovered in the name of the city. Barnes で。 Thompson, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 313, that a mechanic's lien may be enforced by attachment. Hines . Lockport, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 378, that a common council may make streets, sidewalks and repair them. See also New York v. Furze, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 612; People v. Brooklyn, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 404. State v. Buckles, 39 Ind. 272, that a State auditor may draw his warrant on the treasurer. Blake v. Portsmouth R., 39 N. H. 435, that any corporation whose powers expire by limitation may continue to be a body corporate for three years thereafter, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits. See also Medbury v. Swan, 46 N. Y. 202; Baldwin v. New York, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 411; Re Goddard's Estate, 94 N. Y. 552; People v. Livingston Co., 6 Hun (N. Y.) 574; L. I. R. Co. v. Conklin, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 386; N. Y. & E. R. Co. v. Coburn, 6 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 224; Grantman v. Hall, 31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 466; Pumpelly 7. Owego, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 238; Waller 7. Thomas, 42 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 342; People v. New York Co., 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 121; Ex parte Chase, 43 Ala. 311; Horst v. Moses, 48 Ala. 148; Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga. 545; Leavenworth & D. M. R. Co. v. Platte Co. Ct., 42 Mo. 175; Van Wagoner v. Patterson Gas Light Co., 23 N. J. L. . 297; Kellogg v. Page, 44 Vt. 361; Fisher v. Clark, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 332; Peopie v. Otsego Co., 51 N. Y. 401; Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala. 28; Rock Island Co. v. United States, 71 U. S. 435; Ralston 7'. Crittenden, 13 Fed. Rep. 508; Kennedy 7. Sacramento, 19 Fed. Rep. 580; Schuyler Co. v. Mercer Co., 9 Ill. 20; Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587; Jones v. Statesville, 97 N Car. 86; Whitten v. State, 61 Miss. 718; Wright v. State, 5 Port. (Ind.) 290; State v. McGimpsey, 60 N. Car. 337; Leighton v. Maury, 76 Va. 870; Ex parte Lester, 77 Va. 673; Railroad Co. v. Royalston, 58 Vt. 234; Railroad Co. v. Mowatt, 35 Ohio St. 288; Spaulding v. Lees, 4 Mo. App. 351; Mitchell v. Pike, 17 Hun (N. Ÿ.) 142; Reid v. Brambridge, 1 South. (N. J.) 351; Carhart v. Miller, 2 South. (N. J.) 573; Hagadon v. Roux, 72 N. Y. 583; Lyon v. Rice, 41 Conn. 245; Gillinwater v. Railroad Co., 13 Ill. 3; Blake v. Portsmouth etc. R. Co., 39 N. H. 435; People v. Brooks, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 457; Appleton v. Warner, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 270; State v. Board of Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498; Plank Road Co. v.Com., 10 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 237; Chetwood v. State Bank, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 32; Coopers v. Mayor, 55 Cal. 599; Bell v. Crane, L. R., 8 Q. B. 481; Bancroft v. Sawin, 3 N. E. Rep. 307; Johnston v. Pate, 95 N. Car. 68; Welsh v. Solenberger, 8 S. E. Rep. 92; Beau v. Simmons, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 389; James v. Dexter, 112 Ill. 489; Pacific R. Co. v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623; Beach v. Woodhill, Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 2; Lyon v. Rice, 41 Conn. 245; Estate of Ballentine, 45 Cal. 696; Quinn v. Wallace, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 452; Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.) 422; People v. Supervisors, 51 N. Y. 401; People v Com., 4 Neb. 150; Seiple v. Borough of Elizabeth, 27 N. J. L. 407; Phelps v. Fadden, 125 Mass. 200; State v. Laughlin, 73 Mo. 443; Ex parte Whittington, 34 Ark. 394; Coopers v. Mayor, 55 Cal. 599; Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex. 468; Silvey v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 334; Hill v. Barge, 12 Ala. 692; Smith v. King, 14 Oreg. 10; City of Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587; Wormwood v. City of Waltham, 4 N. E. Rep. 194; Ex parte Simonton, 9 Port. (Ala.) 393; Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala.) 28; People v. Otsego Co., 51 N. Y. 401; Nave 7. Nave, 7 Ind. 122; Newburgh etc, Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 124; People v. New York Co., 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 114; Com. v. Marshall, 3 W. N. C. (Pa.) 182; Norwegian Street, 81 Pa. St. 349; Knox v. Lee, 79 U. S. 457; Monmouth v. Leeds, 76 Me. 28; People v. Supervisors, 68 N. Y. 119; State v. Neuner, 49 Conn. 233; Com. v. Smith, 111 Mass. 497; Mc Intosh v. H. & St. J. R. Co., 26 Mo. App. 377; Kohn v. Hinshaw, 20 Pac. Rep. (Oreg.) 629; Johnston v. Pate, 95 N. Car. 68. Under the statute (Gen. Stat., tit. 19, ch. 5, § 11. Connecticut), which provides that "where any married woman shall carry on any business and any right of action shall accrue to her therefrom, she may sue upon the same as if she were unmarried," a suit can be brought only in her name. Rockwell v. Clark, 44 Conn. 534; Rumsey v. Lake, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 339. When, by statute, "a mortgage may be acknowledged before a justice of the peace of the town or district where the mortgagor resides," the word "may" is imperative and the district, in the statute, means election district. Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 Ill. 476. The expression in section 123 of the Probate act (Nevada) "may set apart for the use of the family of the deceased," must be construed as imperative and mandatory as if it had read shall set apart. Estate of David Walley, 11 Nev. 260. The words "may pay" in an insurance contract held to be "liable to pay." Fame Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 397. Directory. In the following cases the word "may" has been held directory: Bank's Case, 28 Ala. 28, that the trial of any person charged with an indictable offence may be removed to another county, on the application of the defendant, duly supported by affidavit. See also Kelly v. State, 52 Åla. 366. Cross v. Pearson, 17 Ind. 612, that in a justice's court all matters of defence, except, etc., may be given in evidence without plea. Reed v. Bainbridge, 1 South. (N. J.) 357, that an assignee of bonds, etc., may maintain an action of debt thereon in his own name. See also Carhart v. Miller, 2 South. (N. J.) 575 Chetwood v. State Bank, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 32, that a plaintiff may assign as many breaches as he shall see fit. See also Shaeffer v. Jack, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 429. Central R. v. Ingram, 20 Kan. 66, that a demand (of damages for killing stock on a railroad) may be made of any ticket agent or station agent of such railway company. See also Union Trust Co. v. Kendall, 20 Kan. 515; State v. Han. & St. Jos. R. Co., 51 Mo. 532, that suit may be commenced by serving the summons on any director, etc., of a corporation. Mitchell. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13, that on a proceeding to set aside a defective execution, and bond and affidavit given, execution may issue against the party making the affidavit and his sure ties. State v. Holt Co., 39 Mo. 521, that a court, if satisfied that an applicant is a person of good character, may grant him a tavern licence. School District 7. Sterricker, 86 Ill. 595, that the certificate of a school teacher may be in the form following (setting out a form). See also Davidson v. Gill, 1 East 64; Crosby v. School District, 35 Vt. 623; Apgar v. Trustees, 5 Vr. (N. J.) 31. Kane v. Footh, 70 Ill. 587, that the court may, at the request of either party, require the jury to render a special verdict. Fowler v. Perkins, 77 Ill. 271, that appeals in certain cases may be taken to the supreme court, does not repeal a prior statute allowing appeals in such cases to the circuit court. See also See also Hogan v. Devlin, 3 Daly (N. Y.) 184; Webb Robbins, 77 Ala. 180; Lewis v. State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 127, that on a jury's recommending a defendant in a capital case to mercy, the court may commute the punishment from death to imprisonment for life. Com. v. Gable, 7 S. & R. (Pa) 423, that in indictments for involuntary manslaughter the attorney general may, by leave of the court, waive the felony and proceed as for a misdemeanor. Com. v. Haines, 107 Mass. 194, that penalties for an offence may be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction does not exclude an indictment for the same offence in the superior court. See also Hirschfelder v. State, 18 Ala. 112; Barnawell v. Threadgill, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 86; McKoin v. Cooley, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 559; Sifford v. Beatty, 12 Ohio St. 189, that in an action against a sheriff for the recovery of property taken under execution and replevied by the plaintiff, the court may, upon application of the defendant in execution. permit him to be substituted as defendant. Cooke v. State Bank, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 339, that suits against any national bank may be had in any court of the United States held within the district where such bank is established, or in any state court in such district, does not exclude a suit in a state court against such bank located in another State. Lovell . Wheaton, 11 Minn. 92, that an award may be returned to any term of court held during the time limited by the submission. See, however, as to time in general, Birdsong . Brooks, 7 Ga. 88; Stevenson v. Lawrence, II Am. Law Reg. 409; Free Press Asso. v. Nichols, 45 Vt. 7; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 18 Wis. 285; Bowman v. Blyth, 7 E. & B. 26-45. Kelly v. Morse, 3 Neb. 224, that the court may require actual notice to be given to either party, where it appears necessary and proper before acting on an award of arbitrators. See also Cole v. Green, 6 M. & G. 872; Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373. Caldwell . State, 34 Ga. 10, that of two or more defendants jointly indicted for any offence, any one defendant may be tried separately. Bauseneer. Mace, 18 Ind. 27, that public sales of lands may be in parcels so that the whole amount may be realized. See also Cunningham v. Cassidy, 17 N. Y. 276. Darby v. Condit, 1 Duer (N. Y.) 599, that the court may, in its discretion, require security for costs of an executor. Allen v. Wells, 22 Ind. 118, that the court, where a cause is transferred to a higher court because the title of land is involved, may tax all costs made in the former court. former court. See also MacDougall v. Patterson, 11 C. B. 755; Jones v. Harrison, 6 Exch. 328; Crake v. Powell, 2 El. & Bl. 210. Buffalo Plank Road v. Commissioners, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 237, that every person liable to do highway labor, living or owning property on the line of any plank road, may, by application in writing, be assessed his proportion of the assessment for the labor on such highway. Bell v. Crane, L. R., 8 Q. B. 481, that every authority having power to impose rates may exempt a building used as a Sunday or ragged school from any rate. As to who may be assessed, Curtis v. Richland, 56 Mich. 478; McMaster v. Lomax, 2 Myl. & K. 32, that the court may issue an attachment for contempt, for want of an answer, "if they shall so think fit." Cutter . Howard, 9 Wis. 309, that the court may remove an executor for certain specified causes (although one of the causes exists). Kelly . Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83, that |