LECTURE IV.

In order to discover the duty and destination of man, having analysed the principles of which he is composed, or taken a view of his mental powers and faculties, we shall now consider in what order, proportion, and degree of these inward principles, Virtue, or a sound moral temper and right conduct, consists; that we may be enabled to discern whence moral obligation arises.

It is by considering the end or design of any part of our nature, that we must direct its motions, and estimate the degree of force necessary to its right exertion.

Now, the defence and security of the individual being the end or design of the defensive passions, that security and defence must be the measure of their strength or indulgence. If they be so weak as to prove insufficient for that end, or if they be so violent as to carry us beyond it, they are so far in an unsound and unnatural state. The passions of fear and anger, in a certain degree, and under proper restrictions, are useful to guard us against evils and injuries; but the excess of these passions renders us miserable in ourselves, and often injurious to others. The pri vate passions lead us to pursue some positive species of private good; but if they be too weak to engage us in the pursuit of their several objects, they are evidently deficient; and if they defeat their end by their violence and impetuosity, they are strained beyond the just tone of nature. With respect both to the defensive and private passions, if any of them, in the degree in which they prevail, be incompatible with the greatest good or most

extensive interest of the individual, they are then unequal and disproportionate. Therefore to proportion them in such measure to our dangers and wants, as to secure the greatest sum of private happiness, is their balance or standard in case of competition.

In like manner, as the public or social affections point at the good of others, that good must be the measure of their force. When a particular social affection, as gratitude, or friendship, which belongs to a particular social connection, namely, that of a benefactor or friend, be too feeble in its operation to make us act the grateful or the friendly part, that affection, being insufficient to answer its end, is defective or unsound. If, on the other hand, a particular passion of this class counteract or defeat the interest it is designed to promote, by its violence or disproportion, then is that passion excessive and irregular. Thus the principle of sympathy or compassion, if it lead us to turn away our eyes

from the object which has excited it, or render us incapable of exerting ourselves for his relief, loses all its loveliness and utility, and becomes a childish weakness of disposition; and thus the powerful principle of parental affection, if it degenerate into a passionate fondness, not only hinders the parents from judging coolly of the interest of their children, but often leads them into the weakest and most pernicious indulgences.

As every kind affection points at the good of its particular object, it is possible that the interest of one may clash with that of another. Thus the regard due to a friend may interfere with that which we owe to a community. In such a competition of interests, it is evident that the greatest is to be chosen; and that is the greatest interest, which contains the greatest sum, or aggregate of public good; greatest in quantity, as well as in duration. It is upon this obvious principle, that gratitude, friendship, and

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even parental affection, as well as a regard to immediate self-interest and self-enjoyment, must be sacrificed, if the necessity of the case should require it, to promote the happiness of our country, or of mankind in general. It is a rule of benevolence, that we prefer the happiness of a large number of men to that of a smaller one, of equal value. It is not, however, frequently, or agreeably to the natural course of things, that this competition takes place. For as the whole is made of its various parts, so public happiness is no other than the sum of individual and private happiness, and necessarily results from that state of things, when every person discharges the duties of his particular station, and promotes the happiness of those who come within the sphere of his influence. This then is the common standard by which the degrees of strength, and the subordinations of the social affections must be adjusted. Therefore we conclude, that these affections are sound and regular when they prompt us