« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
That of Pocasset or Portsmouth.
These show the Rhode Island doctrine is that the majority shall govern.
foundation or support in the history of this State.
it. 16. A limitation imposed by a higher power can be set aside only by that higher
exclusion of negroes from suffrage before accorded them, in New York. No State has yet ordained that majority shall not make and alter their con
stitution of government. Nearest approach to it is in Art. XIII, constitution of Rhode Island. Distinguishable, as limitation requiring special majority of general as.
sembly to initiate an amendment and then a special majority of the
electors to adopt amendment so initiated. 17. Revised constitution attempted to limit will of people to revise or amend
constitution to a three-fifth's majority. This cannot be done. Jameson, 546. Was reason enough for rejection. Majority must govern. This is not a revolutionary doctrine, the contrary
is, and is unknown elsewhere, except to authors of revised constitution,
and partially to framers of constitution of 1842. The latter limited power of majority of electors to accept amendment
initiated by general assembly. Time confers no sanction on such a doctrine. Nor on what is claimed to be intent of framers of constitution of 1842 to
deprive people (by majority vote) of their right to make and alter their
constitution of government. Commissioners of 1897 incorporated this doctrine in their revised constitu.
18. Extraordinary that fifteen able men should agree on such a subversive
constitution until restrained by decision in Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324. Dread of centralized power caused delay until 1647 of acceptance of first
Continued to govern itself under unwritten constitution until 1842. 19. So stated by Story, J. in Wilkinson o. Leland, 2 Peters, 627.
Also by Jameson, Const. Convs. 83.
destroyed foundation of legislative authority.
government as they pleased.
But upon suppression thereof, his demands granted.
Dorr's fame established.
governor not crown officer.
a law unconstitutional.
on Const. Laws, 73. Judiciary more easily took the stand it did because State was governed
under unwritten constitution. 21. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324, 1856, put an end to exercise of judicial power
by general assembly.
21. These two cases, landmarks in political history of State, emphasize too
great power of general assembly.
A constitutional convention alone can impose the limitations needed. 22. Under Art. I, sec. 1, their result would become law upon approval by a
majority of the electors. And a convention should be called whenever constitution needs general re
vision. Official declaration of such necessity by general assembly, January 27, 1897. To guard against new danger of political machine and boss rule, a conven
tion should be called.
Extract from I. A. Bassett's Memorial Day address, May 30, 1899. 23. This new danger must be recognized, met, and overcome.
A constitution, framed by constitutional convention and adopted by electors,
necessary to do this. Sense of civic pride and municipal responsibility must be raised to higher
plane. Advisory opinion, 14 R. I. 654, erred in saying any new constitution which
a convention could form would be a new constitution only in name.
can be added.
It was the result of centuries of effort to right centuries of wrong. 24. Each victory for the right became a new clause in it.
This contest not ended.
government under Art. I, Sec. 1, and right of general assembly to initiate
amendments under Art. XIII, is fundamental. To ignore the distinction is but to contribute to the political subjugation of
the people. 25. New device of political machine to secure political plums for their followers.
Some courts bave maintained its legality.
ment of their State.
England States have had, and, therefore, their decision has a better foundation.
25. In cases denying its legality, the cause for its assertion is made apparent.
Cases cited and quoted from.
This can only be done through a constitutional convention. 26. Explanation of failure of revised constitution.
It did not contain necessary restrictions on powers of general assembly.
constitution to electors, including those who will become electors under
such new constitution, and its adoption by a majority vote.
Our court has recognized this distinction. 27. In Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324.
In Allen v. Danielson, 15 R. I. 480, reversing advisory opinion in 13 R. I. 9.
Tbis distinction recognized in 58 Me. 573, do 615. 28. In 72 Me. 542, McQueen, Ap. Jur. H. of L. 39.
In 24 Am. L. R. 369 and 7 Harv, L. R. 153.
has decided to be necessary. 29. By its resolution of January 27, 1897, declaring the constitution should be
judges said they would be glad to have, to give more careful study to the
and authorities thereon, Or submit to electors an amendment to constitution under Art. XIII pro
viding for calling a constitutional convention and for adoption of new constitution by majority vote of electors including those to become electors thereunder.
29. But the maxim: “ Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is cited as conclusive.
The maxim criticised in 57 L. J. Q. B. 70 and 439.
A construction is to be favored that will give effect to both.
whole of it.
construction of Art. XIII an implied limitation were to be found depriving
the people of express right stated in Art. I, Sec. 1.
Illustration, 31. Difference between power exercised by general assembly under Art. XIII,
and right of people under Art. I, Sec. 1. Members of the court held that express power given to one party to do one
thing in an expressly limited way is an implied limitation upon the ex.
press power of another party to do another thing in another way. The application of the maxim could not be more misplaced. Rather, the maxim should be applied under Art. I, Sec. 1, as reserving the
absolute right of the people to make and alter their constitution of gov.
ernment, and as excluding any restriction thereon under Art. XIII. The maxim has no real application, as Art. XIII relates to a different thing. The maxim is inapplicable, because the expressio unius is not the same in the
two articles. 32. Jameson, 605, quoted to same effect.
A limitation on power of one party to do one thing in one way is no limita.
tion on power of another party to do another thing in another way. The judges held that an implied limitation they found in Art. XIII is ex
clusive of all other methods, and, bence, denies all effect to the expressly
stated right of the people under Art. I, Sec. 1.
of its adoption. People v. Harding, 533 Mich. 485, quoted from.
No constitution is wholly written. Illustration and comment. 33. No constitution is wholly unwritten. Illustration and comment.
The written constitution does not contain all there is of constitutional com
mand. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44.