[1838-1839

Two days later it was found necessary to make certain modifications and to repeal the land bounty,51 but these two laws gave the Army an authorized strength of 12,539 officers and men. 52

"The ills springing from detached service were but partly cured. In failing to provide supernumeraries in the Quartermaster's and Commissary's Departments, two of the most important branches of the staff, as in the past, could only be made efficient at the expense of the line.

"To the prejudice of true economy, the other great defect of the law of 1821, the nonexpansion of the rank and file, was also only remedied in part. Instead of authorizing the President to expand the Army to a given limit, with like power to reduce it by mere Executive order, the moment the public interest would permit, Congress prescribed a war maximum which might continue months after the emergency had ceased and could only be lessened by the slow and uncertain process of legislation." 53

During 1838 and 1839 serious complications occurred on the Northern frontier, which threatened to bring about a third war with England. As the bulk of the Regular Army was occupied in Florida and the Southwest,54 the President was authorized

"to resist any attempt on the part of Great Britain to enforce, by arms, her claim to jurisdiction over that part of the State of Maine which is in dispute between the United States and Great Britain."

Aside from the employment of the Regular military and naval forces and of such militia as he deemed advisable to call into service, the President was empowered to accept volunteers up to the number of 50,000— who were required to supply their own clothing and horses, and to serve for a period of six to twelve months after reaching the rendezvous and $10,000,000 were placed at his disposal.55

"A glance at this law, for the passage of which General Scott claimed special credit,56 shows that on its face there was no indication that Congress had either appreciated or been able to profit by the losses of the Revolution, the War of 1812, or even

1838-1842]

by its own two years' experience with the Florida War. Fortunately for the country, a repetition of the disasters which marked the beginning of the War of 1812 was averted by a peaceful settlement." 57

From 1838 to 1842 the operations in the Florida war were conducted by the successive commanders with small detachments rarely exceeding 100 men. In May, 1839, General Macomb made a treaty with the leading chief of the Seminoles, whereby hostilities were to cease,58 but after a lapse of two months another massacre 59 lighted the conflagration for the third time. The Indians took to their fastnesses in inaccessible swamps,60 and it was only the system of summer campaigns instituted by Colonel Worth, which destroyed the crops and other subsistence, that eventually compelled them to sue for peace. On August 14, 1842, official announcement was made that "hostilities with the Indians in Florida have ceased."

During this war the efforts of the Government to economise were defeated by the persistency with which State militia was forced upon it, sometimes without authority of law.61 Suffice to say that from 1835 to 1842 no less than 48,152 volunteers and militia were in service,62 apart from 12,539 regulars,63 thus making a total of 60,091, and the war expenditures during those seven years for the land forces amounted to no less than $69,751,611.50.64

To appreciate properly the excessive cost of short-sighted military legislation, it must be borne in mind that this war teaches some valuable lessons, viz.:

"First. That its expense was tripled, if not quadrupled, by that feature of the law of 1821 which gave the President, in times of emergency, no discretion to increase the enlisted men of the Army.

"Second. That, as in every previous war, after successfully employing for short periods of service militia and volunteers, and exhausting their enthusiasm, Congress found it more humane and economical to continue hostilities with regular troops, enlisted for the period of five years.

[1842

"Third. That for want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of 17,000,000 of people contended for seven years with 1,200 warriors and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole cause of the war.'

65

Nine days after the termination of hostilities the Army was forthwith reduced from 12,539 officers and men to 8,613 66 without disbanding any of the regiments.67 Had Congress applied the same wise method to the expansion of the Army at the beginning of the war which it did to its reduction at the end, the struggle would never have been protracted for seven years and the loss in lives and money would have been many times less.