[1814

the almost unbroken succession of splendid victories achieved at sea,117 thus affording abundant proof of the merit of the system used with respect to the Navy and the folly of the method employed for our land forces. Indeed even Jefferson who, as governor of Virginia in the Revolution, had utterly failed to offer the slightest opposition to the capture and burning of Richmond by Benedict Arnold,118 and who throughout his public career had continually advocated dependence upon a citizen-soldiery, 119 became so disgusted with the inefficiency of the militia during the first two years of this war that, fourteen months before the climax was reached in the disgraceful rout at Bladensburg, he wrote to James Monroe that

"It proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free state. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. WE MUST TRAIN

AND CLASSIFY THE WHOLE OF OUR MALE CITIZENS, AND MAKE MILITARY INSTRUCTION A REGULAR PART OF COLLEGIATE EDUCA

TION. WE CAN NEVER BE SAFE TILL THIS IS DONE." 120

Drastic as was the measure proposed, his assertion was quite in harmony with a similar outburst on his part thirtytwo years previously when he, as governor of Virginia, found himself at his wit's end owing to his inability to procure the necessary militia to check the British inroads, and so harassed by their refusal to respond to his calls, their insubordination, mutinies, desertions and utter worthlessness, 121 that he had vented his spleen in a letter dated March 1, 1781, to Richard Henry Lee, the Speaker of the House of Delegates, in which he said:

Whether it be practicable to raise and maintain a sufficient number of regulars to carry on the war is a question. That it would be burdensome is undoubted yet it is perhaps as certain that no possible mode of carrying it on can be so expensive to the public, so distressing and disgusting to individuals as the militia." 122

1814-1815]

In view of two such candid statements, both made under the stress of war, it is surprising that in the years which intervened he should have advocated such dependence as he did 123 upon the very class of troops that he condemned so unreservedly.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815

125

The military operations of the last year of the war were short and decisive. The British expedition up the Chesapeake, which ended in the destruction of Washington and the attack on Baltimore in 1814, was originally intended as a feint to draw both attention and the American forces away from Louisiana, which the English purposed to invade preparatory to taking possession of the valley of the Mississippi.124 Pursuant to this plan, a force of 7,000 troops - which had assembled at Jamaica in November, 1814, but whose departure 126 was delayed for ten days until the arrival of Commodore Lloyd's squadron from Fayal 127— reached the mouth of the Mississippi on December 9th, and disembarked at Isle des Pois below New Orleans between the 16th and 20th, but was surprised to find that General Jackson had already begun preparations to meet them.128 Some preliminary engagements and two spirited attacks 129 convinced General Pakenham 130 that the task was more than had been bargained for, and he resolved, now that additional re-enforcements had reached him,131 to carry the American entrenchments on both sides of the river by storm on January 8th. Meanwhile, through Jackson's indomitable energy and perseverance, the lines had been strengthened to such an extent as to be extremely formidable,132 and by the morning of the battle he had succeeded in collecting a force of 5,698 men, only a small fraction being regulars. 133 The bulk of his army was stationed on the east bank of the Mississippi in three lines, while on the west side was General Morgan " with only eight hundred men, all militia, and indifferently armed." 134

[1815

At dawn on January 8th, General Pakenham with 8,000 veteran troops - the flower of Wellington's Peninsular army -advanced to the attack, his columns in solid formation notwithstanding the fact that the ground was almost perfectly level and as smooth as a glacis. Upon their reaching a point 200 yards from the first line of entrenchments, the American fire rang out. In less than half an hour the battle was over, after frightful carnage among the British who fled in wildest confusion.135 On the west bank, however, the scene was reversed. The troops under Colonel Thornton, 136 after many difficulties and being retarded by the strong current, disembarked with half of their original forces and came into action against Morgan's militia.137 Just when the Americans across the river were cheering over a victory still unexampled in our history, just when the advance of a skirmish line might have brought about the capture of the British army, Jackson had the mortification of seeing the Kentuckians" abandon their position and run in headlong flight toward the city." 138 Driving the Louisianians out of their entrenchments and gaining possession of Morgan's line, Thornton routed Patterson's battery, but the débâcle of the British on the other bank and orders to rejoin the main army compelled him to fall back and to re-embark his troops at the close of the day. 139

On the 19th the British withdrew from the Mississippi and on the 29th returned to their fleet, but it was not until March 6th that news was received of the treaty which had been signed at Ghent fifteen days before the battle had been fought. 140

"While the nation had reason to exult over so signal a victory, the battle in no sense vindicated a dependence on raw troops. It only proved, as at Bunker Hill, that with trained officers to command them, with an effective artillery and regular troops to support and encourage them above all, when protected by works so formidable that nothing but a regular siege should have dislodged them-advantages of position may compensate for an utter lack of instruction and discipline.

1815]

Agreeable as it might be to give the entire credit of this battle to raw troops, their heroic commander knew so well the uncertainty of their conduct in the open field that he was obliged to accept the advantages of a mere passive defense.” 111

Troops employed during the War of 1812.

The number of troops under arms at various times during this war was:

Regulars (including about 5,000 sailors and

Opposed to them was an enemy's force which, so far as can be estimated, did not exceed 67,000 all told,143 yet that war cost the United States $86,627,009,144 and no less than $45,950,546 have already been paid in pensions on its account. 145

The Revolution lasted seven years, the War of 1812 two and a half. In the former more than four times as many regulars, but only about one-third as many militia, were employed as in the latter.146 In the Revolution, aside from such victories as Trenton, Princeton, Monmouth, Stony Point, and King's Mountain, Burgoyne's force of 5,763 was captured in 1777, and four years later, with the aid of the French, Cornwallis was forced to capitulate with nearly 8,000.147 Yet few of us realize that "the only decisive victory of the War of 1812 before the conclusion of the treaty of peace was at the battle of the Thames, where the force of British regulars dispersed or captured 148 numbered but little more than 800." 149 The results speak for themselves.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY POLICY FROM THE CLOSE OF THE WAR OF 1812 TO THE BEGINNING

H

OF THE MEXICAN WAR

OSTILITIES were no sooner over than the policy of retrenchment was again resorted to and the peace establishment was fixed at 10,000 men,1 but the organization of the Army was still defective. The Act of April 24, 1816, imperfect as it was in many respects,3 created the first permanent peace establishment in which both the line and the staff were duly represented. A vigorous protest from General Jackson in 1817 put an end to the issuance of orders from the War Department directly to officers without being transmitted through the division commanders.5

4

SEMINOLE WAR

In 1817 began this war which originated in a massacre of a detachment 6 on the Apalachicola River, Florida, on November 30th, followed a fortnight later by an attack by the Indians on Fort Scott, Georgia. In March, 1818, General Jackson advanced into Florida with 1,800 men and, being joined in April by General McIntosh with 1,500 Creeks, destroyed the Mikasuky villages, captured the Spanish garrison at St. Marks, burned a large Indian village, invested the Spanish Fort Barrancas, bombarded it and forced it to surrender after two days, on May 27th.

The management of this war was quite in keeping with the policy followed during the Revolution and the War of 1812. For lack of sufficient regulars, Generals Jackson and Gaines, in defiance of statutory law and orders, undertook to organize volunteers and Indians and mustered them into the