CHAPTER IV

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE END OF THE REVOLUTION

UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE

WAS

WAR OF 1812

'ASHINGTON'S solicitude for our national military welfare did not terminate with the Revolution, but even before resigning his commission he thus set forth his views as to a proper peace establishment for the defence of the republic,1 expressing a belief that

"due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. . . . It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed."

No

Notwithstanding this sound advice, the moment that independence was an accomplished fact, the States all hastened to arrogate to themselves almost every attribute of sovereignty. In the midst of the most critical period in the history of the United States, when the national credit at home and abroad was completely exhausted and when the country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, Congress saw fit to disband all that remained of the Continental Army except 80 soldiers destined to guard public stores 2 its action being tantamount to a declaration that a Regular Army would be dispensed with at the outset of the republic.3 Throwing to the

[1784-1787

winds the lessons of the Revolution, it promptly proceeded to raise a mixed regiment of 700 infantry and artillery drawn from the militia of four States to protect the northwestern frontiers and to garrison the posts about to be evacuated by the British. Within a year, however, the need of a certain amount of regular troops was recognized and a regiment of equal numbers was authorized for the same purpose, the enlistment being for three years.5 Eighteen months later a further increase was made and the two organizations merged into a "legionary corps "8 but, although the States were urged to "use their utmost efforts to raise the quotas of troops respectively assigned them with all possible expedition," their response was so meagre that only two companies of artillery were forthcoming.

The pygmy army just created had scarcely got ensconced on the frontiers than Shays' rebellion took place in Massachusetts, and the Government arsenal at Springfield narrowly escaped capture by the malcontents. 10 Eight months later 11 another body of 700 men, enlisted for three years, was raised by resolution of Congress "in order to save the great expense of transporting new levies to the distant frontiers,"" to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country and in the hope of persuading the soldiers already in service to re-enlist.12

The feeble, ineffective and chaotic administration both of civil and military affairs under the existing system of government had produced a general conviction that a change was imperative, and Congress had recommended a convention of delegates from the States in order to revise the Articles of Confederation.13 This convention met at Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, and on September 17th the new constitution was signed and submitted to the States for ratification. 14 The preamble recites that among other reasons it was instituted to "insure domestic tranquillity" and to "provide for the common defense." Several portions have a direct bearing upon military affairs, 15 and a comparison of the

1787-1789]

war powers of Congress under the Confederation with those granted by the Constitution will suffice to show how radical was the change effected in the form of government. As Upton very pertinently remarks: 16

"Up to this time Congress could justly claim that its feeble and exhausting military policy was largely due to the inadequate powers conferred by the Articles of Confederation. Under the Constitution, however, the authority to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy,' 'to levy and collect taxes,' and 'to borrow money on the credit of the United States' was unqualified and gave every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask.

"Henceforth there could be no division of responsibility between the General Government and the States. If disasters should happen in the future. . . the whole responsibility must lie at the doors of a President and a Congress clothed with unlimited power to meet every emergency.

"Our liberties and independence, our country's honor and credit were thus all committed to one General Government, IT BEING FULLY EXPECTED by a generous and confiding people THAT

EACH REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THIS SACRED TRUST SHOULD REGARD THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AS ONE OF THE CARDINAL DUTIES OF A STATESMAN.'

In consequence of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the military as well as the civil affairs required an extensive overhauling, and the first act of importance pertaining to the former 17 created a War Department, presided over by a Secretary of War who was made responsible to the President instead of to Congress.18 The Act of September 29, 1789, laid the foundations of our present Army by recognizing" the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," by requiring all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance and by vesting the power to appoint officers in the President alone.19 By virtue of the fifth section the President was authorized, whenever it might be necessary to protect the frontiers against Indians, to call into service such militia as he should deem necessary, such militia when in service to have the same pay and subsistence as the

[1789-1791

Regulars a procedure which furnishes the key to our entire policy in respect to subsequent hostilities with the Indians,20

The first general organization of the Army under the Constitution was effected by the Act of April 30, 1790, which fixed the strength of the Regular establishment at one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery,21 but no provision was made for a General Staff beyond permitting the President in his discretion to appoint one or two inspectors. General Harmar's expedition against the Miamis again demonstrated the folly of depending upon newlyformed militia 22 and forced Congress to add another regiment of regulars to be enlisted for three years.23 By virtue of the 8th section of this Act, the President was empowered to employ, "for a term not exceeding six months," a corps of 2,000 non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians in addition to, or in place of, the militia and, if such a corps should not be raised in time for active operations, to make good the deficiency by raising additional levies or by calling into service an equal number of militia; 24 while the 9th section authorized him "to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper.' As Upton points

25

"The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long civil war. The 'levies,' known later as 'volunteers,' were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to raise and support armies,' and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the 'levies' were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.

"The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the governors of the States 27 was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution."

The disastrous rout of General St. Clair's expedition 28

1791-1812]

furnished another proof that the lessons which ought to have been taught by the Revolution and by Harmar's defeat had been wasted upon the Government, but it had the salutary effect of inducing Congress to complement the artillery and infantry then in service to their maximum strength and to add three new regiments of infantry,29 thus bringing the strength of the Army up to 258 officers and 5,156 men.30 During the succeeding twenty years the legislative enactments, depending largely upon our foreign relations and upon troubles with the Indians, caused the size of the Regular forces to vary greatly, as will be seen from the following table:

STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS 31

The various acts of Congress affecting the military and militia establishments are too numerous and complex to require insertion here, but a few of them are of sufficient importance to demand a cursory examination.

The diminutive size and temporary character of the military force created by the early American legislators demonstrate that their intention was to dispense with a standing army entirely; but as time wore on Shays' rebellion, the Whiskey rebellion, the continual trouble with the Indians and the complications with France, Spain and England, engendered a universal belief that national defence must not be disregarded. After considerable discussion, Congress inclined to its usual favourite and sought to appease public opinion by the organic law of May 8, 1792, entitled "An