Conviction of an infamous crime operates as a forfeiture of the "immunities and privileges" of citizenship.

[What constitutes an infamous crime does not appear to have been, at any time, clearly defined. The general p oposition that any offence which would induce the infliction of the death penalty on the offender, or result in his consignment to the penitentiary, is not satisfactory, for it is not general in its application. And the definition given by Bouvier-"a crime which works infamy on one who has committed it"--is too indefinite altogether and needs further explanation. The same authority defines "infamy" as "That state which is produced by the conviction of a criminal and the loss of honor." The crime which renders the infamous person incompetent as a witness.-Treason, 6 Mod., 16, 74; Felony, 2 Bulstr., 154; Coke, Lttt., 6; 1 T. Raym., 364; Receiving Stolen Goods, 7 Metc., Mass., 500 (but obtaining goods under false pretences does not impair his competency as a witness, II Metc., Mass., 302); all offences founded in fraud and which come within the general notion of the crimen falsi of the Roman law, 1 Leach, 496; as perjury and forgery, Coke, Litt., 6; Fost., 209; piracy, 2 Rolle Abr., 886, swindling, cheating, Fost., 209; barratry, 2 Salk. 690, conspiracy, 1 Leach Co. cor., 442; bribing a witness to keep out of the way to get rid of his evidence, Fost, 208; falsehood, I Greenleaf Evid., Sec. 373." But whether or not, in all of these offenses, a conviction would deprive one of his citizenship, is doubtful. Treason, murder, robbery, theft, bribery, perjury, piracy, arson, rape, are recognized as infamous crimes (although theft is subject to qualification in the matter of degree, for which the person convicted would be forfeiting his "immunities and privileges" as a citizen. The Constitution of Connecticut classifies the following offenses as infamous crimes: Bribery, forgery, perjury, duelling, fraudulent bankruptcy, theft, or other offenses for which an infamous punishment is inflicted," and any person convicted of one of them lost his privileges as an elector.--See Const, Conn., Art. VI, Sec. 3.]

In some States the criminal offenses which deprive the person committing either of them of his citizenship, are specifically stated. Any person convicted of an infamous crime is no longer worthy of citizenship, for he has undermined the very foundation of the social fabric which it is the sacred object of citizenship to protect and strengthen. He is, therefore, outlawed by society. Pardon, however, saves the offender. A convicted felon, who may have served part of the term of servitude to which he was sentenced, but to whom executive clemency is extended and pardon granted, is restored, civilly and politically, to his former status as a citizen, no matter what may be the social ostracism he suffers in consequence of his crime.

The effect of the pardon is, however, only prospective, not retrospective. It neither changes the past nor annihilates the fact of the offense (1). The fact remains that the person pardoned was guilty of the crime, notwithstanding the pardon (2). Pardon restores the offender to citizenship simply "because it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that, in the eyes of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence (3)."

But a convict who is restored to his liberty by reason of the natural expiration of his sentence, is forever stripped of all the immunities and privileges of citizenship (4), for one who has so outraged the laws of his country is no longer to be trusted with the precious boon conferred by those laws upon him who respects and obeys them, and nothing can remove his disability except it be an act of the State Legislature, if his conviction was had in a State Court, or an act of Congress, if convicted in a Federal Court. Connecticut adopted a constitutional amendment in 1875, providing that the General Assembly shall have power, by a two-thirds vote of the members of both branches, to restore the privileges of an elector to those who may have forfeited the same by a conviction for crime (5).

(1) 4 Black., 402.
(2) 5 Sawyer, 195.
(3) 4 Wallace; 380.

(4) Colorado, however, furnishes an exception to this rule. Sec. 10, of Art. VII of the Constitution of 1876 restores to citizenship the felon who has served his full term of penal servitude.

(5) Charters and Constitutions U. S., Const. Conn., Art. XVII, Part 1, 269.

FORFEITURE BY EXPATRIATION.

Expatriation is a fundamental right, and citizenship may be forfeited by it.

Whereas, the right of expatriation is a natural and inh rent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and, whereas, in the recognition of this principle this overnment has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and, whereas, it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendant, are subjec s of foreign States, owing allegiance to the government, thereof and, whereas, it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore, any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of the United States which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Republic.--Rew. Stats. U. S., Sec. 1999.

Congress thus declared itself for the protection of its naturalized citizens against the claims of their mother country which denied the right of its subjects to renounce their allegiance. But the rule which was thus laid down by Congress to defend naturalized American citizens against the claim of foreign governments upon their allegiance, operates also as a defense of the right of any American citizen to change his allegiance at his pleasure, by expatriation. A naturalized citizen of the United States may thus resume his original citizenship under the conditions required of the country of his nativity (1). If an American citizen emigrates to a foreign country and renounces his American allegiance, with the view of becoming a subject of the country in which such renunciation is made, it constitutes an act of expatriation (2). But residence in a foreign country and an intent not to return to the United States, while essential elements of

(1) 31 F. R., 106.

(2) 14 Atty. Gen. op., 295.

expatriation, are not sufficient to constitute it (1). These acts must be followed by naturalization before expatriation is complete. If, however, in addition to residence and an intent to remain, acts should be committed, or expressions made which would, in effect, amount to a renunciation of United States citizenship and a willingness to submit or adopt the obligations of the country in which the person concerned resides, such as the acceptance of public employment, or engaging in the military service of the country, these acts may be treated by the Federal Government as expatriation, without actual naturalization (2). It has been held, however, that a woman born in the United States, of Federal citizens, who married a foreigner residing in the United States, and who never became a citizen thereof, and who subsequently moved with her child (also born in the United States) to the country of her husband's allegiance, where she remained until her husband's death, is still a citizen of the United States, and so also is her child (3).

II. STATE CITIZENSHIP.

Federal citizenship is one thing; State citizenship is another. A person may be a citizen of the United States and not a citizen of any particular State (4). This proposition is susceptible of reversal. A person may be a

(1) 9 Atty. Gen. op., 359.
(2) 14 Atty. Gen. op., 295.
(3) 10 Atty. Gen. op., 321.
(4) 2 Blatchford, 162.

citizen of a particular State and not a citizen of the United States. There is in our political system a government of each of the several States and a government of the United States. Each is distinct from the other and has citizens of its own, who owe it allegiance and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those under the other (1). The government of the United States, although it is within the scope of its powers supreme and beyond the States, can neither prevent nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction. All rights or privileges that cannot be so granted or secured are left to the exclusive protection of the States (2). It is State citizenship and not Federal citizenship that gives the holder a right to vote. Constitution of the United States does not guarantee a citizen the right to vote. That right depends entirely upon the laws of the State in which the citizen resides (3), and it may be given under these laws (as it is in many States) to persons who are not citizens (4) and to persons ineligible to citizenship (5. While the

(1) 3 Hughes, 13.

(2) 92 U. S., 542.

(3) 1 Hughes, 148; 3 Hughes, 456.

The

(4) Each State, in the exercise of its loyal and reserved sovereignty, may place foreigners or other persons on a footing with its own citizens as to politic 1 rights and privileges to be enjoyed within its dominion.-19 How., 393 See, also, the chapter on "Voting Qualifications in the S veral States."

(5) Such as Indians who have severed their tribal relations, but who have not been admitted to citizenship by act of Congress.