coinciding with the progress of society. The fudden aggrandizement, the influence, and the example of the kingdom of Pruffia, did not push them beyond their just and natural limits. In all human probability, the armies of the remaining nations would have been no fmaller, their fyftems of finance no lefs complicated, the relations between their efforts and their ftrength no other than they actually were, had this new meteor never risen in the political firmament of Europe.

The elevation of Pruffia has therefore, in no refpect, been productive of pernicious confequences. It has in no shape tended to subvert the system established by the treaty of Weftphalia. As to the first fundamental object of this treaty, the internal constitution of the empire, fo far has it been from destroying it, that it has, on the contrary, more than ever confirmed and secured it. With regard to the next principal object which it had in view, the relations between France and Germany; it has occafioned no other changes in these, than fuch as were generally beneficial, and not effentially prejudicial to France; fuch as France herself defired, and contributed to effect by her own political measures. It is equally untrue, that Pruffia has disturbed the general balance of Europe: the has only kept pace with

the

the continual progrefs made by other nations, without forcibly or unnaturally haftening it;

fhe has only displayed in a peculiar degree, the art of making this progrefs with more regularity, more order, and more firmnefs than others, perhaps than any others engaged in the fame career.

If after all this we confider, that Pruffia, from the moment when fhe was firmly established, became a bulwark to all the weft of Europe, against the attempts of Ruffia, and a neceffary counterbalance to that empire, after its intervention in the general affairs of Europe; that a power fo happily fituated in the centre of the reft, and in the midft of their principal connexions, presented a conftant barrier to every violent ufurpation; that if the fafety of France could require any additional fupport, it received a new one from the elevation of Pruffia; that the powers of Europe, if duly fenfible of their true and common interefts, muft have found it neceffary to create such a state, if fate or genius had not anticipated them; if we further confider what extenfive benefit has been produced during half a century, by the influence of a nation governed with fo much energy and wifdom, with refpe& to the general cultivation of mankind, induftry, literature, the art of government, and every thing exalted and valuable among men ; and what ufc

ful leffons, what glorious examples, it has afforded to its cotemporaries, and to pofterity :-it will not be easy to conceive how the elevation of Pruffia can ever be ranked among the immediate, or even collateral causes of the decay and diforganization of Europe.

The third great event, which, according to the Author, invaded the fyftem established by the treaty of Weftphalia, and at length totally fubverted it, was the prodigious increase of the commercial and colonial system in all parts of the world.

This event (if that may properly be called an event, which is in reality no more than a gradual and still progreffive expansion of human activity) has affected the interefts of fociety, more than any other which has taken place in the political world fince the treaty of Weftphalia. It has opened an immenfe field to the industry, the arts, the ideas, the enjoyments, and the paffions of mankind: it has multiplied the inftruments of power, the combinations of politics, and the objects of defire; and by adding to the charm and fplendour of dominion, it has been the caufe of jealoufies, diffenfions, and, doubtlefs, of wars. It has even been the groundwork in the interior of flates, of a great revolution in all the relations

of

of fociety. The only question is, whether, confidering all this in the most comprehensive point of view, it will appear to be an evil; and particularly, whether the maintenance of a political balance in Europe, is abfolutely incompatible with all these changes; whether the existing political constitution must neceffarily have been fubverted by the increased commercial and colonial system; whether it really was fo, and whether the extenfion of European commerce, and the multiplication of trans-European connexions, led to the decay and diforganization of all nations, and finally paved the way for their future fubjec

tion.

I shall only here examine the general relations of this question: the Author has entered upon it with a view almost exclusively to England, which has given him an opportunity of introducing at the beginning of his book, in a very ingenious and brilliant manner, his favourite theme :— "That during the laft 150 years, England has

oppreffed the industry of all other countries, "has threatened their independence, and encouraged their mutual diffenfions; and that, "in fact, the only danger which menaces Eu

rope, arifes from the tyrannical pretenfions of "the commercial politics of GREat Britain." He has used this favourable opportunity in its utmost extent. I intend to follow a different me

thod.—The question, What has England hitherto been in the general system of Europe? What may, or should it continue to be? or (as it has been the custom to exprefs it of late) "the problem, How to render the existence of the British empire compatible with the interefts and existence of the remaining ftates?" is, without doubt, one of the most important which at the present moment can occupy the politician. It is on this account that it appears most advisable to me, to unite, as much as poffible, under one head, all that relates to this great question, which I fhall endeavour to comprise and arrange in fome general points of view, in a chapter devoted to the present relations of the leading powers. I promise, however, in the mean time, not to pass over a fingle obfervation of any confequence made by the Author; nor to leave unexamined any argument to be found in his work.

It is my opinion, that the extenfion of the commercial and colonial fyftem cannot have been a neceffary cause of the fubverfion of the federal conftitution of Europe, and that it could only have proved the accidental cause of fuch a fubverfion, by means of accidental errors or miffortunes, which might in any other circumftances have been made or experienced. This refiş upon the following grounds: