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volution, the balance of power was an empty term." When the Turkish war broke out, the internal diffenfions of France were fuch as to prevent her taking any active part in foreign political relations; yet, notwithstanding this temporary annihilation of fo important a counterpoife, the plan concerted between the powers of Auftria and Ruffia was defeated by a judicious combination of the remaining members of the federative system. The efforts of Pruffia, England, and Sweden, in behalf of the Porte, prevailed to fave her; and the two powerful allies were ftopped in the midst of their brilliant victories by the active and energetic politics of the mediating ftates. Auftria reftored all her conquefts at the peace of Sziftow. I cannot but look upon this treaty as among the most remarkable events in modern history. The utility of a fyftem of equilibrium, the efficacy of fede rative principles, the triumph of negotiation over arms, have been seldom fo confpicuously and fo honourably displayed; and, what is still more important to our prefent investigation, the date of this event is the very fame at which the federative fyftem is faid to have reached the last flage of diforganization and decay-the year 1790.

PRUSS

PRUSSIA,

I have spoken, in my first chapter, of the political relations of this power, and its beneficial influence on the general fyftem of Europe; and it is unneceffary to repeat what I there have faid. There is, however, among the general obfervations of the Author of L'Etat de la France, upon the changes which have happened in the eighteenth century, one that applies more directly to Pruffia than to Ruffia or England, and which appears to require a nearer examination,

He affures us, in the first place, that he is far from intending to condemn the efforts and fuccefs of those princes, who, taking advantage of favourable circumftances, have raised the nations under them to unexpected power and greatness; but the fource of the evil (fo he continues after this very equitable declaration), "the fource of the evil is not in the changes themfelves, or in the views that led to them. It lay in the improvidence of other governments, careless of adapting their own fituations to the new state of things produced by these events; and in the shortfightedness of statesmen, unmindful that an established federative fyftem affords its members, if they know their own intereft, ample means to prevent every increase of power tending to deftroy the harmony of their relations,

relations, or to make every fuch aggrandizement contribute to the maintenance of thofe relations, without recourfe to the violent measures of deftructive and uncertain war.'

A moment will be fufficient to convince us, that, if applied to the elevation of Pruffia, this cenfure is utterly unfounded*. There was only one power in Europe impelled by great and obvious interests to refift, in every poffible manner, the aggrandizement of Pruffia; and the history of the three Silefian wars will show whether that power beheld it with indifference. All other nations, without exception, were more or less interested in its favour; though fome may at first have been averse to it. Every man fufficiently acquainted with the principles of political equilibrium to calculate its confequences, must surely have defired fuch a change. We have already feen what advantages refulted from it to Ger many; and I have on more than one occafion pointed out wherein it has been favourable to France. Had not Pruffia rifen to her prefent greatnefs, the independence of the Empire muft have been continually exposed to the dangers of

*It must evidently be directed, principally, if not exclufively, to that event. For how the aggrandizement of Ruffia, a natural confequence of its civilization, or how the ascendant of England, the effect of her commerce and colonial poffeffions, could in any way have been prevented, is not very easily imagined.

internal

internal ufurpation or foreign cabal. The Emperor would have aimed at absolute dominion on the one hand; or, on the other, the greater part of Germany would have been a scene of inteftine divifion and confufion, or a prey to the fatal influence of a foreign power. This was fufficient to convince every enlightened statesman, whatever his personal inclinations, or particular principles, that the influence of Pruffia was not only useful, but neceffary. There had only been one opinion in Europe on this point for more than thirty years. It was referved for our times to give additional confirmation, and even an unforeseen extent, to this opinion; and to show that circumftances might exift in which the power of Pruffia could be useful even to Auftria; could in fome respects contribute even to her fecurity and welfare. This, in the year 1789, would have been called a paradox: in the year 1802, it is a fimple, evident, incontrovertible truth.

There appears, therefore, no fufficient reafon to have induced the potentates of Europe to prevent, in time, the extenfion and confolidation of the power of Pruffia. They would have acted very unreasonably, had they opposed a change fo favourable to their general interests; and the only thing they can properly be reproached with, is, their having too long refufed

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to acknowledge those interests; too long and too abftinately combated the acceffion of a weight fo happily adapted to the federal relations of the general fyftem. It would be no lefs unjust to affert, that the formation of this new power was not "made to contribute to the maintenance of the due harmony. between the former members of the federal conftitution;" for Pruffia was as hap pily and wifely interwoven in the general interests, as, any of its former component parts, and perhaps more fo.

The aggrandizement of this kingdom has only in one refpect been prejudicial to the tranquillity and fecurity of the reft. It could not.immedi ately acquire the extent and solidity neceffary to enfure the permanence, and anfer all the wants of its new position. Its territory, at the end of the seven years war, was not sufficiently extenfive for the part it had to act; its revenues were not adequate to the efforts required by its fituation; its provinces were fo divided, as to increase the difficulty of defending its frontiers. This induced a neceffity of extending its limits; and progreffive aggrandizement became in a certain degree the conftant political maxim of Pruffia, as the only means of maintaining her influence, and a rule of self-prefervation. This restless activity frequently rendered her a fubject of appre3

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