PART I.

Of the political Situation of Europe before and at the breaking out of the French Revolution.

THE queftion, Is a fystem of public law neceffary for Europe*? (that is, a conftitution among nations, founded upon treaties, and as much as poffible defined and fixed by mutual compact,) seems, in the prefent state of the science of politics among all civilized nations, to require no further difcuffion. The very nature of the focial conftitution; the tendency of the human mind towards law and order, in preference to anarchy and confufion; the bare idea of independent states bordering on each other, fufficiently answer fuch a question. I may therefore, without any danger, pafs over what the Author has faid upon this subject; to all which I fhall not hesitate to fubfcribe in common with every civilized being,

The following will therefore be the only queftions requiring our attention in proceeding to examine the system of our Author.

* Vide Note A.

ift, How far did the treaty of Weftphalia establish, as he afferts, a fyftem of public law in Europe?

2d, How far have any fubfequent events contributed to diffolve the fyftem of public law, founded by the treaty of Weftphalia; particularly thofe events in the eighteenth century, to which the Author afcribes fuch pernicious effects?

3d, Did there exist any system of public law in Europe, at the commencement of the French revolution?

CHAP. I.

How far did the Treaty of Weftphalia eftablish a Syftem of public Law in Europe?

THE two following conditions are indispenfably neceffary to any treaty intended to be the bafis of an univerfal and perpetual system of public law, even were it only to comprise the nations lying within a certain large circle; fuch, for example, as the extent of Europe. In the firft place, it must comprehend all the states of this circle

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circle in all their feveral relations; and, in the next place, it must contain provifions, whereby all future revolutions in the internal fituation and external connexions of these states should be foreseen, confidered, and taken into the account of the whole political fyftem.

It is only neceffary to ftate these two conditions, to point out the impoffibility of fulfilling them. The difficulty of defining to the fatiffaction of all, in one and the fame negotiation, in one and the fame treaty, the various and intricate relations, wants, and pretenfions of fo great a number of independent nations as Europe alone contains, is evident; and even though this difficulty should not be confidered absolutely infurmountable, it will hardly be thought extraordinary that no ferious attempt should yet have been made to overcome it. The treaty of Weftphalia had only to encounter a part of it; yet, seven years were confumed in negotiation before it was brought about; and the formation and, conclufion of this treaty was, and is ftill, esteemed a master-piece of diplomatic ability.

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But even fuppofing that all the states of Europe could enter into fuch a compa, as would serve for the basis of a general federative conftitution; would ascertain all their rights, and de

fine all their relations; yet, there would still be wanting the means of ensuring the everlasting duration of such a compact, or of providing with any degree of certainty for its future existence. The fate of empires is no less subject to viciffitude than that of individuals: owing to the inequality of their respective progrefs, to the unexpected growth of new branches of industry and power, to the perfonal and family connexions, and, ftill more, to the opinions, the characters, and the paffions of their rulers, there must neceffarily happen many changes which no human wisdom can forefee, much lefs provide againft. Each of these changes occafions new wants, new plans, and new pretenfions; endangers or destroys the former equilibrium; prefents fresh difficulties to the ftatefman, and renders it neceffary to revise the system, and define the respective rights anew. Impoffible as it is for the code of laws of any nation to provide for every poffible future variation in the character and manners, the civil, moral, and domeftic condition of its inhabitants; even fo impoffible is it to establish an eternal fyftem of public law, by means of any general treaty, however numerous the objects which it may embrace, with whatever care and ability it may have been combined.

The

The treaty of Weftphalia could not be expected to perform that which is beyond the reach of any treaty. It was fo far from justifying fuch expectations, that it did not even fulfil the first condition of a compact designed to be the bafis of a federative system; it did not include all the nations even then important; and still less did it embrace all the relations of the states which it did include. Indeed it was hardly poffible that it should; for at the time when this peace was negotiated, the science of politics was a perfect franger to the greater part of those important problems which prefented themselves for solution in the following century; it was not then fufpected how fruitful a principle of social improvement lay concealed in the darkness and confusion of those times; and the meritorious ftatesmen who immortalized their names by this treaty, having only the experience of the age in which they lived, contemplated the fituation and wants of Europe in a comparatively confined and imperfect point of view. It did not even come within their intention, much lefs was it the object of their pride, to lay a folid foundation for the public law of Europe.

There can be no doubt but that the treaty of Weftphalia has been mifconceived, as often as it has been confidered in this light. The peculiar