Personal service not necessary. By post. veyance. Within reasonable time. Where parties live in different places. held inenfrient, Harley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 39; S. C. 6 D. & R. 505; Sharter. Palmer, 7 Bing. 629; S. C. 5 M. & P. 475, in error, 1 Bing. N. C. 194. A mistake in describing the bill or parties thereto will render the notice invalid, if it be such as is likely to deceive or mislead, Beauchamp v. Cash, 1 D. & R. N. P. C. 3. 135. A notice need not be in writing, Goldsmith v. Bland, Bailey, BIIs, 276, 5th ed.; Housego v. Corne, 2 M. & W. 348; a message sent to the party's counting-house, if he be a merchant, within the usual hours of business, is sufficient, although no person is in attendance, Cross v. Smith, 1 M. & S. 545; Bancroft v. Hall, 1 Holt, N. P. C. 476; so a message left at the dwelling-house of a private person is sufficient, Housego v. Corne, 2 M. & W. ub. sup.; see further, infra, as to the mode of giving notice. 2. The Mode of giring Notice. 136. Personal service of a notice is not necessary, it being sufficient if sent to the counting-house, Cross v. Smith, ub. sup.; the usual and safest mode of conveying notice is by post, Walter v. Haynes, Ry. & Mood. 149, recognized and distinguished in Mann v. Moon, Ry. & Mood. 249; if there be no post, then the ordinary conveyance may be used, Muilman v. D' Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565; and the employment of a private agent will suffice, provided he actually give notice, or take steps for that purpose, Bancroft v. Hall, ub. sup. As to the evidence which may be required of notice having been given, see Hetherington v. Kemp, 4 Campb. 194; Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Bing. 715; S. C. 1 M. & P. 750. In the case of a foreign bill, it is sufficient to send notice by the first regular ship, Muilman v. D' Eguino, ub. sup. 3. Time when Notice ought to be given. 137. As a rule, notice must be given within a reasonable time; and although a bill may not require to be presented for acceptance at all, as a bill payable at a certain time after date, yet, if it be presented and dishonoured, notice is requisite, as in the case of non-pay ment, Roscow v. Hardy, 2 Campb. 458. What is a reasonable time is a question of law, depending on the facts of each case, Durrach v. Savage, Holt, 113; S. C. 1 Show. 155. Where parties live in different places it is sufficient to send off notice of dishonour the day following that on which the party receives intelligence of the dishonour, Williams v. Smith, 2 B. & A. 496; where both the parties live in the same place, notice must be given in time to be received in the course of the day following the day of dishonour, Bray v. Hadren, 5 M. & S. 68, recognizing Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 3; it being Bills of Exchange. laid down, "as a rule of practice, that each party in whose hands a dishonoured bill may pass should have one entire day for the purpose of giving notice," per Ld. Ellenborough, C. J., Bray v. Hadwen, ub. sup.; and Sunday or any holiday is not to be reckoned as a day for giving notice, Lindo v. Unsworth, 2 Campb. 602; and a banker with whom a bill is deposited is, for the purpose of notice, to be considered as a distinct holder, and has a day to give notice to his customer, Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388; but it lies on the plaintiff Burden of proof to shew that notice has been given in due time, Lawson v. Sherwood, lies on plaintiff. 1 Stark. 314. A delay in giving notice of dishonour may be excused Delay, when by the holder's ignorance of the indorser's residence or place of busi- excused. ness, Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East, 433; from his absconding or otherwise, Walwyn v. St. Quinton, 1 B. & P. 652; Cross v. Smith, 5 M. & S. 545; provided that the holder can shew that he has used due diligence to discover where the party was to be found, Bateman v. Joseph, ub. sup. ; and what is due diligence was held to be a question for the jury, ib., overruling, as it seems, on that point, Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167; Sturges v. Derrick, Wightw. 76; but to institute the inquiry the day after intelligence of the dishonour is sufficient, Browning v. Kinnear, Gow, 81. 4. The Person by whom Notice should be given. ment. 138. Notice of dishonour of a bill can only be given by some party To be given by to the instrument, the object of the notice being to apprize the person party to instruaddressed that the bill has been dishonoured, and also to inform him that the holder looks to him for payment, Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167; he need not be an actual holder at the time, provided that, as a Need not be party, he may be intitled to call for payment, Chapman v. Keane, 3 actual holder. Ad. & Ell. 193; but see Ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves. 597; and notice even from the acceptor himself has been deemed sufficient Rosher v. Kieran, 4 Campb. 87; but a stranger is incompetent to give it, Stewart v. Kennett, 2 Campb. 177; so notice given by the owner or any other party enures to the benefit of all who stand between that party and the person receiving it, Wilson v. Swabey, 1 Stark. 34; Bayl. Bills, 254, 5th ed.; and notice may be given by any agent, who holds the bill, as a banker or attorney, in his own name, Woodthorpe v. Lawes, 2 M. & W. 109. 5. The Person to whom Notice should be given. 139. As a rule, when a bill is refused acceptance or payment, notice General rule. of such refusal must be given to any party to whom the holder wishes to have recourse, Lafitte v. Slatter, 6 Bing. 623; S. C. 4 M. &. P. Bills of Exchange. No notice to one not a party to bill. To one of seve ral parties sufficient. Notice to person 457; but a person who is not a party to a bill cannot complain of want of notice, unless he can shew that he has been prejudiced thereby, Swinyard v. Bowes, 5 M. & S. 62; therefore the same strictness of proof of notice is not necessary to charge a guarantee as would have been necessary to support an action upon the bill itself, Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 242. Where parties are jointly liable, notice to one is notice to all, Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Campb. 82. 140. Notice to any person in attendance at a counting-house or in attendance. place of business is sufficient, Crosse v. Smith, 1 M. & S. 554; because it is the duty of a merchant to have some one there in attendance, ib.; and, therefore, if a counting-house be shut up and no one there, knocking and endeavouring to make one hear is sufficient notice, Howe v. Bowes, 16 East, 112; and, on the same principle, notice to the wife of a person, not a merchant, has been deemed sufficient, Housego v. Cowne, ub. sup. ; but notice to a man's attorney is not sufficient, Crosse v. Smith, ub. sup. Notice in case 141. Notice of a dishonoured bill to a bankrupt as drawer, before of bankruptcy. the choice of assignees, is good, though dishonoured the morning before the meeting; the bankrupt, until assignees are chosen, representing his estate, Ex parte Moline, 19 Ves. 216; S. C. 1 Rose, 303; therefore where the holder of a bill did not give notice of the dishonour to the drawer, or leave it at his house, nor attempt to give notice to his assignees; held, that the bill was not proveable under the commission against the drawer, Rhode v. Proctor, 4 B. & C. 517. Notice to drawer when necessary or otherwise. 142. When a bill is dishonoured, notice must be given to the drawer, if the holder means to resort to him for payment. A drawer is, however, not discharged by the want of notice, where the bill has passed into the hands of a bonâ fide indorser for value, who had no knowledge of the dishonour, Dunn v. O'Keefe, 5 M. & S. 282. There is also another exception to the rule that want of notice discharges the drawer, when the latter has not effects in the hands of the acceptor at the time when the bill is drawn, Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T. R. 405, recognized in Claridge v. Dalton, 4 M. & S. 226; but if the drawer has effects in the drawee's hands at the time the bill was drawn, although such effects were withdrawn before it became due, held, nevertheless, that he was intitled to notice, Orr v. Magennis, 7 E. 359; or at the time when it was presented, Blackhan v. Doren, 2 Campb. 503; or if the drawer has effects in the drawee's hands at any time between the drawing of the bill and its becoming due, he is intitled to notice, although he had not any such effects at the time of bill drawn, Hammond v. Dufresne, 3 Campb. 145; S. P. Thackray v. Blackett, ib. 164; but want of effects excuses from the Bills of Exchange. necessity of presenting for payment as well as of notice of dishonour, Terry v. Parker, 6 Ad. & Ell. 507; S. C. 1 Nev. & Per. 752. 143. Where a bill is accepted payable at a particular place, it is Notice to acnot necessary, in an action against the acceptor, to prove notice of ceptor not nedishonour to him, Treacher v. Hinton, 4 B. & A. 413. cessary. 144. If the holder of a bill looks to the indorser for payment, it is Notice to inincumbent on him to give notice of the dishonour of the bill, other- dorser necessary. wise the indorser will not be liable, Blezard v. Hirst, 5 Burr. 2672; sers. and if notice of the dishonour regularly circulate back to a distant Where there are indorser or to the drawer, he is liable either to his indorser or to the several indorholder; thus, where the holder on the day of dishonour gave notice to the fifth indorser, and the fifth on the following day to the fourth, he on the day after to the third, the third on the next day to the second, and the second on the following day to the first, held, in an action by the second against the first, that due notice had been given, Hilton v. Shepherd, 6 East, 14, n.; so if the drawer of a bill receives due notice of its dishonour from any person who is a party to it, he is liable upon it to a subsequent indorser, although he had received no notice from him, Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Campb. 373; S. C. 2 Taunt. 373. Want of effects in the hands of the drawee does not in the case of an indorser, as in the case of the drawer, render notice of dishonour to the latter unnecessary, Goodall v. Dolley, 1 T. R. 712; S. P. Wilkes v. Jacks, 1 Peake, 202, 209; but this rule is applicable only to the case of fair transactions; therefore, where the indorser knows that the acceptor is insolvent at the time that he gives the indorsement, he is not intitled to notice, De Berdt v. Atkinson, 2 H. Bl. 336; but see Smith v. Beckett, 13 East, 187. 6. Consequence of Neglect to give Notice. 145. Want of due notice of dishonour discharges the drawer and Discharge of indorser from all liability, whether on the bill or on the consideration drawer &c. for which the bill was paid, Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130; and the want of notice is a complete defence to the action; and evidence tending to shew that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, is inadmissible, except in an action against the drawer who had no effects in the hands of the drawee, Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. 158; S. P. Hill v. Heap, D. & R. N. P. C. 59. Where there are several indorsers to a bill, and one of them is guilty of laches, that discharges all antecedent parties, Marsh v. Maxwell, 2 Camp. 210, n. 7. Excuse and Waiver of Notice. 146. Death, or any dangerous accident rendering notice impossible, Excusing notice. 532 Bills of Exchange. No notice to 457; but a person who is not a party to a bill cannot complain of want of notice, unless he can shew that he has been prejudiced thereby, Swinyard v. Bowes, 5 M. & S. 62; therefore the same one not a party strictness of proof of notice is not necessary to charge a guarantee as would have been necessary to support an action upon the bill itself, Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 242. Where parties are jointly liable, notice to one is notice to all, Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Campb. 82. to bill. To one of several parties suf ficient. Notice to person 140. Notice to any person in attendance at a counting-house or in attendance. place of business is sufficient, Crosse v. Smith, 1 M. & S. 554; because it is the duty of a merchant to have some one there in attendance, ib.; and, therefore, if a counting-house be shut up and no one there, knocking and endeavouring to make one hear is sufficient notice, Howe v. Bowes, 16 East, 112; and, on the same principle, notice to the wife of a person, not a merchant, has been deemed sufficient, Housego v. Cowne, ub. sup. ; but notice to a man's attorney is not sufficient, Crosse v. Smith, ub. sup. Notice in case 141. Notice of a dishonoured bill to a bankrupt as drawer, before of bankruptcy. the choice of assignees, is good, though dishonoured the morning before the meeting; the bankrupt, until assignees are chosen, representing his estate, Ex parte Moline, 19 Ves. 216; S. C. 1 Rose, 303; therefore where the holder of a bill did not give notice of the dishonour to the drawer, or leave it at his house, nor attempt to give notice to his assignees; held, that the bill was not proveable under the commission against the drawer, Rhode v. Proctor, 4 B. & C. Notice to drawer when necessary or otherwise. 517. 142. When a bill is dishonoured, notice must be given to the drawer, if the holder means to resort to him for payment. A drawer is, however, not discharged by the want of notice, where the bill has passed into the hands of a bona fide indorser for value, who had no knowledge of the dishonour, Dunn v. O'Keefe, 5 M. & S. 282. There is also another exception to the rule that want of notice discharges the drawer, when the latter has not effects in the hands of the acceptor at the time when the bill is drawn, Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T. R. 405, recognized in Claridge v. Dalton, 4 M. & S. 226; but if the drawer has effects in the drawee's hands at the time the bill was drawn, although such effects were withdrawn before it became due, held, nevertheless, that he was intitled to notice, Orr v. Magennis, 7 E. 359; or at the time when it was presented, Blackha v. Doren, 2 Campb. 503; or if the drawer has effects in the drawee's hands at any time between the drawing of the bill and its becoming due, he is intitled to notice, although he had not any such effects at the time of bill drawn, Hammond v. Dufresne, 3 Campb. 145; S. P. Thackray v. Blackett, ib. 164; but want of effects excuses from the |