diately after its organization, was the preparation of an elaborate memorial, under date of December 3d, strongly representing to congress the unfitness of the federal system for Chile. This paper is not very ably drawn up, and does very imperfect justice to the ques. tion; but it served at least to ma. nifest the feelings of the assembly, and to produce its influence as their public act. But the proceed. ings of the assembly of Santiago attracted still more attention. On the 15th of March they addressed a communication to the Chilian congress, covering a copy of the instructions given to their deputies, requiring them to oppose every disposition, constitutional or partial, which tended to establish a formal federation, and to destroy the national unity and consolidation; and instructing them to support a sys. tem which, while it preserved the unity of the republic, should confer on the provinces the power of overseeing and regulating their internal economy. The delegates from Santiago desired the advice of the legislative body respecting their duty; and much dispute ensued upon the point both in the public journals and in congress. But as the assemblies had no authority to give instructions to their delega. tion, being constituted only to discuss and examine what congress should submit to them for ratification, not to dictate in anticipation

what should be so submitted, it was decided that the instructions had no binding force upon the de. puties as members of congress. Every one will admit the propriety of this decision; but yet the assuming to give instructions in congress, of which not only Concepcion and Santiago, but Coquimbo also was guilty, was a small usurpation of authority, compared with other acts which followed. The assembly of Santiago voted that no law of the national congress should be enforced within the limits of the province without their approbation. That of Colchagua took possession of the national funds contributed by the province, and appropiated them according to their own judgment. All these proceedings indicate the nature of the evil, and clearly show in what way it should be remedied. The dissolution of the provincial assemblies would be the first step towards improvement. But this would be of little avail, unless the idea of introducing the federal system, where every thing is adverse to it, should be abandoned at once. From the political disquisitions in the Chilian journals, and the memorials of Concepcion and Santiago, there is no difficulty in collecting a fair view of the question.

They who supported the federal system, and who must have done it in good faith, however much mistaken in their views, objected to the plan of centralism, that, al

though more simple, more expeditious, and better adapted to prevent political convulsions, yet that, in the ordinary course of things it must be prone to degenerate into the worst of all forms, a tyrannical oligarchy. It tends, they said, to centralize riches in the point where the supreme powers reside, impoverishing the other departments, because while the for器 mer offers splendour, conveniences, security, and the place and means of aspiring to rank and honour, the latter is destitute of all attractions fitted to allure the rich and enlightened, and affords no room to exhibit opulence, nor any objects of pursuit worthy to sustain ambition. All the advantages of government would be likely to fall upon the provinces near to the capital; all its disadvantages upon the remoter departments of the republic. This, however, was mere general theory, and its inapplicability to the actual condition of Chile will appear from a brief examination of the other side of the question.

Chile is a single undivided state, containing a population of about a million, and having thus far proved wholly incompetent to support the expense of one administration. Its internal organization bears no analogy whatever to the United States. The Chilian federalists, in proposing the frame of government of this country as their model, have failed to reflect that they proceed

in direct opposition to the principle, which actuated our wise and prudent forefathers. Federation in Chile signifies a new thing, and must produce results entirely contrary to those, which it produced in North America; as any one may perceive who observes and compares the different circumstances of the two countries, without being deceived by names. Here, where

the object was to organize states, which had been separate and independent from their very foundation, federation did produce, and must necessarily produce, union. But there, where the political system has always been one kingdom, presidency, or capitania, federation must produce the opposite effect of division.

If the example of the United States were adduced as proving the utility and convenience of confederating all the new states of Spanish South America, it would certainly be strictly applicable; and it might be easy to demonstrate the expediency of such a combination of sister states, which are now separate in point of fact. Federation among them would constitute an easy, honourable, useful, convenient, and truly fraternal mode of union. But to establish the principle of confederation among those communities which are denominated the provinces of Chile, would only be to introduce a temporary anarchy, whose duration it would

be impossible to predict, but which it is probable would soon terminate in a scene of disorder, that would tempt some skilful soldier of fortune to interpose, and make him. self master of the government.— These provinces possess neither adequate size, population, and revenues, nor a sufficient number of freeholders and men of intelligence, nor the habit of living in such a state of separation. Nor could the requisite provincial interests exist in Chile, without creating a set of narrow little politicians, who would be driven to rely upon personal or family prejudices and local antipathies for the support of their influence. The consequence would be, a general spirit of political dissolution, feebleness, and confusion, instead of that harmonious order, that regular subordination, that cheerful and well understood concert, that systematic march of public institutions, that independent, yet mutually adjusted action; all which so remarkably characterize the political organization of the United States.

What the operation of the federal system in Chile would be, according to the sentiments of the central party there, in which we fully concur, may be explained by an obvious illustration. sachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the other original states, had been regulated ever since their settlement as distinct

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governments, perfectly indepen. dent of one another, although occupied for the most part by English emigrants, and subjected, more or less, to the direct control of one common head, the king of Great Britain. When the war of the revolution broke out, they confederated for the common defence, and afterwards combined more closely in a permanent federal union. But suppose they had each revolted from the English government se. parately, and, whether contempo. raneously or not, yet without any organized concert; and had thus individually fought their way to independence, having no common leader, no common congress, no common army, and no common funds for prosecuting the struggle ; the more powerful and successful occasionally lending aid to their less fortunate neighbours, but each and all still retaining their old se parate distinct political systems:

In such circumstances, what should we think of a proposal to subdivide New-York, or Pennsyl vania, into twenty little states, to be confederated together under a general state government, giving to each of their counties, for instance, a legislature, a judiciary, and an executive authority, and all the expensive train of public officers ne cessary to constitute an indeper. dent government: Would not this be considered as doing wanton violence to the existing social system

tntroducing disunion and separation under the name of confederacy, and subjecting the people to a weight of public taxation, absolutely in supportable even in the rich and thriving country where we have the happiness to live? And yet this Utopian scheme, which, when applied to a state of things wherewith we are familiar, is so manifestly wild and chimerical, is precisely what the central party are seeking to avert from Chile. To endeavour to apply to Chile, which is and has always been one, a constitution designed for a cluster of states, they justly describe as nothing better than cutting up Chile into a collection of Cilicitos.

Mexico and Central America, it is true, have adopted the federal system; and a portion of the Colombian s profess to desire it, as well as some of the provinces of Buenos Ayres. But in Mexico, the proceedings of the last year show how difficult the find it to accomodate themselves to a system so new and strange to them. Central America thus far has tended to prove, that federation must be the natural union of several states, not the artificial division of one, in order to operate advantageously for the public good; because its constitution, by forcing upon the country five seperate governments, and their attendant expenses, has led to nothing but confusion and civil war. Colombia

and Buenos Ayres afford cases more favourable to the introduction of the federal system than any other South American states; the latter, on account of the distance and extent of its provinces; the former, because it is in fact an ag. gregation of territories formerly distinct. The distracted condition of the provinces of La Plata may be ascrib. ed in great part to the Brazilian war; and therefore we omit to allege their case in support of our position. Colombia being composed of the three separate Spanish governments of Caraccas, Santa Fé, and Quito, would easily admit of being subdivided into the same number of states, and of thus receiving the federal form of administration. Yet even there, the better opinion seems to favour the central sys. The cause of independence in Colombia was almost desperate, until Venezuela and New Grenada united preparatory to a consolidated government; and under its in. fluence the prosperity, power, and respectability of the republic had gone on gradually increasing, until the parricidal insurrection of Paez in Venezuela, and the machinations of the adherents of military despotism on the Pacific, interrupted the auspicious march of affairs. So that while the theoretical argument among the Chilians is decidedly in favour of continuing the central system there, the central party derive strength and confi.

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dence from, or at least are not answered by, the example of the other South American republics.

Upon this question are the parties in Chile divided. The plan of the federal party is to introduce their system gradually, and by piecemeal. They feel convinced, by the proceedings of the provincial assemblies, that an attempt to introduce the federal system in all its parts at once, will surely defeat the whole plan. Hence they desire, by the gradual adoption of separate portions of it, to accustom the people to its operation; thinking they will thus be finally brought to ap. prove it in the whole. The central party, on the other hand, insist upon the inexpediency of the entire system, the unfairness of endea. vouring to corrupt and deceive the people into it, by means of govern. ment patronage, and government presses; and the necessity of immediately completing a suitable constitution, which may put an end to the embarrassments of the republic.

The government of Chili, therefore, still remains to be organized on a permanent footing. Three attempts have been made to effect this purpose, at three successive periods since the revolution commenced; but all of them have proved unsuccessful. In 1823, the first constituent congress framed a constitution, which was destroyed in a few months after it had been

solemnly sworn to, with great pomp, and extraordinary ceremony. Its imperfect organization and division of the powers of government; its great complexity, which rendered a multiplicity of details neces sary; its great obscurity; and other marking defects, conspired to bring it to a speedy and unregret. ted end. Another constituent congress was installed in 1824, under auspices apparently more favoura ble; but unhappily, it became, ere long, a prey to the spirit of faction, and led to scenes of scandalous anarchy, which produced its dissolution by means not the most regular, but the irregularity of which was overlooked, in consideration of the necessity of the measure. We pass by the congress of 1825, because it was, in fact, nothing but an assembly of the province of Santiago; and was dissolved by the executive, for its attempts to exercise a national authority, to which it was not entitled. Finally came the third constituent congress of 1826, which promised much better things than either of its predecessors, and subsisted for the uncommon period of a year. But the causes which we have explained at some length, defeated the objects of this congress, and led to its dissolution, leaving the country as destitute of any fundamental law as ever. Its last act was the appointment of a national committee of eight persons, author