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than carload soap were excessive and unjust, and that so much of the complaint as sought the restoration of fourth-class rates on less than carload lots should be sustained.
APPLICATION OF CARLOAD RATES TO COMBINED SHIPMENTS.
In the case of the Buckeye Buggy Company v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company et al. (9 1. C. C. Rep., 620), lately decided by the Commission, the complainant desired to forward in one carload vehicles of its own manufacture and some manufactured by another concern but forwarded to it for the purpose of shipment to the same consignee. The question was whether vehicles manufactured by different concerns, but combined and offered to a railroad company by one party as consignor for transportation and delivery to one consignee were entitled to carload rating. The carriers use the Official Classification, which provides that commodities of different kinds may be combined in carloads and shipped at the carload rate, the rate applicable to the entire carload being the highest which would be applicable to any commodity in the carload, and the minimum weight being the highest which would be taken by any article in the carload. But the operation of this rule is restricted as follows:
In order to entitle a shipment to the carload rate, the quantity of freight requisite under the rules to secure such carload rate must be delivered at one receiving station, in one day, by one consignor, consigned to one consignee and destination; and receiving agents will not receive and consign shipments of property consisting of several consignments to delivering agents for distribution among several consignees, nor will agents at destination distribute such shipments of property among two or more consignees. It was also provided that the rule would apply only on freight from one consignor or owner and would not cover less than carload shipments of property from two or more consignors combined into carloads by forwarding agents claiming to be acting as shippers. The term “forwarding agents” is described in the classification to mean agents of actual consignors of the property or any party interested in the combination of less than carload shipments of articles from several consignors into carloads at points of origin.
The position taken by the carriers in this case was that in all cases the owner of the property must deliver it to the carrier for shipment; that the fact that the consignee became the owner under the contract of sale upon delivery to the carrier for shipment was not enough, but that he must have actually taken possession of the goods and have become the owner in fact before the delivery to the carrier.
The broad question presented had reference to the right of a carrier, in according a carload rating, to look beyond the transportation itself to the ownership of the property transported. We did not find it
necessary to decide that question in this case. Our decision was limited to the question whether the conditions are different when the consignor is the actual owner of the entire carload from what they are when the consignee is such owner. The Commission held that before allowing the carload rating to a carload shipment a carrier is entitled to require that the goods shall be loaded at one time and place, that a signed bill of lading shall be issued, and that the shipment shall be from one consignor to one consignee; but that when the goods are so loaded and by the terms of sale become the property of the consignee upon delivery to the carrier, the carrier has no right to inquire whether the consignee obtained his title from one or several owners; and if it accords the carload rate in case the consignor is the owner, failure on its part to extend the same privilege when the consignee is the owner violates sections 1, 2, and 3 of the act to regulate commerce.
We directed, therefore, that the rule in the defendant's freight classification covering the application of carload: rates to carload lots should be so modified as to accord the same rating to consignor and consignee when the condition of ownership after the property is delivered to the carrier is the same. Upon the question whether a carrier may distinguish between a forwarding agent and the actual owner of the goods no opinion was expressed.
A like ruling was made by the Commission in the case of the C. S. Bell Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company et al., which was heard at the same time.
STOP-OVER PRIVILEGE ON SHIPMENTS OF GRAIN.
In the matter of rates and practices of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company in the transportation of grain to Vicksburg, Miss., shipped from or through St. Louis, Mo., and East St. Louis, Ill. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 373), the Commission held that a published tariff regulation permitting grain to be shipped through from points of origin to final destination with stop-over privilege in East St. Louis for cleaning, sacking, or other legitimate purpose, the shipment afterwards carrying a proportional or balance of a through rate from East St. Louis, was not shown to be objectionable in this case, but that that part of defendant's tariff regulation which provided that grain might be shipped to East St. Louis on a local rate and forwarded as a new shipment from that point on a 12-cent proportional rate to Vicksburg, Miss., and common points disregarded the higher 15-cent local rate from East St. Louis to those destinations and was not in accord with the doctrine announced by the Commission in a previous decision rendered “in the matter of alleged unlawful rates and practices in the transportation of grain and grain products by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company and others (7 I. C. C. Rep., 240).”
In the case of W. H. H. Macloon v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company et al. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 642) the complainant alleged that he was unlawfully charged a passenger fare from Boston, Mass., to Janesville, Wis., which was $2 more than he had paid and which was in force for the transportation of passengers in the opposite direction from Janesville to Boston. This fact alone was relied upon to support the charge.
The Commission found that the two rates had no necessary connection or relation, and the fact that a rate over a road or line in one direction is materially higher than the rate on the same class of traffic over the same road or line and between the same points in the opposite direction does not establish prima facie the unreasonableness of the bigher rate, and it did not appear that any unjust discrimination resulted from the difference in charge. The complaint was dismissed.
In the case of Samuel K. Behrend v. The Washington Southern Railway Company (9 I. C. C. Rep., 637) the complainant was charged a through fare from Washington, D. C., via Richmond, Va., to Moseley, Va., of $4.65. At that time there was in effect a rate of fare of $3.50 from Washington to Richmond, and another rate of 65 cents from Richmond to Moseley, amounting to a total of $4.15. The complainant claimed that the difference between the through rate and the lower combination, amounting to 50 cents, was unlawful. It appeared, however, that the local rate from Washington to Richmond applied only to a particular station in that city, and not to the point of junction with the railway running from Richmond to Moseley, and that the difference of 50 cents between the through rate and the combination rate represented a transfer charge from the station of the initial road in Richmond to the station of the connecting road running from Richmond to Moseley. The complaint was dismissed.
In a proceeding entitled “Charles Roth v. Texas & Pacific Railway Company” (9 I. C. C. Rep., 602), the railway company submitted to the Commission a claim for overcharge which had been presented to the company by Roth arising out of less than carload rates applied to a mixed carload of lemons and pineapples shipped by him from New Orleans to Dallas, Tex., over the defendant railway.
In submitting the matter to the Commission the general freight agent of the railway company said:
This appears to be a very aggravated case, and with a view to ascertaining what this company should do to adjust the matter, the papers are respectfully referred to you. We will be guided by your judgment or suggestions.
Examination of the company's tariff covering a mixed carload of green fruit showed that bananas and pineappies might go as a mixed
carload and that lemons and bananas mixed would take the carload rate. It also appeared that pineapples could be mixed in a carload with almost any other kind of green fruit mentioned in the tariff except lemons or oranges. As bananas and pineapples might be mixed and lemons and bananas might be mixed, it was difficult to see why the complainant was not correct in contending that lemons, bananas, and pine apples might be mixed in one carload and carried at the carload rate. Technically, however, lemons and pineapples could not, under the tariff, be forwarded together in a carload and receive the benefit of the carload charge.
The Commission thought, with the general freight agent of the railway company, that this was a clear case of injustice, which was probably due to an oversight in constructing the tariff and which ought to be remedied by an amendment of the tariff so as to provide for mixed carloads of lemons and pineapples as well as mixed carloads of other kinds of fruit as specified therein, and by reparation to the complainant.
The railway company was directed to revise its tariff in this respect and refund to the complainant the amount collected in excess of what the charge would have been if the carload rate had been applied to complainant's shipment as a mixed carload.
In Ulrick & Williams v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company et al. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 495), the complainant asked for reparation on account of rates on ice from Hillsdale and other points in Michigan which, prior to September 3, 1901, were higher over the line formed by defendant roads for the shorter distance to Springfield than for the longer distance to Columbus, the rates to both points having been made the same on that date. It appeared, however, that other and shorter delivering lines competed for the traffic to Columbus and that the short-line distance to Columbus was less than he short-line distance to Springfield. The complaint was dismissed.
In the case of Daish & Sons v. Cleveland, Akron & Columbus Railway Company et al. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 513), the complainant alleged unjust discrimination against it in favor of other shippers by reason of unreasonable delay in forwarding and delivering a carload of hay consigned from Condit, Ohio, to Washington, D. C., and prayed for an award of damages. No unjust discrimination or undue prejudice to the complainant was shown, however, and the complaint was therefore dismissed.
In the case of Sayles v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company et al. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 492), a question of classification arose upon the transportation of two cows and a calf from Newport, Vt., to Pawtucket, R. I. The through rate charged was 55 cents per 100 pounds on an estimated weight of 8,500 pounds.
The carriers conceded that billing the freight to destination at this through rate and estimated weight of 8,500 pounds, or 7,500 pounds,
which weight was used over a portion of the line, would be erroneous under the general but not universal rule of using the combination of local rates where they aggregate a less amount than the through rate.
During the pendency of the proceeding the complainant died, and after the hearing complainant's executor received from the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company $22.90 in settlement of the claim for reparation. In view of this fact and the limited amount of
. testimony submitted regarding the question of classification as well as the extent of territory and traffic which the question affected, an order was entered dismissing the case without prejudice to any future proceeding involving the same question.
EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO COMPLY WITH THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
In October last the Commission rendered a report and opinion upon a number of applications by carriers for extension of time within which to comply with the provisions of the act of March 2, 1903, relating to safety appliances. (9 I. C. C. Rep., 522.) This decision is stated under the head of “Safety appliances” in this report.
INJUNCTIONS RESTRAINING CARRIERS FROM DEPARTING FROM THEIR PUBLISHED TARIFF
Upon investigations made by the Commission in regard to rates charged by carriers operating east of the Missouri River to the Atlantic seaboard upon the transportation of grain and grain products, dressed meats and packing-house products (which investigations were described in our last annual report), applications were made in 1902 upon request of the Commission and under direction of the Attorney-General to the United States circuit courts for the northern district of Illinois and the western district of Missouri for injunctions restraining certain common carriers from departing from their established tariff rates upon those commodities and any other interstate traffic in which they may be engaged, and on March 24, 1902, temporary injunctions were granted by Circuit Judge Grosscup in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, the Illinois Central Railroad Company, Michigan Central Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania Company, the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, and Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company.
On March 25, 1902, like temporary injunctions were granted against the Wabash Railroad Company, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, the Chicago &
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