nor need the notice state at whose request it is given. Shred v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401; and see as to time and manner, Williams v. The Bank U. S. 2 Peters's Rep. S. C. 96; Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Peters's R. 551.

Where the holder of a bill of exchange seeks to recover against the endorser on default of the acceptor, the notice given to the endorser should state, expressly, or by necessary implication, that the bill has been dishonoured. It is not sufficient to say that the holder looks to the endorser for payment. Solarte et al. v. Palmer et al. 7 Bing. 530; Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 339.

On the non-payment of a bill of exchange, the notary public left a notice of the same for the endorser at a private boarding house, where the endorser lodged-having called at the boarding house to see the endorser, and enquired of his fellow boarder for him, was informed he was not in, he left the notice with the fellow boarder, requesting him to deliver it to the endorser. Held, sufficient notice to the endorser, to charge him with the payment of bill. Bank of U. S. v. Hatch, 6 Peters, 250.

In an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange dated "Manchester," Held, that it was sufficient evidence of his having had notice of its dishonour, to prove that a letter, containing such notice, had been put into the post-office in London, directed to him "Manchester." Mann v. Moors, 1 Ry. & Mo. 249. Cor. Ld. C. J. Abbott.

A notice of protest to an endorser, that the note of A. B. endorsed by him, is protested for non-payment, although the date be not given, and the amount be erroneously stated in the notice, 'tis nevertheless sufficient to put him on enquiry, and if from the facts appearing on the trial, the jury are satisfied that the endorser was not misled by the notice, they are authorized to find a verdict against him. Bank of Rochester v. Gould, 9 Wend. 279; Reed v. Seixas, 2 Johns. Cas. 337; Ontario Bank v. Petrie, 3 Wend. 456; Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 9 Peters, 33.

A letter from the holder to the endorser of a bill threatening legal measures unless the bill be paid, does not amount to notice of dishonour of the bill by the acceptor :such notice ought, in express terms, or by necessary implication, to convey full information that the bill had been dishonoured. Solarte et al. v. Palmer et al. (Dom Proc.) 1 Bing. N. C. 194; 27 Eng. C. L. R. 351; Hartley v. Case, 4 Bar. & C. 339, affirmed. Notice of dishonour may be given on the same day the bill or note is dishonoured. Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102; Lindenberger v. Beall, 6 Wheat. 104; Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Campb. Cas. 193; Hine v. Allaly et al. 4 Barn. & Adolph. 624. It need not be given by the next practicable post; [the parties residing in different towns,] it is sufficient if given by the post on the day following that in which the party receives intelligence of the dis

honour.

Williams v. Smith, 2 Barn. & Ald. 496, 500; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. R. 230; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 449.

When action may be instituted. Mead et al. v. Engs, 5 Cowen, 303; Geill v. Jeremy et al. 1 Moo. & Malk. 61; Ogden et al. v. Dobbin et al. 2 Hall's R. 112; Osborn v. Moncure & Robinson, 3 Wend. 170; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. R. 401; Wilson v. Williman, 1 N. & M'C. 440.

Where a note is made payable at a particular place and the endorser resides there; if the holder remits it to his agent at such place for payment, and it is dishonoured, the agent is not bound to give notice of the dishonour to the endorser; but his duty is to give notice to his principal, who may then give notice to the endorser, and if given in due time after the principal has received notice, the endorser is bound. Due notice given by any party on a bill or note, is notice to charge in favour of all subsequent parties. Bank of U. S. v. Goddard, 5 Mason, 366; Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 9 Peters, 33; Brown & Son v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 37; Dickens v. Beal, 10 Peters, 572.

An endorser of a promissory note, who, before the note falls due, takes an assignment of all the estate of the maker to meet his reponsibility, is liable, although no demand of payment is made, and notice of non-payment is not given. Mechanics Bank of N. Y. v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165; Barton v. Baker, 1 Serg. & Raw. 334; and authorities in these cases cited.

The maker of a negotiable promissory note, before it comes to maturity, assigns all his effects, for indemnity of the endorser as to part of the amount of the note, and it does not appear, that the effects assigned, are adequate to such indemnity: the endorser's acceptance of this assignment, does not exempt the holder from the duty of making due presentation of the note, and demand of payment at the place appointed in respect to the endorser. Watkins v. Crouch &c. 5 Leigh, 522; and see May v. Boisseau, 8 Leigh, 165, 213.

A promissory note payable at a particular place, must be demanded at that place, in order to give the holder a right of action, if it be not paid; and in declaring thereon, the demand must be alleged and proved. Sanderson v. Bowes et al. 14 East, 500; Dickinson v. Bowes et al. 16 East, 100; Bowes et al. v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30. Berkshire Bank v. Jones, 6 Mass. R. 524; Woodbridge et al. v. Brigham et al. 12 Mass. R. 403; 13 Mass. R. 556, S. C.

When a note is payable at a bank, it is not necessary to make any personal demand on the maker elsewhere. It is his duty to be at the bank within the usual hours of business to pay the same, and if he omits to do so, and a demand is there made of payment by the holder within those hours, and it is refused or neglected to be made, the holder is entitled to maintain his action for

such dishonour. If on the day when the note became due, the bank being the holder thereof, and it being payable there-after the usual banking hours were over, it was delivered to a notary by the officers of the bank, they informing him at the time, that there were no funds there for the payment of the note-'tis a sufficient demand of payment. U. S. Bank v. Carneal, 2 Pet. U. S. R. 543; Fullerton v. The Bank of U. S. 1 Peters R. 617; Nichols et al. v. Goldsmith, 7 Wend. 160; Ogden et al. v. Dobbin et al. 2 Hall's R. 112.

And, if a bill of exchange be accepted payable at a particular place, the declaration in an action on such bill against the acceptor, must aver presentment at that place, and the averment must be proved. Rowe, esq. v. Young, (house of lords, 1820,) 2 Brod. & Bing. 165, and the opinions of the judges; App. 180, in which this subject is very fully considered.

This case in K. B. is rep. 5 Mau. & Selw. 291, and 'tis also reported (as heard in the house of lords) by Bligh, in his 2 vol. of Rep. of Cases in the house of lords, p. 391-511, to which is added a review of the cases on the subject: Best, Richardson, Garrow, Holsoyd, Baley, Richards, Abottfor opn. K. B. Parke, Wood, Dallas, Eldon, Redesdale, contra. This case overruled Fenton et al. v. Goundry, K. B. 13 East, 459, and established the opinion of the C. B. in Gammon et al. v. Schmoll, 5 Taunt. 344.

But it is not essential in an action against the acceptor, to aver that the bill was presented at maturity. If, however, the acceptor has sustained damage on account of the non-presentment at maturity, as by the failure of his banker at &c. he will be discharged. Rhodes v. Gent, 5 Barn. & Ald. 244. 'Tis presumed, on same principle, that the maker of a note, payable at a particular place, will not be released by holder's neglect to demand payment at maturity, if no injury result to maker from such neglect but to charge an endorser of a bill or note, the presentment for payment should be made, at the time and place of payment; and the declaration should so aver the fact, which must be proved.

Where a bill is drawn payable at a particular place, and the drawee accepts it payable at that place; in an action against the drawer, presentment to the acceptor at that place, must be proved. Gibb v. Mather et al. (Exch.) 8 Bing. 214; and The Bank of the U. S. v. Smith, (Feb. T. 1826,) 11 Wheat. 171-5. Thompson, J. delivered court's opinion, after noticing the cases of Rowe v. Young and Wolcott v. Van Sanvoord, said, this question, (as to the necessity of the averment,) "does not necessarily arise in the case now before the court, and we do not mean to be understood as expressing any decided opinion upon it, although we are strongly inclined to think, that as against the maker and acceptor of such a note or bill, no averment or proof of demand of

payment at the place designated, would be necessary."

Query, whether, in the case of a note made payable at a particular bank, it is necessary, in an action on it against the maker, to aver and prove due presentation of the note for payment, at the bank? Barrett v. Wills, 4 Leigh, 114.

On a promissory note payable at a particular house, an actual or virtual demand must be made at such house, and notice of non-payment there, must be given to the endorser, to charge him; and, notwithstanding the maker's insolvency and absence from the com'th, unless the note is at such house on the day when it becomes due, in the hands of some one authorized to receive payment, no demand, actual or virtual, can be made. Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132.

In an action against maker and endorser of a negotiable note, negotiable and payable at the Farmers Bank of Virginia, it is not necessary to aver and prove due presentation of the note and demand of payment at that bank, in order to entitle the plf. to recover of the maker; but it is necessary, in order to entitle him to recover against the endorser. Watkins v. Crouch & Co. 5 Leigh, 522.

As against the endorser of a bill or note, such averment and proof, is, in general, necessary. But where the bill or note is made payable at a particular bank, and the bank itself is the holder, such averment and proof may be dispensed with; and all that is necessary is, for the bank to examine the account of the maker with it, in order to ascertain whether he has any funds in its hands. See Wolcott v. Van Sanvoord, 17 Johns. R. 248, 260; Caldwell v. Cassidy, & Cowen, 271; Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. R. 389.

A presentment at the particular place, is equivalent to presentment at the house of the maker, or acceptor; and, therefore, in an action against the acceptor of a bill, thus accepted, it is not necessary to prove a notice of non-payment, at that place, to the acceptor. Treacher v. Hinton, 4 Barn. and Ald. 413.

As to bankers, it is established with reference to a well known rule of trade, that a presentment out of the hours of business is not sufficient; but in other cases the rule of law is, that the bill must be presented at a reasonable hour. Between 7 and 8 o'clock, P. M. held reasonable. Wilkins et al. v. Jadis, 2 Barn. & Adolph. 188; and see Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Campb. N. P. R. 527; Morgan v. Davidson, 1 Stark. N. P. R. 114; Trigg's adm'x v. Newnham, 10 J. B. Moore, 249; see Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 413.

As to the materiality of the place of payment, in a promissory note; and of the effect of a specification by the maker, made subsequent to an endorsement, on the obligation of the endorser; see the very elaborate opinions of Spencer, C. J. in Bank of America v. Woodworth, 18 Johns. R. 315, 321; and of Kent, Ch. in S. C. (in error) 19 Johns. R. 393, 418.

§ I. Any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise :

1st. That he shall have declared on oath or affirmation, before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit courts, [See post. § III.] of some one of the states, or of the territorial districts of the United States, or a circuit or district court of the United States, three years, [Two, by act of 1824, postea.] at least, before his admission, that it was bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity of any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, whatever, and particularly by name, the prince &c. whereof such alien may, at the time, be a citizen or subject. [But, any alien, being a free white person, who was residing within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the 18th of June, 1798, and the 14th of April, 1802, and who has continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, without a compliance with this 1st condition. (Act of March 26, 1804, c. 400,

(1) Parol evidence, of the arrival of an applicant five years prior to the application, is insufficient, the certificate of the report made in pursuance to the second section of this act is the evidence of that fact; and this report, must have been made five years before the application for naturalization. Anony. 1 Peters's R. 457. This report is conclusive evidence of the period of arrival, but is not the only admissible evidence of the fact. The law does not exclude other evidence, nor does it require that the alien shall report himself within any limited time after his arrival. Five years may intervene between his arrival and report, and yet the report will be valid. Spratt v. Spratt, 4

Peters's R. 393.

(2) A certificate by a competent court, that an alien has taken the oath prescribed by the act respecting naturalization, it must be presumed, nothing appearing to the contrary, that the court before whom the oath was taken, was satisfied as to the character of the applicant, as to moral character, &c. The oath, when taken, confers on him the rights of a citizen, and amounts to a judgment of the court for his admission to those rights. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 182.

The various acts on the subject, submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as

2dly. That he shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare, on oath or af firmation before some one of the courts aforesaid, that he will support the constitution of the United States, and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince &c. whereof he was before a citizen or subject; which proceedings shall be recorded by the clerk of the court.

3rdly. That the court admitting such alien shall be satisfied, (1) that he has resided within the United States five years, at least, and within the state or territory where such court is at the time held, one year at least; and it shall further appear, to their satisfaction, that, during that time, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same :(2) Provided, That the oath of the applicant shall, in no case, be allowed to prove his residence. See post. Act 1816, § 2.

4thly. That in case the alien, applying to be admitted to citizenship, shall have borne citizens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judg ment is entered on record as the judgment of the court-and, if it be in legal form, it closes all inquiry; and, like every other judgment, is complete evidence of its own validity. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters's R. 393. It is improper to look behind an order of a court of record admitting a foreigner to citizenship, for any irregularity in the previous proceedings, unless the irregularity be such as to shew plainly that the requisitions of the act of congress have not been complied with therefore, where the record of the previous declaration made by the party, omits to state that it was made on oath, and that it included a renunciation of allegiance to foreign princes, &c., such omission does not invalidate the subsequent act of naturalization founded on such previous declaration. If the certificate of naturalization states that the party "took the oath in such case required by the act of congress," it shall be held, [conclusively,] to import that he took the oath required in the very words prescribed by the act, and the naturalization, therefore, complete. Towles's case, 5 Leigh, 743.