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bring it into general circulation but the restoration of confidence. What was the cause that had produced the failure of that confidence, but the folly into which the whole nation had been plunged during the last two years? A man purchased 3 per cent stock at 96, and he now found they were down at 73. He could not tell the reason for this fall, nor could any man help him to discover it. People had been led on, step by step, to the giddy eminence from which at length they had so unexpectedly fallen. This was the work of the government, and this was a reason -to him a conclusive one-why the government should interfere to remedy that evil which they, and they alone, had occasioned. Another reason, and not a less forcible one, was, that nothing, in fact, was wanting but public confidence. By adopting the measure which he had proposed, the House would effectually restore that confidence. Persons were flocking from all parts of the country with complaints of the distress which they felt, and imploring ministers that something might be done without delay for their relief. He did not doubt that these applicants were received with perfect urbanity and good manners, by the right hon. gen tleman and his colleagues, for nothing else could be experienced from those who at present directed his majesty's councils. But, they were answered, one and all, with the greatest coldness, that the government could and would do nothing for them, let their distress be what it might. But, said the right hon. gentleman to the suffering commercial men who beset him

chased, they run the risk of being paid off at par, when the resources of the country should be so flourishing as to permit of that measure; but, did they ever think that they should become losers of their money by means of an artificial rise of the value of stock produced by the combination of the Bank and the government? He knew he might be told, that all men were masters of their own stock, and that if they sustained any loss, they did so with the full exercise of an option to continue their stock upon the new terms, or to be paid off at par. But this was not true to the extent at which it was stated. It was not true of families, of children, of trustees, and of others who had not the power of removing the stock in which they were interested. These persons were all of them entitled to consideration and to redress, if it could reach them; but that was impossible. This had all been brought about by the extravagant language which ministers had indulged in, and by the immense issues of paper from the Bank. The leading topics of the last year were the actual and prospective wealth of the country; and what was the consequence? If ever the commercial world could claim the assistance of the government, it was now; because all that they were at present suffering was brought upon them mainly and substantially by the conduct and language of government, and by that alone. The right hon. gentleman now said, that they ought to have foreseen what would happen. Did he foresee what would happen? If he did, what could he say about the reduction of the 4 per cents? If he did not, why was not the commercial world entitled to all the relief that the government could give them? And what justice was there in the right hon. gentleman's turning round upon them, and refusing that relief, because they had not foreseen that which no man could foresee but those who were behind the curtain? Never had there been, he believed, an occasion so pressing as that which the House was now called upon to consider; and never had any proposal been made which held out a fairer prospect of success than that which the right hon. gentleman had rejected. He was at a loss to conceive any reasonable grounds upon which that refusal could be justified. There was nothing in the circumstances of the country that should induce it. Day by day money was said to be coming in, and nothing was wanting to

"I'll tell you what I'll do. I can't give you any relief myself, but there is a gentleman who lives not far from here, and I'll give you a letter of recommendation to him. He'll lend you as much money as you want." And thus it was that the ministers got rid of their importunate claimants for relief, by turning them over to the Bank of England. But then, when they got to the Bank of England, they were not much better off; for when they offered to deposit their goods as a security for the loans they asked, the Bank said, "No; we don't deal in those commodities-they are not in our line." But, then, upon for reading the charter of the Bank the first time, of course-it was discovered, that they did possess the power of lending money on goods. They had been all wrong for a hundred years past, and it was just now found out, that they were

the most proper people in the world to be applied to in the present crisis. Now, he did not mean to deny that the Bank had a right to lend money in this way, although the discovery was so recent a one. The right hon. gentleman said there was no doubt of it; but an honourable Bank director said, that the power was only a permissive one. The right hon. gentleman had a satisfactory answer to that, when he told him that the power was just the same as that which enabled them to deal in gold and bills of exchange. This was true, and could not be denied here or elsewhere. He believed that, when that power was given, the Bank got it from the government-not because they were entitled to it, but because they thought it right (and he could not blame them) to get all the power they could. Well, then, upon reading the charter a little further, it was discovered (he spoke only upon the authority of an extract which he had read in the newspapers, but he believed it was correct), that the Bank directors had a right to sell the goods on which they lent money, for the purpose of procuring repayment of their loans. It was clear, therefore, that the Bank had the power which it was now proposed to call upon them to exercise; but it nevertheless appeared to him, that they were, of all others, the most unfit to be so called upon at the present moment. What authority could they have that would enable them to discharge the office which would be thus forced upon them? The right hon. gentleman opposite abjured the commission; but, had the Bank any power to administer an oath? No. Had the commission? Yes. The act gave them that power which was necessary for them to investigate the applications made for relief, and to examine all parties on oath. The Bank could have nothing of that sort. They could only issue money; and that, he contended, was not the thing that was wanted. It was confidence alone; for of money there was plenty. The inefficacy of any thing that could be done by the mere advance of money by the Bank had been lately shown in the most striking manner. Within the last fortnight, two millions had been advanced by the Bank for the purpose of Exchequerbills. And what good had been the result? None, that he could perceive. He could not see that any rise had taken place in the public funds; and to an ignorant man, and one of limited capacity

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like himself, that was the only criterion by which he could form an opinion. What greater good, then, would be derived from the issue of three millions more in the same way? What reason was there to believe that the loan of money in this manner would relieve the distress? How was it to be issued? On the application of the parties, and in the same manner as by the commissioners in 1793? That, indeed, was what he wished, but that he sure would be impossible. The charter of the Bank enabled them to lend money, but not to inquire who wanted it. On the former occasion persons had been engaged in the commission who had means of knowing, and could examine into the correctness of the applications? How was the Bank to be enabled to do this? How was partiality in the disposition of the money to be prevented? How were they to know that they did not lend to the wrong instead of the right men. How could they ascertain that they were not issuing a quantity of their notes which would be made use of in Stock-exchange, or in other speculations, and wholly independent of the sufferi. 7 interests of commerce? What had been done in 1793 was, as it ought to be now, not so much to furnish a supply of money as to restore the paralyzed spirit of trade, by reinstating the confidence of the country. The good effects of that measure were felt instantly, and would be so now. If he possessed at this moment 10,000l. worth of goods, and went to his banker for an advance of money, he would tell him, that he was very sorry that he could not let him have a farthing in the present depressed state of the market. But if he went to him and said, "I have got 5,000l. in Exchequer bills," he would find immediately that his banker and his other friends would come forward to his assistance; and without even sending his Exchequer bills into the market, he would be enabled to continue his business merely by the restoration of confidence. The general effect of the measure would be, to call out money which now lay dormant,

locked up of which there was an immense quantity, and much more than the wants of the country required. The advance of 2,000,0007. had been in vain, and that of 3,000,000l. would be the same. If the government thought they could get rid of their difficulties for ever, by staving them off now upon the Bank of England, and by doling out 3,000,000l. through

now no foreign loans to swallow up the gold; and the apparent scarcity was caused only by that wild and senseless disposition to get gold for the purpose of looking at, or rather of hoarding it. This it was that had withdrawn the gold from circulation, and the want of confidence kept it in its retreats. It was in the power of the government, and beyond the reach of any other power, to effect that restoration. The example of that which had been done in Mr. Pitt's time, and which some whom the wreck of time had spared could well remember, ought to teach the government, that that was the safe and advantageous course for them to pursue. That had proved the salvation of the country. This which they wanted to substitute for it in the present emergency was mere milk and water. He knew very well that nothing was more easy for a man who possessed much less talent than the right hon. gentleman, to answer his speech, and to throw a mist over all he had said. But he was satisfied that the substantial good sense of the country was with him. And he was satisfied that if he could poll the persons interested in the prosperity of the country on the question, whether there should be three millions issued by the Bank of England, or two millions by the government in the form of Exchequerbills, he should have an immense majority in favour of the latter. They knew

their hands, they were quite mistaken. The measure of 1793 produced permanent and substantial good; there could be no difference of opinion on that subject. The result of that measure was now a matter of history. A formal report was made of it to the House, by which it ap. peared that 2,000,000l. had been issued, not a farthing of which had been lost; that it restored credit and confidence, alleviated and extinguished the distress, and put 4,000l. into the pockets of the country. In the face of this example, the ministers of the present day chose to say they would do nothing towards the relief of the distress, but that the Bank of England might. Why, then, if the Bank of England did, let them have the credit, and them only. The government, who had led the country into its present distressing condition, pursued a line of conduct which it required some temper even to discuss. If they thought fit to reduce, or rather to raise the Bank of England by this measure, in which they parted with a power which properly belonged to them, they would find hereafter ample cause to repent it; because they could have invented no means so likely to increase the power of the Bank to an extravagant degree. The Bank would be able to make out a case which would not only entitle them to great privileges; but, when the renewal of their charter came to be discussed, they would be known to be so useful, from their being the source from which alone assistance was to be procured in the time of need and distress, that all voices would be in their favour. The country gentlemen, who, of course, always voted very honestly, would support them; and particularly if there was any existing, or the prospect of any impending distress, every one would wish to be well with the only power who had the will as well as the means of assisting them. The Bank would be then remembered in this crisis to have done all they could, while the government had done nothing. The Bank had already opened their coffers for the assistance of the country. They had advanced 2,000,000l. It was true that had done no good, because it had had no effect in doing that which he could not sufficiently impress upon the House was the only thing wanting at this time; namely, the restoration of general confidence. It was obviously impossible that there could be any real want of money. There were

it was universally known-that the issue of Exchequer-bills would remedy the evils under which they suffered. That measure had been tried, and the result had been most satisfactory and successful. The one which it was now proposed to adopt was a mere dexterous device-a trick of special pleading on the construction of the Bank charter; and its sole object was to raise the directors of the Bank into a higher description of pawnbrokers. The directors submitted to it; but only because nothing else was to be done, and because living, as they did, in the city, surrounded by the commercial distress, they could not see it without attempting to relieve it by such means as the government chose to permit them to use. The ministers had plainly avowed their determination to do nothing, and something must absolutely be done. He was satisfied that the right hon. gentleman felt as keenly as any one the nature of the existing distress; and he regretted that he could not be prevailed on to adopt that which was a simple, approved, and effica

To the chancellor of the Exchequer he gave his warmest and heartiest thanks for the wholesome and sound measure which he had introduced, for the purpose of putting an end to the issue of one and two pound notes; but yet it was necessary to consider the effect of that measure. When ministers said, they had nothing to do in producing the difficulties of the country, but that the country had brought them all on themselves, might not the country say, "We did not pass the bill for putting an end to small notes?" Did not ministers know that the effect of that measure would be the abstraction of seven or eight millions from the currency, which must necessarily aggravate the existing distress? Again he must guard himself from being misunderstood. He did not object to the measure in question. He gave the chancellor of the Exchequer all possible credit for his recent policy. The right hon. gentleman might depend upon him for support. So long as the right hon. gentleman stood by himself, he would stand by him, like a good and faithful soldier. He could not, however, conceal from himself, that the abstraction of a considerable portion of the currency-the effect of the Promissory-notes bill-had caused much distress; and yet ministers would not consent to do that which alone could relieve the sufferings of the country. It was almost heart-breaking to a man, between whom and bankruptcy there was but a small line, to be told, "Government cannot afford you assistance, because it would be contrary to principle to do so." Was not the very plan recommended by ministers contrary to principle? It was absurd to talk of principle on such an occasion. It was, after all, only a question of convenience and good sense. It was necessary to consider what was best to be done on one day and what on another. To talk of principle with respect to the issuing of Exchequer-bills or Bank-notes, was, in his opinion, quite ridiculous. On account of the respect which he felt for the chancellor of the Exchequer, and the interest which he took in his character, he had felt it necessary, on the present occasion, to state the reason why he preferred an issue of Exchequer-bills to an issue of notes by the Bank. Past experience induced him to form a good opinion of the former measure; but, even if it had not past experience in its favour, he thought it was more likely to do good than the latter. He thought that if the

cious remedy. He (Mr. Tierney) was not one of those who contemplated Mr. Pitt's character with any great degree of admiration; but this he would say, that he was a great man-that he took the most comprehensive views of the financial situation of the country. Indeed, he never knew a man whose mind was more capable of embracing large concerns, and forming a correct judgment upon them, than Mr. Pitt, when he was himself. Ministers had Mr. Pitt's example to follow. On the present occasion, he was himself a Pittite. He called upon ministers to follow the steps of Mr. Pitt by issuing Exchequer-bills. Ministers assigned no other reason for not doing so, except that they had discovered the principle of Mr. Pitt's measure to be bad-the country, they said had no claim to the assistance of government, because they had brought their distresses upon themselves. Now, he thought that the country had the strongest claim upon the assistance of government, because they were made to believe by ministers-innocently enough, perhaps, on their parts-that their prosperity knew no bounds. Ministers thus encouraged those speculations in foreign loans, and other things, at which they were now so indignant. Ministers said, that the persons who had been engaged in extravagant speculations ought not to receive any assistance; but, might they not obtain it from the Bank under the arrangement now proposed? This could not happen if government would consent to issue Exchequer-bills; because the commissioners who would have the power of examining on oath, might ask the persons applying for assistance how they had incurred their difficulties. The Bank could enter upon no such inquiries, but would confine themselves to the lending of their money upon goods, or upon personal security. It appeared, from the report of the commissioners of 1793, that the greater part of the relief then afforded was advanced to the applicants rather upon the securities given by others than upon goods deposited by themselves. As he had stated on a former occasion, he was not one of those who participated in the sort of alarm which had been raised from one end of the kingdom to the other. Much misunderstanding existed, in his opinion, with respect to the present situation of the country. He wished it not to be supposed that he blamed ministers for the measures which they had adopted.

Bank lent money upon goods, they would be placed in a very invidious situation. On the one hand, they would be vested with extravagant powers; and on the other hand, their affairs would be placed in a state of jeopardy, of which it was perhaps impossible to foresee the consequences. The Bank must necessarily make large issues of paper, if the arrangement now proposed was determined upon; and it was not impossible that those persons who were on the watch to re-establish the system of currency which parliament had expressed its determination to put down, might hail such a measure with pleasure, and turn it to their advantage. The Bank was not in a situation to venture upon any hazardous experiments. The exchanges, it was true, were in our favour at present; but there were many reasons why they should not continue so. In the first place, it was unnatural that they should continue in our favour, at a time when there was an increased issue of paper money; and the moment any thing unnatural was discovered in our situation, it was for a wise man to suspect all that might happen. He apologized to the House for having trespassed so long on their attention. His only object was, to afford relief to the country. He viewed its present situation with an aching heart. He knew that many of the most amiable men in the country were at the present moment in a state of jeopardy. Could nothing be done to save them? Let not the chancellor of the Exchequer expose himself to have it said of him, at a future time, that there were sufferings which he might have averted from the country, and would not [cheers].

or against it, the more objectionable it appeared to his mind. The right hon. gentleman had stated his case with the most perfect fairness - he had mixed nothing, not an atom of asperity with any of his observations; and though he had felt it his duty to comment on the conduct of government, and to blame them for the course which they had taken, he had done so in a manner of which no one had a right to complain, and indeed, as far as he was himself concerned, he felt personally beholden to him. The right hon. gentleman had however said, that government was called upon to take the particular course which he recommended, because, in his view, the conduct which they had previously held, and the language which they had previously used, had contributed, in a great degree, to produce that state of things to which it was now desirable to apply a remedy. Certainly the circumstances stated by the right hon. gentleman might make it incumbent on government to apply a remedy; but not any particular remedy, unless it could be clearly shown that the benefit to be derived from that particular remedy was so greatly superior to the evil consequences that might be apprehended from it, as to over-balance all the objections which could be offered to it. It was because he did not think that the remedy proposed by the right hon. member was of that description, that he could not bring himself to adopt it. He, however, was not disposed to admit, that the course which government and parliament had pursued for the last few years, deserved all the imputations which the right hon. gentleman had thought fit to The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, cast upon it. The right hon. gentleman that if he thought any consideration which accused government of having been the he could give to the subject, after the full original cause of the reduction of the rate consideration which it must be obvious he of interest, which he said had led to exceshad already bestowed upon it, could in- sive speculation. He had charged upon duce him to think that the mode of pro- ministers the having produced that by oriceeding which the right hon. gentleman ginal acts of their own. What were those recommended was the most advisable to acts? Various of the acts which the be pursued, he could assure him, that no right hon. gentleman and others made a unwillingness to abandon his own system, matter of blame to government, took no fear of any reproaches which might be place after the particular event to which cast upon him for want of firmness or the present distresses of the country were consistency, would induce him to abstain ascribed. The right hon. gentleman asfrom adopting it; but the more deliber-cribed the reduction of the 5 per cents ately he had considered the measure which the right hon. gentleman recommended as best calculated to effect what they all had in view, in relation either to the arguments which were advanced for

to some mysterious combination between government and the Bank. Under what circumstance did government propose that measure? It was proposed under the direct sanction of a parliamentary com

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