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the battle-flags of the First Napoleon's countless hosts were furled in 1815 arose over the European sky. "A million of men were placed under arms between the Baltic and the Alps; a million more arming in France and Italy. Russia announced her sense of the coming crisis by throwing forward her troops in unusual force towards the Polish frontiers, and Turkey turns yet another screw upon her suffering treasury, in order to “mobilize" her whole disposable military power. Most significant and most disastrous of all, the Emperor of the French, after a studied silence of months on the European situation ” spoke out, after his own mystical and portentous fashion, and declared his “ detestation" of the "treaties of 1815," and by a single phrase terrifies the enterprise and industry of Europe and pricked the bubble which was just ready to burst.

Such were the causes operating to produce the panic which resulted in giving so severe a shock to commercial credit and effecting a decided halt in the steady progress of English industrial enterprise. Here it had less influence than much smaller and less formidable revulsions which have from time to time occurred in Europe. Some twenty millions of gold have been exported to England since we received the first news of her financial troubles, and still there has been no derangement of general business, and little interruption of public confidence. Even at the Stock Exchange, the ever sensitive quotations of Government and other securities have been sustained better than might have been expected. It is not, indeed, improbable that but for one perturbing cause, we should scarcely have felt the shock at all, except in cotton, and in a few securities which are largely held in England. The circumstances to which we refer as having chiefly caused the recent perturbation in the money market, is the sale by the Government of thirty millions of gold in the short space of ten days. Some of our readers may be at a loss to understand how these sales of gold should produce such derangement. We will try to explain.

It is well known that under the Sub-Treasury law of 1842, the government requires all payments to be made to it in gold or in other legal tender money. Consequently, the sale of thirty millions of gold would draw into the vaults of the Treasury forty millions of currency, and would absorb this sum suddenly. But the ordinary business of the country is done by a much more economical use of currency. Look, for example, at the Clearing-House settlements of any given day, and you will find that eighty or ninety millions of debt are paid off by the use of only two or three millions of currency. Thus it appears that as much currency is needful for the transactions attending the sale of thirty millions of gold as would suffice to consummate a vastly greater amount of the ordinary business transactions of the country. Moreover, the currency used by the people in their business does not leave the current of the circulation. It is used over and over again and continues actively to pass from hand to hand. But in the case of money paid into the Treasury it is far otherwise This currency is locked up in the vaults of the government, and depletes for a time the current of the circulating medium of the commupity. If the depletion be great a stringency in the loan market supervenes till equilibrium is restored. It is easy, therefore, to see that comparatively small government transactions in gold, involving the sudden payment of greenbacks into the Treasury, may, by making currency scarce, paralyze the movements of capital, stir up great temporary derangement in the money market, and engender wide-spread mischiefs in those departments of industrial enterprise whose success depends on the easy and equable operation of our financial machinery. When we remember that during three days of one week no less than fifteen millions of gold had to be paid for by purchasers from the government broker, it will not appear surprising that we have had a pinch in the money market. The only wonder that the flutter was not exaggerated till it grow into a panic, as most likely would have been the case had not the Assistant Treasurer at New York, by his skillful arrangements, prevented monetary stringency.

But there were peculiar causəs for our exemption from the influences of this London panic. First, we do not fear the threatened continental war. It is evident that, if the expected war breaks out in Europe, that continent will grow less food than usual. An iminense impulse will thus be given to our raising of breadstuffs and other agricultural and industrial products. The resulting activity in business will benefit our railroad and shipping interests, will impart a higher value to property invested in such enterprises, and will be productive of other important financial advantages. These are some of the reasons on account of which the European war fails to awaken much alarm here. The scene of the conflict is too far off; and, while some of the effects of the struggle would work for our interest, we are so completely isolated from all connection with the belligerents that there is not the slightest danger of our being drawn into the vortex.

Moreover, the fact that our monetary system does not rest on a specie basis is another cause of its stability under the recent shock. If the basis of our currency were liable to be suddenly contracted and disturbed with every sudden demand for coin for exportation, the recent shipments would have spread, throughout the length and breadth of this continent, as much terror as was caused by the most memorable panics our people have ever known. Here we bave one of those compensatory provisions which continually meet us at almost every view we take of any department of human enterprise and achievement. A paper currency not redeemable in coin is a curse to any curreney where it prevails ; but, as we have just seen, the curse is not without its blessing. Our paper money is unsettled and unstable in its value that is its evil-but our paper money system is not liable to derangement from foreign demand for specie-that is its compensating good.

Much has been said about this aspect of our return to specie payments, and some persons are asking with much anxiety whether, wben we do get back to a coin basis, our financial system will be liable to be at any moment shaken by the exportation of coin, as was invariably the case in former times. Two remedies have been proposed. One is that we should pay all our debts to foreigners, and not go in debt any more. This is, of course, Utopian. Probably more than a thousand millions of dollars of foreign capital is in various way, held here, and we are liable to be called on to pay any part of this debt at any time when our creditors want their money. Now, when a panic arises in any foreign money market, some of our creditors there want to sell our securities or draw their bal. ances. The consequence is that the foreign exchanges are likely to run against us, and before long gold has to be shipped from this side. Now, this exported coin formed part of the basis of our domestic currency. In taking it away to pay debts abroad, we deplete our interior currency to supply currency for exterior foreign use.

On this view of the case a plan of some ingenuity has been proposed to keep up specie payments, and yet prevent our home currency being violently contracted and our domestic trade distu, bed whenever our foreign balances run against us. The plan consists of three provisions. First, let the banks of issue be compelled to redeem their notes not in specie but in gold notes. Secondly, let the government issue these notes on deposit of gold and issue no notes which are not represented by gold actually in hand. Thirdly, let the gold notes be legal tender and let a weekly statement be published of the amount outstanding similar to weekly reports of the banks of England and France, and let a minimum and maximum amount be fixed below or above which the outstanding volume of gold notes shall not go. We do not offer this plan as perfect. Indeed, we see several objections to some of its details. But it may, perhaps, suggest a better plan, or be itself susceptible of the requisite modifications. Of course, its adoption requires that the greenbacks should all be called in, and that hereafter nothing should partake of the nature of legal tender except either the standard coin itself or the gold notes which are actually represented by coin on deposit in the National Treasury.

Some such expedient, it is supposed, would give the needful elasticity to our currency, and would enable us at once to preserve the converti. bility of our notes, which is the grand central principle of the Bank of England system; and to preserve our currency without contraction from sympathy with derangements in foreign trade, which is the great recommendation of the system of the Bank of France. It is, perhaps, inevitable that commerce should periodically run into wild inflations, and that financial affairs should lapse into an unsound state ; but the de. rangement of our internal commerce should not follow every European panic, and would not, if some such expedient were adopted. Finally, this disturbance in the London money market shows us that there are decided defects in the English monetary system. Had it been possible, without sacrificing the principle of convertibility, to invest the Bank of England under easier conditions, with the power to do what was allowed to it in the last extremity by the government, there might have been no panic. The banking houses had an abundance of the most desirable securities; but the Bank of England was verging upon the legal limit of its circula: tion, and the securities were consequently of no avail

. There was a dead lock to loans, because the Bank could no longer lend. The effect of the legal restrictions upon the c.rculation of the Bank, is seen in the circunstance that the panic began to subside the moment it was known that the restriction was reinoved, and also in the fact that, in foriner crisis, panic was stayed instantly upon the suspension of the bank restrictions. system needs another feature; in some way disconnecting as much as possible the internal finances of the kingdom from its international exchanges.

COAL IN THE UNITED STATES. WHATEVER may be the future product of the Coal Mines of Great Britain, it is certain that the United States possess a supply which many generations cannot exbaust. The whole extent of the coal area in the United States has been usually divided into four principal coal-fields or tracts, viz.:—The Great Central, Alleghanian or Appalachian coal-field, extending from Tuscaloosa in Alabama, through Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, Western Virginia, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennyslvania, and reappearing in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. This field has been computed to cover within the United States an area of 50,000 to 60,000 square miles of which about 40,000 square miles, or 25,600,000 acres, are considered workable area. It is subdivided into eight minor divisions productive of bituminous coal. The second coal-field occupies the greater part of Illinois and Indiana, and in extent is nearly equal to the first. A third field covers a large portion of Missouri, and the fourth the greater part of the State of Michigan. The Chesterfield bituminous coal-field, a detached district of small area near Richmond, Virginia, contains the oldestworked collieries in America, and for many years furbished the only supply of coal for the seaboard towns. The greater part of the area of workable coal in the bituminous coal-fields above mentioned remains as yet undeveloped. The detached basins of anthracite coal in Pennsylvania, which form one of the most interesting of this great coal-producing territory, though limited in aggregate area, as yet produce considerably more than ali the others put together.

The coal area of the United States, according to Taylor's “Statistics on Coal,” a work published in 1855, was estimated in 1845 to cover 133,132 square miles, or 85,204,480 acres, which was nearly one-fourth of the total area of the twelve States in which the coal formations lay. It was equivalent to nearly three-fourths of the coal areas of the principal coal-producing countries of the world. Of this area 8,397 square miles were on the west side of the Missouri River, and 124,372 square miles east of the Mississippi River, wbilst 437 square miles were occupied by the anthracite deposits of Pennsylvania. More recent estimates (from the report of the Commissioners of the General Land Office) have made the Ainerican coal-fields, so far as they have been developed, to cover nearly 20,000 square miles, or one-tenth the entire area of the kingdom. The coal formations of British America are computed to bave an area of 18,000 square miles.

In 1845 the production of the British coal-fields was set down at 31,500,000 tons annually. The product in 1858 was stated to be upwards of 65,000,000 tons, worih at the pit's mouth 16,700,0001., and in 1863, 86,292,215 tons, valued at 20,572,9451. An eminent geologist estimates the average thickness of the workable coal of Great Britrin at 35 feet, and the total quantity of workable coal at 190,000,000 tons. If the whole area of the productive coal-fields of North America be taken at 200,000 square miles, and the average thickness at 20 feet, Mr. Kennedy calculates that their product will be 4,000,000,000,000 tons. The relative size of the coal measures of the United States and other countries has been made more appreciable by taking the amount of workable coal in

Belgium as 1, then that of the British Islands becomes rather more than 5, that of all Europe 84, and that of North America 3. Professor Rogers, in a work on the coal-bields of the United States as compared with those of Europe, calculates that the United States has 1 square mile of coal field to every 15 square miles of territory; Great Britain 1 to every 30 of surface ; Belgium, 1 to every 22}; and France, 1 to every 200 miles of surface. The relative superficial inagnitude, he observes, of the co' l-fields of the countries possessing coal will be recognised if we compare them by some simple unit of measure. Let this be 100 square miles. In this case-Russia will be represented by 1; Spain, 2; anthracite fields of Pennsylvania, 4; Westphalia and Bohemia, 4 ; Belgium, 5; France, 10; Rhenish Prussia, 10; British Provinces of North America, 17; British Islands, 40; Europe, 75: Pennsylvania, 126; Appalachian coul-fields of the United States, 2,200. Whichever way tbe foregoing figures are taken they clearly represent the enormous coal-producing power and the vast' mineral wealth of North America.

In view of these extensive coal fields in every part of the country it would seem hardly possible that the exhorbitant prices of the last two years could be much longer s'istained. And yet we must remember that our supply at present comes from a very limited region, and is under the control of a few transportation companies. Previous to the war the Pennsylvania product had supplied fuel for half the continent, meeting the requirements of our seaport and frontier towns, and even underselling the colliers of Nova Scotia in the markets of Canada. This was due to the facility with which it was quarried and conveyed to different places. These facilities were steadily increasing. Canals and railroads were extended from New York and other parts of the country to the coal regions of Pennsylvania to bring away their product to now districts. But the demand was also steadily increasing year by year when the war began. The war having at once added largely to that demand in supplying our greatly increased steam marine, and the extensive manufactories which were kept in operation to finish material for military use, which aided by the Government issues of currency immediately gave an upward impulse to prices.

Ibis impulse was aided by the flood of 1862, which suspended operations, and led to the exhaustion of the stocks in hand. These and other causes continued to operate sending prices up as a matter of course till the conclusion of the war; at which time indication appeared of a decline. These indications, however, were doomed to disappointment. The attempt during last season of the colliers of the Lackawanna and Wyoming coal districts to reduce the wages of the miners, were followed by an extensive strike, which enabled the companies to sell their stocks at such enormous profits as to suggest to many the possibility that they had secretly convived at the affair. Certainly the strikers only obtained pepury for their part of the transaction, and the consumers by reason of it have been compelled to pay exorbitant prices during the entire win. ter. There are symptoms now of the approach of better times, and yet we do not look for any permanent change for the better until the financial system of the country is placed in a healther condition, and railroads for the transportation of coal to the different ports of the country where it is required have been multiplied.

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