1835. Ex parte further back. But I am not prepared to draw the line too The rest of the court concurring, the rule was, with this modification, made (a) In the course of the argument it was stated that the opinions of Mr. Preston and of two other eminent conveyancers had been taken upon the question. The former learned gentleman was Absolute (a). of opinion that the abstract proproperly embraced the deeds of 1737 the two latter, that the leases of 1761 and the will of Lady Chichester (1773) were sufficient. Wednesday, In the indorse ment on a writ of summons, the residence of the attorney stated thus No. 1, Clifford's Inn Passage, Fleet Street, in the city of London," without mentioning the parish is suffi cient. ARDEN and Another v. GARRY. THE defendant was served with a writ of summons, Humfrey, on a former day, upon an affidavit stating that Clifford's Inn Passage was in the parish of St. Dunstan in the West, obtained a rule calling upon the plaintiffs to shew cause why the writ of summons should not be set aside for irregularity, on the ground that the indorsement was not in compliance with the 2 Will. 4, c. 0 39, s. 12, and the schedule No. 1, which provides that Talfourd, Serjeant, contra, referred to Engleheart v. Gray's Inn, London," and "Gray's Inn Square, Lon- Humfrey, in support of his rule.-The cases cited are wholly inapplicable: Gray's Inn is extra-parochial, and though, strictly speaking, it is not within the city of London, it is within the ambit of that which is in common parlance styled London. TINDAL, C. J.-I think this indorsement is sufficient. The statute intended to provide for cities, towns, or parishes by themselves. To favour the construction contended for on the part of the defendant, we must read "and" for "or." VAUGHAN, J.—I am not aware of any city that does not contain several parishes. The words of the statute are exactly complied with by giving the name of the city, or the town, or the parish. The rest of the court concurring Rule discharged, with costs (a). (a) See Yardley v. Jones, 4 D. 45. 1835. ARDEN บ. GARRY. 1835. Wednesday, trial before the sheriff is given for a day not fixed for trying issues, is no SAME v. SAME. That a notice of WILDE, Serjeant, in Michaelmas Term, obtained a rule calling upon the plaintiffs to shew cause why the notice of trial given in this cause should not be set aside for irregularity, with costs. The irregularities complained of were that no issue (properly so called) had been delivered and that the notice was given for a day which the sheriff before whom the cause was to be tried had not fixed for trying issues. ground for moving to set it aside. In causes to be tried before the sheriff, the issue must be delivered as in other cases. Talfourd, Serjeant, shewed cause. He submitted that the last objection was not one that the party could take on motion: the proper course being to treat the notice as a nullity. [To this the court assented.] As to the first point, he contended that in causes directed to be tried by the sheriff, the issue need not be delivered in the same manner as is required in causes in the superior courts referring to the 59th rule of Hilary Term, 2 Will. 4, which provides, that, " in all cases where the plaintiff in pleading concludes to the country, the plaintiff's attorney may give notice of trial at the time of delivering his replication or other subsequent pleading; and, in case issue shall afterwards be joined, such notice shall be available; but, if issue be not joined on such replication or other subsequent pleading, and the plaintiff shall sign judgment for want thereof, and forthwith give notice of executing a writ of inquiry, such notice shall operate from the time thatnotice of trial was given as aforesaid." Wilde, Serjeant, in support of his rule.-There can be no reason why the defendant in a cause to be tried before a sheriff, should not have the same information, and conveyed to him in the same form, as in the case of a trial at Nisi Prius. Great confusion and uncertainty would inevitably result from the court holding that the delivery of the issue may be dispensed with: the mode of proceeding in these inferior jurisdictions is in general already sufficiently loose. TINDAL, C. J.-The non-delivery of the issue is clearly an irregularity. The defendant is entitled to have the proceedings fairly copied before him. The schedules, Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, to the general rules of Hilary Term, 4 Will. 4, give the forms of the issue and proceedings where the cause is directed to be tried before the sheriff: and these were not intended to be a dead letter. The rest of the court concurring— Rule absolute, with costs (a). (a) See the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, ss. 17, 18, by the latter of which it is provided that "the sheriff, or his deputy or judge, presiding at the trial of such issue or issues, shall have the like powers with re- 1835. ARDEN v. GARRY. INNES v. LEVI. THIS was an action of debt against a sheriff's officer for extortion, under the statute 32 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1, which (amongst other things) provides, that "no sheriff, undersheriff, bailiff, &c., shall demand, take, or receive, or cause to be demanded, taken, or received, directly or indirectly, any other or greater sum or sums of money than is or shall be by law allowed to be taken or demanded for any arresting or taking, or for detaining, or waiting till the person or persons so arrested or in custody shall have given an appearance or bail," &c. In the present case it appeared that the plaintiff was arrested within the distance of three miles from the sheriff's office; and that the fee Wednesday, The only fee the officer from a party arrested, is 4d., the prescribed by the statute 23 Hen. 6, c. 9: if he take more, he is liable to be sued for the penalty imposed for extortion by the 32 Geo. 2, c. 28. 1835. INNES v. LEVI. demanded and received from him was a fee of 11. One of the masters of the King's Bench, who had formerly been in extensive practice as an attorney, and who was called as a witness on the part of the plaintiff, proved that, when the arrest took place within three miles of the office, the officer was entitled to a caption fee of 10s. 6d., and to 17. 1s. when the distance exceeded three miles: and, on his cross-examination he stated that he had very many times paid 17. or 17. 1s. to the officer on behalf of a defendant, and had the same allowed on taxation. On the part of the plaintiff it was contended that the only fee by law payable by the party arrested to the officer, was 4d., the fee provided by the statute 23 Hen. 6, c. 9. Bosanquet, J., before whom the cause was tried at the last Sitting in London during the present term, told the jury that he thought the fee taken by the defendant on this occasion was larger than the law allowed. A verdict having been taken for the plaintiff for the amount of the penalty Bompas, Serjeant, on a former day, moved for a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that the fee taken was a legal fee; or for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.-The fee in question is totally distinct from the fee allowed as between party and partythe caption fee, which is payable in the the party who puts the sheriff in motion. first instance by This fee is given on the defendant's being admitted to bail (which was formerly a matter that rested entirely in the discretion of the sheriff), and is clearly established by law. In Martin v. Bell, 6 M. & Sel. 220, it was held that the table of fees prescribed by the statute 32 Geo. 2, c. 28, does not apply to the sheriff's fee for an arrest, and that the evidence of what the law allows is what upon taxation by the master it is the practice to allow. And in Martin v. Slade, 2 New Rep. 59, it was held, that, in an action on the same statute, for penalties, against a sheriff's officer for taking a larger |