PART II called a continual claim, followed by an action within a T. 6 CH. 1. year after such entry or claim. In the case of an abatement or intrusion, the rightful owner, that is, the heir, remainderman, or reversioner, has but a constructive seisin or seisin in law prior to and at the time of the abatement or intrusion, and the effect of the abatement or intrusion is to give an adverse possession to the abator or intruder, so as to drive the rightful owner to have recourse to his right of entry or claim and action, as in the case of a disseisin. But if, in the case of lands of freehold tenure, such entry or claim was not made, and the land was suffered to descend immediately to the heir of the abator, intruder, or disseisor (without dower or curtesy interposed), and the rightful owner was under no disability, such as infancy, coverture, unsoundness of mind, imprisonment, or absence beyond the seas, and, in the case of disseisin, five years of peaceable possession by the disseisor himself followed the wrongful act, this descent cast (as it was termed), "tolled," or took away the right of entry from the rightful owner, and his estate was then divested even of the constructive seisin or seisin in law, and converted into a mere right of action; but the rightful owner still retained the true right of possession, as well as the right of property or ownership, though the heir of the abator, intruder, or disseisor had an apparent right of possession and the actual ownership, until the result of an action deciding that the property or ownership was in the rightful owner. If no such entry or continual claim was made, followed by an action within the year, the lapse of a period of twenty years after the accrual of the right of entry, even without any descent cast, was sufficient to convert a right of entry into a right of action, but the rightful owner still retained the true right of possession as well as the right of ownership or property, though the abator, intruder, or disseisor had an apparent right of possession and the actual ownership, T. 6, CH. 1. until the result of an action deciding that it was in the PART III. rightful owner. But the period for entry did not begin to run till all prior estates, including terms of years and other chattel interests, were out of the way. If a certain number of years, which varied from thirty to fifty years, according to the kind of action which might be brought, were suffered to elapse without an action, the right of possession, as well as the actual possession, was lost, and there then remained nothing but a right of property, or a mere right as it was called, as distinguished from a right both of property and of possession. And if sixty years were suffered to elapse without an appropriate action, the ownership altogether ceased; the law no longer allowing the rightful owner to enforce his claim (a). 1471. the phrase "put to a right." It may be here useful to remark, that the being con- Meaning of verted into a right of action, as distinguished from a right of entry, is what is generally meant by the estate being "put or turned to a right;" but that expression sometimes signifies the being converted into a right of entry, and at other times into a mere right of property, which, though indeed a right of action, could only be enforced by a droitural, and not by a possessory action (b). 1472. allowed. The remedy by entry took place in the case of abate- Where entry ment, intrusion, and disseisin only. Upon a discontinuance or deforcement the owner of the estate had only a right of action (e), to which the same observations are applicable, as to the right of action which existed in the case of abatement, intrusion, and disseisin. 1473. If an owner of freehold iand dies intestate, and another (a) Compare 2 Bl.Com. 195-199; 3 Bl. Com. 168-9, 175-180, 196; 1 Cruise T. 29, c. 1, § 3-12, 16, 17; 1 Cruise T. 1, § 20-24; 3 Steph. 480-2; Fearne, 286 & n. (e); Burton, c. 1, § 6, particularly § 363 -377, 383, 411; see also § 1310; Litt. s. 385-398, 402, 405; Co. Litt. lib. 3, c. 7; Co. Litt. 237 b, (b) See Co. Litt. 327 b, 332 b, T. 6, CH. 1. PART III. person wrongfully enters, devises it to others and dies, and the heiress at law also dies, but having devised to another "all real estate (if any) of which she might die seised,” she did not become seised in fact or in law, and therefore the property did not pass under her devise (a). 1473a. Descent does not In the case of copyholds, a descent does not strengthen strengthen the right arising from mere possession, by taking away case of copy the entry of the more worthy claimant (b). 1474. right, in the holds. (a) Leach v. Jay, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 496; 9 Ch. D. (Ap.) 42. (b) Burton, § 1310. CHAPTER II. OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27 (a), [and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 (b).] [THE sections of stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, with the exception of seven which are repealed, must now be read and construed with those of the stat. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, intituled "An Act for the further Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real Property," which was passed on the 7th of August, 1874, but did not come into opera (a) By s. 1, it is enacted, "that the words and expressions hereinafter mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall in this Act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the Act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows: (that is to say,) the word 'land' shall extend to manors, messuages, and all other corporeal hereditamentswhatsoever, and also to tithes (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole), and also to any share, estate, or interest in them or any of them, whether the same shall be a freehold or chattel interest, and whether freehold or copyhold, or held according to any other tenure; and the word rent' shall extend to all heriots, and to all services and suits for which a distress may be made, and to all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land (except moduses or compositions belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole); and PART III. T. 6, CH. 2. tion clause. 'the person through whom another Interpretaperson is said to claim,' shall mean any person by, through, or under, or by the act of whom, the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or interest claimed as heir, issue in tail, tenant by the curtesy of England, tenant in dower, successor, special or general occupant, executor, administrator, legatee, husband, assignee, appointee, devisee, or otherwise, and also any person who was entitled to an estate or interest to which the person so claiming, or some person through whom he claims, became entitled as lord by escheat; and the word 'person' shall extend to a body politic, corporate, or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons, as well as an individual; and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male." (b) See Appendix. T. 6, CH. 2. PART III. [tion until the 1st of January, 1879, and enacts by s. 9, “From and after the commencement of this Act all the provisions of the Act passed in the session of the third and fourth years of the reign of his late Majesty King William the Fourth, chapter twenty-seven, except those contained in the several sections thereof next hereinafter mentioned, shall remain in full force, and shall be construed together with this Act, and shall take effect as if the provisions herein before contained were substituted in such Act for the provisions contained in the sections thereof numbered two, five, sixteen, seventeen, twenty-three, twenty-eight, and forty respectively (which several sections from and after the commencement of this Act shall be repealed), and as if the term of six years had been mentioned instead of the term of ten years in the section of the said Act numbered eighteen, and the period of twelve years had been mentioned in the said section eighteen, instead of the period of twenty years." 1475. General rule as to re covery of land or rent at law. By s. 1 of stat. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action or suit, to recover any land or rent, but within twelve years after the right to make such entry or distress or to bring such action or suit first accrued (a). The word rent in this section, as in the repealed second section of stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, would seem not to include rents under leases, but to be used in the sense of rent-charge (b). 1476. This section does not operate to prevent the tithe owner from recovering tithes (which by the first section of stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, are included in the expression "land") as chattels, from the occupier just as the repealed second section of the last-mentioned Act did not so operate; but it is confined to cases where there are two parties, each claiming an adverse estate in the tithes. Thus if a person (b) Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113. (a) Sands to Thompson, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 614. |