under due restraints) shall not alien the same, this condition is void for repugnancy, and the gift or sale is absolute (a). And where alienation of a term for years is prohibited by a lessor, the original limitation must not be to the lessee and his assigns; for that would be a contradiction (b). 240. Personal property cannot be given for life, any more than absolutely, without the power of alienation being incident to the gift, so long as the estate or interest remains in the owner, except in the case of a gift for a woman's separate use (c). But a condition in a lease for years, that the landlord shall re-enter on the tenant's becoming a bankrupt, is good (d). And the owner of property may on alienation make the interest of the alienee determinable on bankruptcy, insolvency, or alienation, by means of a proviso for reverter or cesser, or a condition, or a special limitation, or a conditional limitation (e). Thus, where there is a limitation over of a life interest for the benefit of the children of the tenant for life, in case he should in any manner charge, assign, incumber, or anticipate the income or any part thereof, or if the same or any part thereof should by operation of law, either by bankruptcy, insolvency, or any other ways or means whatsoever, be assigned or become payable to any other person or persons whatsoever, or be or become (a) 1 Pres. Shep. T. 131, 176; Co. Litt. 223 b, and n. 1. (b) Burton, § 852. (c) Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Barton v. Briscoe, Jac. 603; Turner, V.-C., in Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare, 480; 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 30; see infra, Part IV., T. 1, c. 3, s. 5, iii. (d) 2 Cruise T. 13, c. 1, § 50. (e) Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 433; Burton, § 737; supra, par. 165-171; 11 Jarm. & Byth. by Sweet, 486; 2 Spence's Eq. Jur. 89, PART II. T. 1, CH. 5. T. 1, CH. 5. PART II applicable to or for any other purpose than for the prospective maintenance of the tenant for life, such a limitation over is valid (a). And if the income of a fund is made payable to a person for his life," or until he should do or suffer any act" whereby it should become payable to another person, his life interest will be forfeited, if a judgment creditor of his obtains a charging order against the fund (b). But where the terms of the prohibition are such, that they may refer only to an assignment or charge by the act of the party himself, and not to an assignment by operation of law, or to an act of insolvency not causing a cessio bonorum, it has sometimes been held, that the property will not go over on an assignment by operation of law, or on such an act of insolvency, but, on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the tenant for life, will pass to his assignees (c). And where the limitation over is substantially a provision for him alone, or for him jointly with others, whether through the instrumentality of a discretionary power in trustees or otherwise, it will be invalid, and his assignees or creditors will be entitled during his life to the whole or to his share, as the case may be (d). 241. Although, as we have seen, the owner of property may limit it in favour of another, so as to render the interest of such other person determinable on his bankruptcy, yet the owner of property cannot so limit it in favour of himself, as to render his own interest determinable on his bank (a) Yarnold v. Moorhouse,1 Russ. & My. 364; see also Joel v. Mills, 3 K. & J. 458; White v. Chitty, L. R. 1 Eq. 372; Lloyd v. Lloyd, L. R. 2 Eq. 722; Billson v. Crofts, L. R. 15 Eq. 314. (b) Roffey v. Bent, L. R. 3 Eq. (c) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 25- Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare, 475; Brandon v. Ashton, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 24; Churchill v. Marks, 1 Coll. 441; Graham v. Lee, 23 Beav. 388; Arison v. Holmes, 1 Johns. & H. 530, 540, and cases stated in the reporter's note to p. 540; Townsend v. Early (No. 2), 34 Beav. 25; Montefiore v. Behrens, L. R. 1 Eq. 171; Montefiore v. Enthoven, L. R 5 Eq. 35. (d) 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 794. ruptcy, and thereby defeat his creditors. And on the same principle a provision in a deed of partnership, that, in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of a partner, his share should go over to his co-partners, is void, as being in fraud of the bankrupt laws (a). 242. PART II. T. 1, CH. 5. conditions, An assignment of arrears of income is not within the meaning of a proviso of cesser of income in a will, in case the party entitled should attempt or endeavour to anticipate or otherwise assign or incumber the income (b). 243. Conditions are void if they are contrariant in themselves; Contrariant as in the case of a proviso for determining an estate tail as if the tenant in tail were dead, without adding any such words as "and there were a general failure of issue inheritable under the entail" (c). 244. Conditions are void if they are uncertain or ambiguous; Urt as in the case of a proviso against advisedly and effectually attempting, etc., to alien (c). 245. Uncertain or am biguous con conditions. Conditions are void if they are impossible at the time of Impossible their creation, or afterwards become so, by the act of God, by the act of law, or by the act of the party who is entitled to the benefit of them (d). If there are two things, in the copulative, required by the condition to be done, both must be done, otherwise the condition will not be performed, unless one of them becomes impossible by the act of God, or by the act or default of the opposite party (e). But where a condition consists of two parts, in the disjunctive, and the party has an election which of them to perform, both being possible at the time of creating the condition, but one of them afterwards becomes impossible by the act of God, this will in some cases excuse the performance of both (f). 246. (a) Whitmore v. Mason, 2 Johns. & Hem. 204. (b) In re Stultz's Trusts, 4 D. M. & G. 404. (c) Smith's Executory Interests annexed to Fearne, § 696. (d) Ib. Co. Litt. 206 a, b, 209 a. (ƒ) 2 Cruise T. 13, c. 2. § 24 ; Co. PART II. T. 1, CH. 3. Too remote possibility. Condition not to dis. A condition is void if the contingency is too remote a possibility. It would seem that "a limitation may depend on any number of contingencies, even though they may be engrafted on each other, so long as each amounts to a common probability, and so long as they may, according to common probability, grow out of, or be connected with, each other, in the manner specified by the instrument containing the limitation. But a limitation is invalid. when made to depend on a single contingency, if it is made to depend on too remote a possibility, or when made to depend on two contingencies, if, according to common probability, they do not grow out of, or are not connected with, each other, in the manner specified" (a). 247. It is a valid condition in a will of real estate, that, if pute a will. the devisee shall dispute the will, or the testator's competency to make it, or shall refuse, when required by the executors, to confirm it, the disposition in favour of such devisee shall be revoked, and the property shall go over (b). 248. It has been said, however, that in the case of personal estate, there is this distinction, that where a testator imposes on a legatee a condition, that he shall not dispute the will, such a condition is regarded as in terrorem only; and therefore a legatee will not, by having contested the validity or effect of the will, forfeit his legacy, where there was probabilis causa litigandi, unless the legacy is given over upon breach of the condition (c). 249. From the cases in which the condition is that the legatee shall not dispute a will, and in which there is no gift over on disputing it, we must distinguish those in (a) Smith's Executory Interests annexed to Fearne, § 697-8. See also 2 Pres. Shep. T. 515. (b) 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 47; Cooke v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727; 14 Sim. 493. (c) See 2 Jarm. Wills, 2nd ed. 46; 1 Rop. Leg. by White, 795; Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90; Lloyd v. Spillett, 3 P. W. 344; Morris v. Burroughes, 1 Atk. 471; Spurling, 2 P. W. 526. Clearer v. T. 1, CH. 5. which a legacy is given upon an express condition to PART II. release the testator's estate, or not to disturb the trustees of the will, and there is no gift over. For, in this case, the legatee is put to his election by virtue of the express condition to release or not to disturb the trustees, whether there is a gift over or not (a). 250. And there are many other cases in which a legatee is put to his election, without any express condition, upon the principle that no one shall claim under and in opposition to the same instrument; a tacit condition being deemed to exist in such cases, that the person taking do not disturb the disposition which his benefactor has made (b). 251. Where there is a condition not to dispute a will, but there is no gift over on breach of the condition, such a condition is open to the construction that the testator's object is only to restrain vexatious litigation, and not to debar the legatee from asserting his right where there is probabilis causa litigandi. In such cases, therefore, the Court is not actually driven to reject the condition, but merely puts such a construction upon it, that the legatee does not forfeit his legacy merely by the asserting of a reasonable claim. This constitutes a distinction between such cases, and those cases where the condition is to release in which the condition is incapable of being so explained away. 252. The construction, however, which imputes to the testator an intention merely to restrain vexatious litigation, could not be put on any higher footing than mere conjecture. 253. But the fact is, it was not founded in any presumable intention, but in an imitation of the in terrorem doctrine of legacies given subject to a condition subsequent in partial restraint of marriage; a doctrine that originated in |