Had they been the legislators of the world, we should never have seen many of the public evils that have appeared in it. It was thought formerly, for example, a glorious thing to attempt to drive Paganism from the Holy Land; but Quakers would never have joined in any of the crusades for its expulsion. It has been long esteemed, again, a desideratum in politics, that among nations differing in strength and resources a kind of balance of power should be kept up; but Quakers would never have engaged in any one war to preserve it. It has been thought, again, that it would contribute to the happiness of the natives of India, if the blessings of the British constitution could be given them instead of their own; but Quakers would never have taken possession of their territories for the accomplishment of such a good. It has been long thought, again, a matter of great political importance, that our West-India settlements should be cultivated by African labourers; but Quakers would never have allowed a slave-trade for such a purpose. It has been thought, again, and it is still thought a desirable thing, that our property should be secured from the petty depredations of individuals; but Quakers would never have consented to capital punishments for such an end. In short, few public evils would have arisen among mankind, if statesmen had adopted the system, upon which the Quakers reason in political affairs, or if they had concurred with an ancient Grecian philosopher, in condemning to destruction the memory of the man, who first made a distinction between expediency and moral right.

That this trait of reasoning upon principle, regardless of the consequences, is likely to be a feature in the character of the Society, we are warranted in pronouncing, when we discover no fewer than three circumstances in the constitution of it, which may be causes in producing it.*

This trait seems, in the first place, to be the direct and legitimate offspring of that explained in the last chapter. For every time an individual is called upon to bear his testimony by suffering, whether in the case of a refusal to comply with the laws or with the customs and fashions of the land, he is called upon to refer to his own conscience, against his own temporal interest and against the opinion of the world. The moment he gives up principle for policy in the course of his reasoning upon such occasions, then he does as many others do, that is, he submits to the less inconvenience; and then he ceases to be a Quaker. But while he continues to bear his testimony, it is a proof that he makes expediency give way to what he imagines to be right. The bearing of testimony, where it is conscientiously done, is therefore the parent, as it is also the bulwark and guardian, of reasoning upon principle. It throws out a memento, whenever it is practised, and habituates the subject of it to reason in this manner.

But this trait is nourished and supported, again, by other causes; and, first, by the influence, which

* The Sierra Leone Company, which was founded for laudable purposes, might have been filled by Quakers; but when they understood that there was to be a fort and depôt of arms in the settlement, they declined becoming proprietors.

the peculiar customs of the Quakers must occasionally have upon their minds. their minds. An individual cannot go out of doors but he is reminded of his own singularities, or 'of his difference in a variety of respects from his fellow-citizens. Now every custom, in which he is singular, whether it be that of dress, or of language, or of address, or any other, is founded in his own mind on moral principle, and in direct opposition to popular opinion and applause. He is therefore perpetually reminded, in almost all his daily habits, of the two opposite systems of reasoning, and is perpetually called upon, as it were, to refer to the principles, which originally made thedifference between him and another citizen of the world.

Neither has the discipline of the Society a less tendency to the production of the quality in question. For the business, which is transacted in the monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings, is transacted under the deliberation of grave and serious men, who consider themselves as frequently under the divine influence, or as spiritually guided, on such occasions. In such assemblies, it would be thought strange, if any sentiment were uttered, which savoured of expediency in opposition to moral right. The youth, therefore, who are present, see no other determination of any question than by a religious standard. Hence these meetings operate as schools, in which they are habituated to reason upon principle, and to the exclusion of all worldly considerations, which may suggest themselves in the discussion of any point.

CHAPTER VII.

A fifth trait is, that they have an extraordinary independence of mind-this probable, because it must be the result of the former trait-because likely to be produced by their discipline-by their peculiar customs and by their opinions on the supposed dignity of situations in life—because, again, they are not vulnerable by the seduction of Governments

-or by the dominion of the Church—or by the power of fashion, and of the opinion of the world.

THE next trait, conspicuous in the character of the Society, and which is nearly allied to the former, is that of Independence of Mind.

This feature is of long standing, having been coeval with the Society itself. It was observed by Cromwell, that "he could neither win the Quakers by money, nor by honours, nor by places, as, he could other people." A similar opinion is entertained of them at the present day. For of all people it is generally supposed that they are the least easily worked upon, or the least liable to be made tools or instruments in the hands of others. Who, for example, could say on any electioneering occasion, whatever his riches might be, that he could command their votes?

There will be no difficulty in believing, this to be a real feature in the character of the Society; for when men are accustomed to refer matters to their

reason, and to reason upon principle, they will always have an independence of mind, from a belief that they are right. And wherever it is a maxim with them not to do evil that good may come, they will have a similar independence, from a consciousness that they have never put themselves into the power of the world. Hence this independence of mind must be a result of the trait explained in the former chapter.

But in looking into the constitution of the Quákers, we shall find it full of materials for the pra

duction of this noble trait.

Their discipline has an immediate tendency to produce it; for in no community does a man feel him so independent as a man. A Quaker is called upon in his own Society to the discharge of important offices. He sits as a representative, a legislator, and a judge. In looking round him he finds all equal in privileges, but none superior to himself.

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Their peculiar customs have the same tendency; for they teach them to value others, who are not of the Society, by no other standard than that, by which they estimate themselves. They neither take off their hats, nor bow, nor scrape. In their speech they abstain from the use of flattering words and of titles. In their letters they never subscribe themselves the humble servants of any one. They never use, in short, any action or signature, which, serving as a mark of elevation to others, has any influence towards the degradation of themselves.

Their opinions also upon the supposed dignity of