the dec sion of the court in a particular case. He had known the party come to Harrisburg, swearing nothing less than destruction against the judge who had decided the case. He had seen him coming there winter after winter, asking for an impeachment against him, until, finally, he has succeeded in wearing the judge out of patience, and induced him to send in his resignation.

He had known a man who lived in the same district as the judge who had decided against him, (and about whose case he knew neither the merits nor the demerits) swear vengeance against him for so doing.

Now, these were facts, and this was the state of things we were desirous to have reformed. But gentlemen on the other side, advocated such alterations of the constitution, as would contiuue the evil of which he had spoken, if not make it greater than it now was. Yes! gentlemen were

now for a limited tenure.

He begged the attention of the convention to one further observation. Delegates had not come to that convention to destroy the tenure of office of the county courts by the will of the people. He begged gentlemen to give the people an opportunity of judging between the two systems. wished them to see whether it was the tenure of office that had produced the evils complained of.

If they believe that a change in the tenure of office would remove the evils, they might, at least, leave the supreme court alone, and let the people have an opportunity of judging of the two systems. Let the people decide for themselves whether they will have a limited tenure for the supreme court, as well as for all the other courts. He entertained no doubt as to what conclusion they would come.

Now, he would ask, why they would refuse to have a permanent tenure for the county courts? Why they will refuse to submit the question to the test of public opinion, and leave the people to choose? Let the experiment be tried, and we would soon be convinced which of the systems Iwould be best. As to himself, he had no fears in regard to the result. He was not to be charged with being unwilling to trust the freemen of Pennsylvania, with being opposed to allowing them an opportunity of exercising their judgment. He wished, as he had already said, to leave the question to them-to submit it to them, which of the two tenures they like best.

He would not detain the convention many minutes longer, as he had only a few words to say. He knew that on this occasion, there were not men wanting who thought that all that was said by a professional man-a member of the bar-against the proposed change, ought to go for nothing, because he was supposed to be biassed-to be prejudiced-to acting under influences which prevents him from seeing the matter in its true light.

He (Mr. M.) knew it to be in vain to attempt to remove a feeling of this sort, which prevailed among certain men. He, therefore, would not attempt it.

What he had said, he had said in all the sincerity of his heart. He believed, as he lived, that by the cutting down of the executive patronage and the making of this great change in the judicial system of Pennsylvania, a deadly blow was aimed at the roots of this government.

With respect to the change proposed to be made in the judicial department, he knew the members of the bar to be divided, at least, in this body. And, although gentlemen here might be told that what a lawyer says goes for nothing, still his (Mr. M's) reliance was in the people, who, he trusted would not be so blinded-so misled as to imagine that the change would have the effect, as some gentlemen contended, of restoring the purity of this government.

In his opinion, no surer step could be taken of destroying it, much less of restoring it. Here was an attempt made to destroy that which rendered every thing else secure under this government. However free the executive might be, unless the judiciary was equally free, what, he asked, was protected? What was secure? Neither life, liberty, nor property. sincerely believed, that when this question of a change in the tenure of the judges should be submitted to the people, they would be brought to see it in its true light.

He

He again repeated, that he was anxious to leave the people to try the experiment as to the two systems.

He trusted, then, that a majority of this convention would be found in favor of adopting this course. But, if there should not be, he at least would have the consolation of knowing that he had done his duty. He knew that there were some men who were not able to do a thing, because lacking moral courage. He did not profess to have more moral courage himself than most men; but he could say that he had given, and would always give, his vote according to his opinions. He saw no moral courage in a man having to give a vote founded on his best judgment. But, those he admitted to possess moral courage who could resist the popular cry, when satisfied that it was in error-who, seeing that the changes proposed to be made, were fraught with evil, could refuse to lend his sanction to them, despite of every consideration to the contrary.

He did not say-nay, he did not believe, there were any men present who would lend themselves to do that which they, in their conscience, believe to be wrong and improper.

If it should happen that a majority of this convention should refuse to give the people an opportunity of judging between the two systems, we should not only have violated their rights, but have prevented them from having an independent judiciary to decide upou their grievances.

Mr. Scorr, of Philadelphia, rose and addressed the convention. After making two or three remarks, which were very indistinctly heard by the reporter, he said that he was glad to see that a sentiment of humanity had found its way to the bosoms of the members of this convention. He saw all very clearly-scattered before his eyes-dressed in all the habiliments of mourning. The block was there-the axe was there. And, he believed that in a few moments, the body of the constitution, so far as the judicial branch of it was concerned, would be lying there. He believed that in a few moments, the bleeding body of the constitution would be there immolated and destroyed. If no one else would, he would avail himself of the few moments grace that still remained to the victim, to raise his voice in its behalf, weak and feeble though it may be in these halls; so, that when the people hereafter come to pass on the actions of this convention (if he

was successful in his efforts) they might say we had, at least, left some few remnants of the constitution of 1790. He proposed to address a few remarks to the democrats of this body, and to the democrats of the state of Pennsylvania-to that party in this house and out of it, who go, as they say, for the sovereignty of the people, and for the sovereignty of the laws. He believed that in consistency with their own principles, they were bound to vote not only for the amendment of his colleague (Mr. Meredith) or against the whole section as it stands. He would call the attention of the convention and of the people of the commonwealth not merely to the effect of the change of tenure upon the judiciary itself,-but also, to the utter and total change in the whole frame of their government which results from the combined effect of the change of the judicial tenure and of the mode of appointment. What is the change which has been produced in the whole frame of our government? You have now an executive, elected by a majority of the people, whose business it is to superintend to the due execution of the laws; you have a legislature, whose business it is to enact your laws; and you have a judiciary appointed by your executive, who is to appoint your judges, but who from the instant of that appointment, loses all control over those judges. A man whom he has placed on the judgment seat, from the moment he has signed his commission, he remains to him an utter and entire stranger. There is your clear, beautiful distribution of powers-securing to every man safety, liberty, and law. What is it under your alteration? You elect your governor, and by and with the consent of the senate, you appoint your judges for ten or fifteen years. Twice in the active life of a man, must the whole judiciary of the commonwealth be exposed to change at the will of the executive and the senate. Now what is the influence of this on the frame of your government. I say, and I declare it to the people of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, that this change in the democratie government of Pennsylvania, is turning it into an oligarchy, into the worst of all possible forms of government ever known on the face of the earth,-worse than a monarchy-worse than an aristocracy-worse than the despotism of a single man, whose appetite is generally satiate with one or two victims of passion. This oligarchy is composed of the governor of Pennsylvania on one hand, and of the senate on the other, who elect your judges four times in the course of their natural life. Who, I ask, will elect your judges? Will it be the governor of this commonwealth? No, it will be the senate; for, it is by and with the advice and consent of the senate, that appointments are to be made. And, those who look for justice must go a humble suitor, not to the executive for executive favor, but to the senators from every territorial district in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania for appointments.

Will it be the senate of thirty-three men who will appoint your judges? Will it be even that body of thirty-three men? or will it be that great overruling spirit which has commanded the senate and which hereafter may command the senate.

Your power of appointment would be in the breast of the man who can rule the passions of the people, and control the will of your senate chamber. There lies your power of appointment; and thence will he diffuse a spirit of dependent and blind subserviency with the judicial bench, till that spirit shall pervade every section of your state.

The judge will know that through the senator of the particular county, he has obtained his office. Suppose he should be subservient to the gov ernor. It is infinitely less degrading than when the subserviency is upon an oligarchy of thirty-three men, having the control and influence of every county in the commonwealth. In such a state of things, the judge will be free and independent on no bench. Where ever he may go, in whatever county of the state he may assume his seat on the bench of judgment, he knows that he is constantly watched by a power to which in a few short years, he must again bow his head for the means of obtaining a re-appointment to his office.

Mr. SCOTT here gave way to a motion to adjourn, which was agreed to. And the convention adjourned until half past 3 o'clock this afternoon.

The convention resumed the second reading of the report of the committee to whom was referred the fifth article of the constitution, as reported by the committee of the whole.

The amendment to the second section of the said report being again under consideration,

Mr. SCOTT rose, and resumed his remarks, as follows:

Mr. President: When the convention adjourned this morning, I was speaking on the abolition of the tenure of good behaviour, as taken in connexion with what was already done in allowing the senate to participate in the election of the judicial officers, and I was saying that it would create an oligarchy in the commonwealth.

The senate is a body which never dies. I know that, theoretically, the same remark may be made of the house of representatives; that is to say -there is always a house of representatives existing-but the house of representatives of one year may, and often does, find itself retained during the successive year. The office, however, expires at the end of a year, and there is no continuation of it. How does the case stand with your senate ? Two-thirds of the senators always come in and continue in power from year to year. Even under the new constitution, you change one third of the senators every year, so that the passions or the prejudices which might find their way into that body in the year 1840, may run through the senate of forty one, two and three. There is a continuation -a succession of feeling, and a transmission of it from body to body and from period to period.

It is a very remarkable fact, that while in Great Britain, they are grad.

ually breaking down the power of their oligarchy-of their house of lords, which is their senate-we are endeavoring, in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by this representative convention, which assembled, among other things, for the purpose of reducing executive patronage—we, I say, are endeavoring to build up an oligarchical power.

The senate of Pennsylvania-under this new constitution which we are about to submit to the people, if that constitution should be ratified-will be placed in such power that, so far as power is concerned, I would rather be a leading senator of the state of Pennsylvania, than a peer of Great Britain. Compare the two. What do you find the peer of Great Britain to be ? He is a man possessed of great wealth and hereditary powersitting in a body which at this time can scarcely stand against the repeated assaults made upon it by the house of commons ;-sitting in a body which even now is tottering to its fall. Compare such a man to a senator of Pennsylvania-to what a senator of Pennsylvania will be, under this new constitution, with all the power and authority which you are thus about to pour into his lap. There is no comparision between them in point of authority-there is no comparison between them in point of personal influence. Your new senator will be elevated to a higher pinnacle than that on which the peer of Great Britain stands. Yet this is what you aim at, when you give to the senate the authority to control the judicial appointments of your commonwealth. The manner in which the spirit of dependence in a judiciary thus created, will infuse itself into private life, has been ably descanted upon by another member of this body, but with reference solely to the supposed control of executive influence. For my own part, I conceive that the danger to be apprehended from that source, is infin itely less than that which will ensue as the results of this vast senatorial influence.

What is the influence of your executive? It is that of a single man—a man who is to be removed from power at the expiration of a certain time; and, therefore, a man with whom controversies, if they exist at all, may be one or two in the course of his term-which, however, are not very likely

to occur.

What will be the effect of senatorial influence? Your senators live in every county and all of them are capable of exercising some influence upon the minds of those who are dependent on that body for office; an influence resulting either from present power, or the prospect of future favor. How easy will it be for a prominent or ambitious senator to perpetuate the existence of his power in that body. His own constitnents or district may send him two terms, and his friends or relations may succeed him; and thus the machine of power may be kept in constant existence-almost from generation to generation. You can assign no limit-you can fix no period at which that power shall terminate.

But there is another point of view in which this question is to be regarded. The power which you thus propose to bestow, will exercise a deep

influence in controversies of a different character from those which have reference to private life. Your judicial officers are constantly and daily engaged in the decision of political controversies; and there are such controversies of importance which can be brought for decision before no other tribunal, save before a judicial tribunal. I recollect, within the las